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Abstract
In the Internet of Things (IoT), everyday objects are equipped with the ability to
compute and communicate. These smart things have invaded the lives of everyday
people, being constantly carried or worn on our bodies, and entering into our
homes, our healthcare, and beyond. This has given rise to wireless networks of
smart, connected, always-on, personal things that are constantly around us, and
have unfettered access to our most personal data as well as all of the other devices
that we own and encounter throughout our day. It should, therefore, come as no
surprise that our personal devices and data are frequent targets of ever-present
threats. Securing these devices and networks, however, is challenging. In this
dissertation, we outline three critical problems in the context of Wireless Personal
Area Networks (WPANs) and present our solutions to these problems.
First, I present our Trusted I/O solution (BASTION-SGX) for protecting
sensitive user data transferred between wirelessly connected (Bluetooth) devices.
This work shows how in-transit data can be protected from privileged threats, such
as a compromised OS, on commodity systems. I present insights into the Bluetooth
architecture, Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX), and how a Trusted I/O
solution can be engineered on commodity devices equipped with SGX.
Second, I present our work on Amulet and how we successfully built a wear-
ii
able health hub that can run multiple health applications, provide strong security
properties, and operate on a single charge for weeks or even months at a time. I
present the design and evaluation of our highly efficient event-driven programming
model, the design of our low-power operating system, and developer tools for
profiling ultra-low-power applications at compile time.
Third, I present a new approach (VIA) that helps devices at the center of
WPANs (e.g., smartphones) to verify the authenticity of interactions with other
devices. This work builds on past work in anomaly detection techniques and shows
how these techniques can be applied to Bluetooth network traffic. Specifically,
we show how to create normality models based on fine- and course-grained in-
sights from network traffic, which can be used to verify the authenticity of future
interactions.
iii
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In the Internet of Things (IoT), everyday objects are equipped with the ability to
compute and communicate. These smart things have invaded the lives of everyday
people, being carried or worn on our bodies, and entering into our homes, our
healthcare, and beyond. This trend has given rise to wireless networks of smart,
connected, always-on, personal things that are constantly around us, commonly
known as Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs).1 Devices within WPANs
have unfettered access to our most personal data as well as all of the other devices
that we own and encounter throughout our day. It should, therefore, come as no
1Indeed, the term WPAN was in use before the term IoT was popularized. Today WPAN is
sometimes seen as a subset of the umbrella term, IoT.
1
Figure 1.1: An example of a Wireless Personal Area Network, where various IoT devices are
connected around a personal hub, such as a smartphone.
surprise that our personal devices and data are frequent targets of ever-present
threats. Securing WPANs, however, is challenging.
One specific concern is the fact that hub devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets,
laptops, and dedicated smart-home “hubs”) at the center of WPANs run applications
(e.g., health applications, finance applications, messaging applications, virtual assis-
tants) that interact with nearby devices and regularly handle sensitive information
(Figure 1.1). Threats to these applications and their information (e.g., theft of data,
tampering with data) are ever present: they can come from over the Internet, from
other software that coexists on the device, or even from other physically-proximate
devices.
Past work has largely focused on remote security, which aims to protect devices
from attacks arriving over the Internet (e.g., attacks exploited over the TCP/IP
stack). Local security, on the other hand, is concerned with issues such as protecting
devices from people and other nearby devices, or protecting applications within a
device from malicious software within the device. Local security, unfortunately, is
2
generally regarded as less of an issue than remote security because localized threats
and attacks are expensive and often do not scale in terms of their impact. Indeed,
local attacks require that an adversary be physically present to carry out an attack, or
at least requires the adversary to compromise another device that will be physically
proximate to the target of the attack. However, if an adversary can compromise
even one device (be it remotely or locally), they can use that device as a vector to
attack other nearby devices. For example, an adversary may compromise a smart
light bulb and use it to attack other smart devices in the home; or, an adversary
may compromise a smartphone and use it as a vector to attack in-home or on-body
devices via local attacks. While these threats were once far-fetched, the rise in the
ubiquity and mobility of computers is making them real. Indeed, with the recent
interest in IoT, localized threats are possible and becoming more common. Thus, in
this dissertation we focus on local security and posit that the attitude of viewing
local security as a lesser threat is no longer acceptable.
In this dissertation, we outline three critical problems in the context of WPANs
and present our solutions to these problems At its core, our solutions are largely
focused on making WPANs more trustworthy: re-envisioning how we compose and
verify the software, systems, and connections that form the basis for trust in these
devices and networks.
1.1 Preliminary Definitions
Throughout this dissertation we specifically focus on WPANs, but use the umbrella
term of IoT interchangeably. WPANs are made up of hub devices (hubs), peripheral
devices (peripherals), and networks of these devices. Hubs, such as smartphones,
tablets, laptops, and smart-home hubs (sometimes referred to as “personal digital
assistants”), are so named because of their role as a central device within WPANs.
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Hubs generally run end-user applications, and support one or more local network-
ing technologies, such as those that enable Body/Personal Area Networks (via
Bluetooth or ZigBee, for example) as well as (Wireless) Local Area Networks (via
Wi-Fi, for example).
Peripheral devices, such as mHealth devices, wearables, sensors, actuators,
and user-interface devices, are so named because of their ancillary role within
WPANs. Some peripheral devices are used for input (e.g., input from an end-user
into a hub device) or output (e.g., provide feedback to an end-user from a hub
device, administer medication to an end-user per the instruction of an application
running on a hub device). Some peripheral devices sense (or actuate upon) the
physical world. Peripheral devices generally do not connect directly to the Internet,
but rather, connect with a hub device (which may in turn enable the peripheral
device to interact with applications on the hub device or over the Internet).
Networks of these hub and peripheral devices are what we refer to as WPANs.
Personal Area Networks (PANs) need not be wireless networks, but today, many
are (i.e., many PANs are WPANs). Body Area Networks (BAN) and Personal Area
Networks (PAN) are all common terms used to refer to networks that connect all
devices worn (or carried) on or near the body (or even within the body!); these
are often WPANs. Body Area Health Networks (BAHN) are a type of BAN that is
specifically made up of health and wellness devices. Home Area Networks (HAN)
are a kind of Local Area Network (LAN) that connect all devices within the home
(PCs, smartphones, televisions, etc.); these could be WPANs.
We state all of this for clarity as there are many ways of defining these net-
works. All of these networks and ones like it are relevant to our work. Generally
speaking, our work aims to address the threats and challenges that come along with
everyday end-users operating WPANs.
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1.2 The Insecurity of WPANs
Both hub and peripheral devices are commonly used by end-users that have little
or no technical insight into how the devices operate, yet they may have significant
dependence on their presence and the integrity of their operation. For example,
consider a patient that relies on these devices to manage a health condition and
interact with her clinician. Thus, throughout this work, we hold that it is vital
that security solutions in this context must consider their impact on factors that
ultimately impact the end-user; this includes factors such as performance, energy
consumption, usability, and compatibility (with respect to the technologies that
commonly make up these devices, such as commodity operating systems, network
stacks, and the applications themselves). To understand this better, and to illustrate
some of the insecurities that our work addresses, let us consider the following
scenario.
1.3 Scenario: IoT-based Patient Health Monitoring
Bob is an elderly patient that is clinically obese, has high systolic blood pressure, and
was recently diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. To help Bob successfully monitor and
manage his health, his primary care physician has prescribed a strict diet and activity
regimen, blood-pressure medication, as well as a suite of health devices. The devices
are intended to provide Bob meaningful feedback each day, monitor his adherence to
the prescribed plan, and enable Bob and his physician to interact regularly between
in-person visits. The suite of health devices includes a continuous glucose monitor
that will regularly measure Bob’s blood sugar levels, a head-mounted eating device
that will assist Bob in tracking his food and beverage consumption, and a wrist-
worn health device that runs multiple mobile health (mHealth) applications – some
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of which interact with the other prescribed health devices.
The wrist-worn device is a critical device for effective treatment as it is in-
tended to be an always-present device in situations where Bob is not near his
home computer or smartphone. This device has built-in sensors and wirelessly
communicates with the other health devices to aggregate data, which is offloaded
to companion applications on Bob’s laptop or smartphone when they are nearby.
The companion applications communicate with remote services to upload Bob’s
relevant data as well as render feedback for Bob.
At least three problems arise in scenarios like these, which pose significant
threats to Bob, his devices, and his data. We describe these problems briefly next.
Problem #1: Malware and Threats to Sensitive I/O Data
Data from the various health devices is continuously aggregated in the wrist-worn
health device and offloaded to Bob’s smartphone or laptop whenever possible. To
ensure Bob’s privacy, all of the health devices employ over-the-air encryption to
secure sensitive data in transit between devices. Unfortunately – unbeknownst to
Bob – Bob’s smartphone was recently the victim of a drive-by-download attack
that successfully installed a privileged malware – undesirable software with the
capability of accessing resources (e.g., protected files, network interfaces) that are
generally restricted to privileged entities only; the malware has been surreptitiously
siphoning-off any data in and out of the smartphone’s Bluetooth network interface.
The reality today is that communication is protected in transit between the
devices (using over-the-air encryption, for example), but not necessarily in transit
within the devices (between the intended companion application(s) and the network
interface, for example). This lack of protection within the devices leaves internal
I/O vulnerable to theft and tampering. Figure 1.2 provides an overview of the































Figure 1.2: An overview of our system model and the threats to sensitive I/O data hub de-
vices. Components within a hub (left) that pose a potential threat to sensitive I/O data are
colored red.
Problem #2: The Vulnerability of Peripheral Devices
The wrist-worn health device and other peripheral devices like it run a variety of
software, including one or more applications. For instance, the wrist-worn health
device in our scenario runs multiple mHealth applications, including an activity
monitoring application, a food and beverage consumption tracking application, and
a continuous glucose monitoring application; this device also runs software that was
not specifically prescribed to Bob for his healthcare treatment, such as an alarm clock
application and a sleep monitoring application. While the mHealth applications
were developed by reputable companies, the alarm clock application that Bob
downloaded from an App Store contained malware.2 Once installed, the malware
exploited a buffer-overflow vulnerability in the system and obtained the ability to
execute arbitrary code. The malware has since used its access to the system to steal
information from other applications on the device, and to launch attacks against
Bob’s smartphone (in an attempt to compromise smartphone applications and
2In this case, Bob knowingly downloaded the application (though he did not know that it
































Figure 1.3: An overview of the threats to apps and data on peripheral devices. Components
within a peripheral (right) that pose a potential threat to apps and data are colored red.
obtain access to the Internet). Figure 1.3 provides an overview of the components
within a peripheral that pose a potential threat to apps and data.
The reality today is that malware and other threats can find their way into
peripheral devices through various means. And because of the nature of peripheral
devices – which are often small, battery-powered devices, operating on low-cost and
functionally-limited hardware – they often lack traditional resources that protect
against these threats. This lack of security in peripheral devices makes them ideal
targets to adversaries seeking to steal or tamper with data, to commandeer system
resources, or to obtain control over the device in order to carry out further attacks
on other nearby devices.
Problem #3: The Absence of (Re-)Verification of Trust Relationships
Even if the latter two problems did not exist, and even if hub and peripheral devices
employed a variety of state-of-the-art security and privacy solutions to protect
against known threats, one unfortunate reality remains: at some point the adversary
will be successful in compromising the system or network. For example, at some
point an attacker successfully installs malware on one of Bob’s devices. Or, at some
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point an attacker observes the identifiers of one of Bob’s devices and uses them to
masquerade as that device in order to establish a connection with his smartphone,
which can be used to carry out a subsequent attack on that device.
There exist efforts to address this reality today. For instance, antivirus software
installed on a device periodically scans file systems in search of patterns (“signa-
tures”) matching known malware. Alternatively (or possibly simultaneously),
software agents can run in hub devices or in Wi-Fi access points or in network
switches that aggressively monitor network traffic to detect abnormal network ac-
tivity. Unfortunately, today’s solutions face a number of challenges and have been
shown to be insufficient by themselves – we list a few of these challenges here. First
and foremost, it is not necessarily possible to install software agents or antivirus
software on each device, especially peripheral devices, rendering today’s solutions
inapplicable in our patient monitoring scenario (and scenarios like it). Second,
most antivirus solutions today are rule-based or signature-based,3 and therefore
can only detect known malware (i.e., malware with a known signature). Unsurpris-
ingly, malware developers have been quite successful in adding slight variations to
malware, which changes its signature and enables the slightly-modified malware
to evade detection. Third, antivirus software that scans file systems inherently
assumes that malware is at some point written to persistent memory such as the
hard drive. Recently, however, there have been discoveries of malware that resides
only in non-persistent memory, such as RAM or caches, and employs techniques to
avoid ever being written to persistent memory. Fourth, even if existing solutions
were to scan both persistent memory (e.g., hard drives) and non-persistent memory
(e.g, RAM, caches), it is possible that the contents of that memory are encrypted by
software or platform security, preventing antivirus software from performing its
3While there are other forms of solutions, such as anomaly-based detectors, they are less common.
In large networks – where these solutions are often deployed – it is important to avoid false-positives
so that short-staffed security teams can focus their attention on real threats. Thus, signature-based































Figure 1.4: An overview of the components within hub and peripheral devices that pose a
potential threat to the trustworthiness of Bob’s WPAN are colored red.
inspection. Last, not all malicious network traffic is IP-based network traffic. In fact,
many communications in the IoT are peer-to-peer, using Bluetooth/BLE, ZigBee,
Z-Wave, or others.
These observations amount to an unfortunate reality: there are currently
no mechanisms for Bob or his physician to actively detect (or protect against) a
compromise within Bob’s WPAN. In our scenario, this amounts to Bob and his
physician never knowing if there has been a breach within Bob’s personal devices.
Has Bob’s privacy been violated? Is the data obtained from the devices trustworthy?
Figure 1.4 provides an overview of the components within hub and peripheral
devices that pose a potential threat to the trustworthiness of Bob’s WPAN. Namely,
threats to Bob’s WPAN could come from the hub device (e.g., a malicious application
attempting to spread and compromise nearby devices), or from peripheral devices
(e.g., a device masquerading as another device in an attempt to obtain access to
Bob’s data). Today, there is no standard mechanism to detect this threat in WPANs.
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1.4 Our Vision: Making WPANs More Trustworthy
The trustworthy WPANs we envision are hardened against attacks that target
personal devices and sensitive user data. Furthermore, WPANs employ mechanisms
to continuously (re-)verify that past trust decisions (e.g., Bob connects and pairs
two new devices, A and B) remain valid over time.
Problem #1 – malware and threats to sensitive I/O data – is addressed by
our work, BASTION-SGX [156, 184]. BASTION-SGX is a security architecture for
protecting applications on hub devices from attacks within the device, such as a
compromised operating system, drivers, or other variants of malicious software.
This work aims to make I/O more trustworthy between peripheral devices and
apps running on the hub. We present BASTION-SGX in Chapter 2.
Problem #2 – the vulnerability of peripheral devices – is addressed by our
work, Amulet [91, 139]. Amulet is a novel platform, which enables developers to
create secure and efficient mHealth applications on resource-constrained peripheral
devices, such as health and wellness wearables; our work on the Amulet Platform
focuses on how these devices and their software can be composed and verified in a
more trustworthy way, fortifying them from being compromised by errant appli-
cations that might attempt to interfere with other applications or the underlying
system itself. We present Amulet in Chapter 3.
Problem #3 – the absence of (re-)verification of trust relationships – is ad-
dressed by our most recent work, Verification of Interaction Authenticity (VIA).
VIA is an extension of techniques commonly used in anomaly-detection and
intrusion-detection systems, which enable authentic interactions between apps
and devices to be modeled. The models we produce can be used to verify that
future interactions remain consistent with the previously-learned models. Our
approach has yielded promising early results, suggesting that VIA can be used to
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Verification of Interaction Authenticity
Figure 1.5: Overview of the system model, network model, and contributions presented in this
dissertation.
mitigate threats where an adversary attempts to carry out an attack that deviates
from the authentic interactions that were previously observed (e.g., when a trust
relationship was first established). We present VIA in Chapter 4.
We see our solutions working together in complementary ways (illustrated
in Figure 1.5). Specifically, BASTION-SGX (Chapter 2) is a solution that offers
more trustworthy I/O between peripheral devices and apps on hubs. Amulet
(Chapter 3) is a solution that offers insights into how to design and deploy more
trustworthy peripheral devices. And VIA (Chapter 4) is a solution that offers
ongoing verification that interactions between apps and devices with a WPAN are
authentic, and therefore more trustworthy.
1.5 Contributions
This dissertation makes significant contributions towards the analysis of threats to
WPANs, as well as the design and development of tools and system enhancements
for protecting apps, securing data channels, and identifying suspicious behaviors
within these networks (Figure 1.5).
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In aggregate, we make the following contributions in this dissertation.
Establishing Trustworthy Channels for App-Device Communications
In our work on BASTION-SGX [156, 184], we introduce an architecture and method-
ology for achieving secure and trustworthy I/O on platforms with SGX-enabled
processors. We present BASTION-SGX in Chapter 2 and make the following contri-
butions:
1. We identify and solve several challenges in realizing Trusted I/O for Bluetooth
on SGX-enabled platforms.
2. We define and present a new Trusted I/O architecture.
3. We present an analytical evaluation of the performance impact of Trusted I/O.
4. We present a prototype and a case study that demonstrates how our solution
effectively protects sensitive Bluetooth I/O data from privileged malware.
Designing Trustworthy Peripheral Devices
In our work on Amulet [91, 139], we present a secure, low-power platform and
suite of tools for developing and deploying mobile health applications. We present
Amulet in Chapter 3 and make the following contributions:4
1. We define and present the design and implementation of Amulet’s software
stack and runtime system.
2. We define and present the design and implementation of Amulet’s firmware-
production toolchain that guarantees application isolation.
4The Amulet project was made possible through the efforts of many researchers at Dartmouth
College and Clemson University. Here I emphasize my specific contributions to the project.
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3. We define and present the design and implementation of resource models that
are deployed in a graphical developer tools that aid developers in developing
secure and efficient applications.
4. We present an experimental evaluation of Amulet.
Along with the broader amulet hardware and software, my contributions have
been publicly released and are freely available.5
Verifying Trustworthy Behavior
In our work on VIA, we introduce a novel approach for ongoing verification of
authentic interactions between apps and devices in WPANs. We present VIA in
Chapter 4 and make the following contributions:
• We assembled a testbed made up of two distinct device categories (smart
health and smart home devices) consisting of 9 different device type, and 20
devices in total. From this testbed, we produced a novel dataset of more than
300 Bluetooth HCI network traces. This new dataset will be made publicly
available when this dissertation is published.
• We contribute extensions to open-source Bluetooth-analysis software to en-
hance the available tools for practical exploration of the Bluetooth protocol
and Bluetooth-based apps.
• We present a novel modeling technique (hierarchical segmentation), coupled
with n-gram models to reliably characterize and verify app-device interac-
tions.
• We present an experimental evaluation of our work using the 20 off-the-shelf




A majority of the material presented in this dissertation is adapted from previous
publications.
• Parts of Chapter 2 appeared in the Proceedings of the Workshop on Hard-
ware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP’18) [156],
in conjunction with the 45th International Symposium on Computer Archi-
tecture (ISCA’18) – the premier forum for new ideas and research results
in computer architecture. Parts of this chapter are also motivated by our
patent: System, apparatus and method for providing trusted input/output
communications [184]. This paper and patent introduced an architecture and
methodology for achieving secure and trustworthy I/O on platforms with
SGX-enabled processors.
• Parts of Chapter 3 appeared in the Proceedings of the 14th Conference on
Embedded Network Sensor Systems (SenSys’16) [91]. An earlier subset of this
work also appeared in the Proceedings of the Workshop on Mobile Medical
Applications – Design and Development (WMMADD’14) [139]. These papers
presented a secure, low-power platform and suite of tools for developing and
deploying mobile health applications.
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2
Establishing Trustworthy Channels for
App-Device Communications
In Chapter 1 we introduced the idea that there exist threats (e.g., malware) to
sensitive I/O data within hub devices. In this chapter, we present BASTION-SGX
(Figure 2.1), a novel security architecture for protecting applications on hub devices
from attacks within the device, such as those that may come from a compromised
operating system, drivers, or other variants of malicious software (henceforth
malware). While many of the ideas and solutions in this chapter are relevant to all
































Figure 2.1: Overview of System Model and BASTION-SGX.
devices – specifically those that have CPUs with Intel’s Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) (see Section 2.2.2 for a brief overview). Moreover, this chapter discusses
I/O security with respect to Bluetooth I/O data. Again, many of the ideas and
solutions discussed herein are relevant to other I/O technologies; however, this text
is grounded in discussion of Bluetooth to demonstrate its value when applied in
practice.
This work draws on work that I did as a Security Research intern at Intel Labs
in 2015 and 2016. This chapter is a modified version of our paper, BASTION-SGX:
Bluetooth and Architectural Support for Trusted I/O on SGX [156], which was published
in June of 2018, and our patent System, apparatus and method for providing trusted
input/output communications [184], which was published in August of 2019.
2.1 Introduction
Recently, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have generated considerable
interest as a means to protect application code and data from unauthorized access.
TEEs are especially promising in light of the ubiquity of malware that threatens to
compromise applications and steal or modify security- and privacy-sensitive data
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such as personally identifiable information (PII), passwords, credit card numbers,
and health data. For example, Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [100] has
been shown to be effective in protecting password databases [43] and even arbitrary
containerized processes in Docker [22] from such malware attacks.
For many sensitive applications, input/output (I/O) data has the same level of
sensitivity as the data protected inside a TEE-protected application, creating a need
to protect I/O data against theft or tampering from a malicious actor. Therefore,
many applications that need to use a TEE also need a mechanism to protect user
I/O data; this is especially so where sensitive user data is frequently communicated
between hub devices and peripheral devices.
To address this need, past work has proposed to construct trusted paths: secure
channels between applications and a user’s I/O devices. A common approach to
construct such a path is to introduce a combination of trusted drivers, middleware,
operating systems (OSes), virtual machines (VMs), and hypervisors. As a result,
the application’s security and the security of its I/O is reduced to the security of
the drivers, middleware, OS, VM, and hypervisor, which currently have no way
to attest itself to the TEE/TEE-protected application. In contrast, in our work
we develop lightweight extensions to the platform itself and describe how those
extensions can be attested.
To better understand this issue and the improvement that our solution makes,
we must first formalize the trusted path problem and discuss the shortcomings of past
work.
2.1.1 The Trusted Path Problem
In the canonical trusted-path problem, an application within the hub device (for
example, App1 in Figure 2.2) wants to send/receive data securely to/from periph-























Figure 2.2: Today’s solution to the trusted-path problem is to assume that apps, drivers, mid-
dleware, OSes, VMs, hypervisors, and hardware are capable and trustworthy with respect to
handling sensitive I/O data.
sensors (see the User I/O Device in Figure 2.2). More precisely, there exists a col-
lection of applications (apps) that run on a hub device (hub). On the hub is one
or more apps that handle sensitive data (e.g., banking app, health app, messaging
app). These apps want to securely communicate with peripheral devices (e.g.,
keyboard, microphone, speakers) connected with the hub, even in light of software-
based adversaries (malware) that may have compromised drivers, OSes, VMs, or
hypervisors.
Today’s solution (Figure 2.2) assumes that any apps, drivers, middleware,
OSes, VMs, hypervisors, and hardware are capable and trustworthy with respect to
handling sensitive I/O data. Not all of these components of a system are equally
worthy of user trust, however.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the general idea behind early research towards addressing
the trusted-path problem (e.g., [189, 200]). Specifically, given a hub with TEE
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technology (e.g., SGX), TEEs are used as a mechanism to protect the execution of
an app (parts of its code and data) by partitioning it into trusted and untrusted
parts; this leads to the notion of a trusted app [96], which is distinct from other user
apps. A combination of new, trusted components – trusted drivers, middleware,
OSes, VMs, and hypervisors – are then used to construct trusted paths between the
trusted app (TApp in Figure 2.3) and user I/O device through untrusted software.
For instance, a hypervisor-based solution [200] will run a trusted VM with an
untrusted commodity OS (e.g., Windows, Linux). The hypervisor and VM are
relied upon to contain the untrusted OS, preventing it from accessing I/O devices
or memory regions (memory that belongs to a trusted app, for example) that are
meant to be protected. All I/O goes from the hypervisor to the trusted VM, where
it is encrypted and sent to the trusted app that runs within the untrusted OS.
This approach, however, is not effective for SGX-enabled apps since the software
outside of its TEE does not have a way to attest itself to the SGX app. Furthermore,
these approaches include complex and error-prone software within the Trusted
Computing Base (TCB). As a result, the security of the trusted app is reduced to the
security of the (many) trusted components that are relied upon in past solutions –
components that are regularly exploited.
This leads to Figure 2.4, which depicts our solution. Rather than introducing
non-standard drivers or hypervisors, as past work does, we introduce lightweight
extensions to the platform itself. Specifically, we developed new platform features
to equip SGX-enabled platforms with Trusted I/O capabilities for specific I/O
paths. These features are primarily concerned with ensuring I/O protection from
all software adversaries, including privileged software, such as the OS. By enabling
Trusted I/O in the platform – removing all system software from the TCB – we
























Figure 2.3: Variations of proposed solutions to the trusted-path problem rely on a combina-
tion of trusted drivers, VMs, and hypervisors for I/O security. For example, past work [189]
describes how secure app-to-driver binding and driver-to-device binding can be achieved via
trusted VMs and hypervisors.
Hub Device
TApp





















Figure 2.4: Our solution to the trusted-path problem is to implement lightweight features in I/O
hardware, securing the path between the TEE and a specific I/O interface.
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2.1.2 Scope: Securing Bluetooth I/O on SGX Platforms
In our solution we consider the trusted-path problem for a specific wireless I/O tech-
nology – Bluetooth – using a specific TEE technology – SGX. Also, we specifically
consider the challenges around securing only the sensitive user data sent to/from
Bluetooth devices (e.g., keyboard key presses, health sensor data) on SGX-enabled
platforms. Thus, all references to I/O security throughout this chapter are specifi-
cally aimed at securing user data over Bluetooth. While we focus our attention on
Bluetooth and SGX, we postulate that similar notions apply to other wired (e.g.,
USB), wireless (e.g., ZigBee, NFC, Wi-Fi) and TEE (e.g., ARM TrustZone [19], AMD
Secure Technology [7]) technologies.
Furthermore, in our solution we consider adding security only where it is
needed, but does not yet exist. Namely, today, wireless I/O technologies – including
Bluetooth – already provide I/O protection at the hardware link level (i.e., between
the hub and peripheral device), but leave the hub-side security (i.e., within the
hub) up to the OS. All I/O between the hub and its connected devices is already
secured with existing security, such as Over-The-Air (OTA) encryption; all I/O
within the hub, however, is transferred in plaintext between apps and the hub’s I/O
hardware (e.g., Bluetooth Controller). Our work addresses this hub-side insecurity
by securing I/O data between the I/O hardware and trusted apps.
2.1.3 Challenges in Bluetooth Trusted I/O
Today, hub devices run a vast number of apps and connect with a multitude
of Bluetooth devices that enable human users to interact with these apps. It is
imperative that the hub be capable of reliably managing multiple connections with
other Bluetooth devices. Therefore, in light of the trusted-path problem, we need a
Trusted I/O mechanism that can selectively secure only user data, and only between
22
trusted apps and designated devices, while allowing all other apps and devices to
communicate as usual; this ensures all other apps can continue to work without
modification. We discuss this fundamental challenge and how we overcome it in
greater detail in Section 2.4.
2.1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this work are:
1. We identify and solve several challenges in realizing Trusted I/O for Blue-
tooth. Namely, we describe an approach to connection monitoring that can
be applied within a hub’s Bluetooth Controller, allowing it to unobtrusively
collect Bluetooth device and channel metadata.
2. We present BASTION-SGX, an architecture for realizing Trusted I/O specifi-
cally for Bluetooth on SGX-enabled platforms. Our architecture is grounded in
lightweight extensions to existing Bluetooth I/O firmware to enable Bluetooth
Trusted I/O.
3. We present a prototype of our work in a case study that secures sensitive
Bluetooth I/O data between Human Interface Devices (keyboard/mouse)
and a trusted app. Specifically, our work shows how it is possible to extend
existing over-the-air Bluetooth security all the way to a trusted app with
our new security features that secure Bluetooth I/O between the Bluetooth
Controller and the trusted app.
We emphasize that all of our contributions significantly enhance I/O security
relative to today’s solution by protecting user I/O data from software-based ad-
versaries on the hub. Furthermore, our solution only requires modifications to the
firmware of the hub’s Bluetooth Controller and the trusted apps.
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2.2 Background
In this section we present background information on the prominent technologies
featured in this chapter: Bluetooth and Intel’s SGX.
2.2.1 Bluetooth
A detailed description of the Bluetooth architecture and its protocols are beyond the
scope this work. For this, we refer the reader to the Bluetooth Core Specification [35]
(more than 2,500 pages!). A basic understanding, however, is required to appreciate
the challenges and solutions we discuss. Note that this chapter describes specific in-
sights into our work with Bluetooth Classic. The main ideas carry over to Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) as well since the the hierarchy of links and channels (defined
below) are arranged similarly in both Bluetooth Classic and BLE. Therefore, we
make references throughout this text to Bluetooth, with the understanding that it
applies to both Bluetooth Classic and BLE.
A typical deployment of Bluetooth (within a hub) consists of a Host and one
or more Controllers. The Host Controller Interface (HCI) is a command interface
between the Host and Controllers. A Bluetooth host is a logical entity made up
of all the layers between Bluetooth’s core profiles (i.e., Bluetooth applications and
services) and the HCI. A Bluetooth controller is a logical entity made up of all of the
layers below the HCI, and enables the client to communicate with other Bluetooth
devices. In most hub devices, the Host is implemented in software (within an
OS such as Linux, for example), whereas the Controller is implemented with a
combination of firmware and hardware. The Bluetooth specification identifies
several of possible configurations of Hosts and Controllers, but an understanding
of this representative deployment is sufficient for the reader. A simplified view of
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Figure 2.5: A simplified view of the Bluetooth stack.
During normal operation of Bluetooth, a physical radio channel is shared
by two or more devices. A collection of devices sharing a single radio channel
(synchronized to a master device) is referred to as a piconet. Without loss of
generality, the following text describes relevant internals of a physical channel
shared by only two devices.
Within the context of a shared, physical radio channel, there is a complex
layering of links and channels and associated control protocols that enables coor-
dination amongst the devices as well as data to be transferred between devices.
A detailed description of each of these channels and links is beyond the scope of
this dissertation (see the Bluetooth Specification [35], Volume 1, Part A). Worthy of
note in our work is, however, the Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol
(L2CAP) channel. L2CAP channels provide a channel abstraction to applications
and services. The L2CAP layer of the Bluetooth protocol carries out many functions,
including segmentation and reassembly of application data, and multiplexing and
de-multiplexing of multiple channels over a shared logical link. Application data




In our work we focus primarily on two aspects of the Bluetooth protocol: the HCI
and the L2CAP. The HCI is the interface between software (i.e., the Bluetooth Host
software) and Bluetooth I/O hardware (i.e., the Bluetooth controller firmware and
hardware); by extending this interface, we can enable trusted software to create
secure channels for Bluetooth data within the hub. The L2CAP protocol is the
primary protocol for enabling applications and services; by applying Trusted I/O
security at the L2CAP layer, we can offer fine-grained, channel-based protection for
user data.
2.2.2 Intel SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [100] is a set of new instructions and mech-
anisms that can be used by app developers to protect selected code and data
from disclosure or modification by partitioning apps into CPU-enforced containers
known as enclaves (Figure 2.6). Enclaves offer protected areas of execution in
memory that increase security even on compromised platforms. Specifically, an
enclave provides confidentiality, integrity, and replay-protection guarantees, even
without relying on trusting drivers, middleware, OSes, VMs, hypervisors, firmware,
or the BIOS. SGX also provides remote and local attestation capabilities, allowing
enclaves to be measured and verified – or in other words, a means for an enclave to
provide proof of its authenticity.
More information on SGX is available through Intel’s official SGX documenta-
tion [100] as well as past academic research (e.g., [130, 189, 59]). Today, however,




















Figure 2.6: Overview of SGX and anatomy of an SGX enclave.
2.3 System & Security Model
In this dissertation, we address the trusted-path problem for Bluetooth I/O, as
illustrated in Figure 2.4. We break the overall path between the trusted software
and the user (device) into two subpaths: (1) the path between trusted software
and the trusted Bluetooth Controller (Figure 2.4, E1-E2), and (2) the path between
the trusted Bluetooth Controller and a trusted Bluetooth device (Figure 2.4, E3-E4).
As in related work [189, 200], we assume that the latter path is secure today (e.g.,
through standard Bluetooth OTA security). Our work focuses on the former path
and how trusted software and the trusted Bluetooth Controller can secure I/O
channels through untrusted Host software within the hub. Towards this end, this
section describes our goals and security model.
2.3.1 Threats & Adversaries
While there are certainly many types of adversaries and threats that one can imagine,
in this dissertation we are primarily concerned with software-based adversaries,
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including privileged software. Specifically, we concentrate on preventing two types
of software attacks: (1) unauthorized access attacks, which aim to access sensitive
user data transported via Bluetooth, and (2) data-injection or replay attacks, which
aim to inject data that is not authentic, or replay authentic data for malicious
purposes.
To this end, we consider an adversary (malware) that has various capabilities
and employs various tactics to successfully perform such attacks. Specifically, adver-
saries can read or write the code and data of system software and untrusted apps on
the hub. Adversaries can create their own trusted/untrusted apps. Adversaries can
also interpose on communication (i.e., intercept, insert, alter, deny messages), either
between trusted software and Trusted I/O hardware within the hub or between
the hub and device (or both). Adversaries cannot physically access the hub device
or any of its connected Bluetooth devices. Adversaries cannot read or write the
data or code of trusted software that is protected within a TEE, nor the data or code
protected by the trusted hardware. Adversaries cannot break encryption primitives
or protocols known to be secure today. Denial-of-Service (DoS) and side-channel
attacks are out of scope for our work.
2.3.2 Assumptions & Trust Model
In our work we assume the human user is not an adversary. We assume that the
Bluetooth I/O device is implemented correctly and is trusted by the user to faithfully
handle I/O on their behalf; furthermore, we assume the device accurately identifies
itself to the hub. We assume the hub has SGX-enabled hardware. We assume that
system software (e.g., drivers, OS) and other apps are not trusted. We assume
all trusted software and trusted hardware (including firmware) is implemented
and authenticated/loaded/initialized/booted correctly. We assume trusted apps
trust that the I/O Controller will comply with security policies (Section 2.3.4), not
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disclose user I/O data to other devices or apps, and implement OTA protection
between the client and any Bluetooth devices. We assume the physical channel
between the hub and device (Figure 2.4, E3-E4) is protected with existing Bluetooth
OTA security.
2.3.3 Goals
In light of these threats and assumptions, we seek to achieve the following four
goals: (G1) We aim to design a hub-side architecture that is not dependent on trusted
hypervisors, trusted OSes, or trusted drivers for security. (G2) We aim to provide
confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection guarantees over select user I/O data
between trusted software and hardware. (G3) We aim to provide protection against
impersonation of trusted software or hardware. And last, (G4) we aim to achieve
these goals in a way that does not interfere with existing I/O protocols (namely,
Bluetooth) or break existing routing mechanisms.
2.3.4 Bluetooth Trusted I/O Security Policies
Bluetooth applications and services rely on L2CAP channels to transport user data.
Thus, we apply Bluetooth Trusted I/O security to L2CAP channels that carry user
data.
A Bluetooth Trusted I/O security policy specifies what Bluetooth I/O data
needs to be protected between a trusted app and the Bluetooth Controller, as well
as information used to secure the data. Specifically, a policy is made up of two
elements: (1) information to identify the specific channel(s) that should be secured
(e.g., user data from a Bluetooth keyboard), and (2) a symmetric key; the symmetric
key is used to apply cryptographic protection over the specified channel’s data.
Here, a secure channel is one with the properties noted in goals G2 and G3 described
above. We discuss what information is needed to identify specific channels that
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carry user I/O data in Section 2.4, and how security policies can be programmed into
the Controller in Section 2.5.1.
Because our architecture aims to provide confidentiality of user I/O data (G2),
a trusted app that configures a security policy has exclusive access to the channel(s)
defined in the policy. This step ensures that no other software can access the
Bluetooth I/O data that the trusted app aims to secure. The OS enforces exclusive
use of some devices today (e.g., keyboards, cameras) for security. For example, by
default, the OS ensures keyboard input is only sent to the app that has focus to
ensure that no other app can observe passwords or other sensitive data entered
by the user. Since the OS and other system software is not within the TCB of our
architecture, however, we aim to provide similar guarantees without relying on this
untrusted software.
2.4 Channel Selection & Security Policy Enforcement
Today, the hub’s Bluetooth Controller is the gateway for all packets transported
between the client’s Host software and all connected Bluetooth devices (Figure 2.7).
An implication of the Controller’s current design and role as gateway, however, is
that all ingress Bluetooth packets (device-to-hub), from all connected devices, are
multiplexed within the Bluetooth Controller into a single stream and delivered to
Host software via the HCI. Similarly, all egress packets (hub-to-device) must be
demultiplexed within the Controller and sent to the correct Bluetooth device.
In our work we seek to not interfere with the Bluetooth protocol or break
existing routing within the hub’s software (G4). Therefore, our Trusted I/O solution
aims to selectively secure only user data, and only between trusted apps and
designated devices, while allowing all other apps and devices not requiring secure
I/O to communicate as usual. Realizing Trusted I/O for Bluetooth has raised
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Figure 2.7: Illustrating Bluetooth’s packet routing. Packets sent from Bluetooth devices are
multiplexed into a single stream and interleaved as they are sent to Host software. Packets
sent to Bluetooth devices must be de-multiplexed and associated with their respective device
before transmission from the hub.
three main challenges: (C1) associating multiplexed and interleaved packets to
their respective devices and channels; (C2) isolating and protecting only user data
(without interfering with control channels or packet headers); and (C3) overcoming
tension between enforcing high-level security policies given only low-level context.
We discuss these issues next and refer to aspects of Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9.
2.4.1 Packet Multiplexing & Interleaving
Today, a Bluetooth Controller must maintain basic metadata about connected de-
vices and their channels so that it can route packets to Host software. Conceivably,
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a Bluetooth Controller need only maintain a mapping between an HCI connection
handle and the corresponding device’s Bluetooth address, enabling the Controller
to know which packets belong to which devices. Knowing how to differentiate
packets by device, while necessary, is not sufficient for securing user I/O data. To
elaborate, actual user data is transported between Host software and Bluetooth
devices using L2CAP channels. All L2CAP packets (Figure 2.8) have a channel
identifier (CID), and according to the Bluetooth specification, the L2CAP CID of a
packet enables routing software to associate packets with specific L2CAP channels.
Unfortunately, the CID used in L2CAP packets is guaranteed to be unique only per
device. This can give rise to ambiguity. For example, Figure 2.9 illustrates a hub
connected with two Bluetooth devices, each with one channel used to exchange
user data with the hub. Per the Bluetooth specification, it is actually reasonable
for the channels to have the same CID. The disambiguating attribute in this case
is the identifier for the physical link (i.e., the HCI connection handle or Bluetooth
Device Address, which identifies a unique Bluetooth device), which is not part of
the L2CAP packet. While all of this information is not located in a single packet,
the combination of an HCI connection handle and an L2CAP CID can be used to
uniquely identify channels.
2.4.2 Isolating & Securing User Data Only
Distinguishing between channels within one device and between channels be-
longing to different devices is a necessary precursor for identifying and securing
channels that carry user data. The next issue, however, is that the L2CAP packets
mentioned above actually come in two different types: those that carry control
information and those that carry user data. To ensure all user I/O data is secure,
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HID PayloadReport ID
Figure 2.8: An example of the Bluetooth packet hierarchy. In our prototype work we show how
input data from HID devices can be secured. User data (e.g., key presses) is transported in
HID packets (top level). These packets are nested in multiple layers of the Bluetooth protocol
for transportation from a device to a client’s Host software.
L2CAP CID = 63
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PSM = 0x0011 (Control)
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Figure 2.9: An example of two Bluetooth devices connected with a hub. Trusted I/O requires
fine-grained channel selection. For each device and channel, a Trusted I/O-enabled Bluetooth
Controller maintains information about: the physical connection (HCI Connection Handle),
logical channels (L2CAP CIDs) and their respective protocol/service multiplexor (PSM; control
vs. data), and Class of Device (COD; composed of Major and Minor numbers).
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belonging to communication with a specific device. This approach, however, can
have atrocious effects on existing Bluetooth functionality. For example, as depicted
in Figure 2.9, Device 1 has one channel (L2CAP CID = 63) dedicated to handling
signaling (e.g., enable device options, determine current device state) between the
hub and device; as a consequence of securing all packets, Trusted I/O security
would obfuscate (encrypt) this signaling channel and “break” application-level
functionality. For other, primary signaling channels, this can be even more destruc-
tive, breaking functionality that controls how packets are routed, and how logical
channels are created, maintained, and destroyed. In general, essential Bluetooth
functionality relies on access to HCI connection handles, L2CAP channel identifiers,
and in some cases, even information in the L2CAP packet payloads (e.g., control
parameters). Thus, in order to not break existing Bluetooth functionality, packets
that contain control information should not be secured, and packets containing data
should only be secured if a relevant security policy exists.
The underlying issue here is that L2CAP packets have no type descriptor in
the packet that can be used to disambiguate control packets from data packets.
Such a descriptor is, however, present at the time that new L2CAP channels are
created. During L2CAP channel creation, a Protocol and Service Multiplexor (PSM)
value is exchanged. PSM values are useful for securing channels as they provide
higher-level insight into the purpose of the channel and the type of information that
will be exchanged over the channel. Furthermore, some data and control channels
are defined in the specification and are allocated reserved channel identifiers that
indicate their purpose (data vs. control). Thus, while channel type information
is not contained within all packets, such information is either standardized (and
therefore need not be directly observed) or available during the creation of channels
(and is therefore observable within the Controller).
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2.4.3 Understanding Device Types
More information may yet be required to enforce meaningful security policies. Thus
far we have worked to disambiguate devices from one another, to disambiguate
channels from one another, and even to disambiguate types of packets from one
another. What we are lacking, however, is a higher-level understanding of con-
nected devices. Specifically, we seek a mechanism to map security policies that
are meaningful to humans and apps, to any connected devices. For instance, a
Trusted I/O security policy may require that all I/O from/to a particular device, or
particular class of device (such as all keyboard devices; see Device 2 in Figure 2.9),
should be secure. Fortunately, Bluetooth defines the notion of Class of Device
(COD), which provides higher-level information about the purpose and function
of a device. Each Bluetooth device belongs to some class, represented by major
and minor class information. Bluetooth currently defines 32 major classes (e.g.,
Computer, Phone, Peripheral, Health). There are many minor classes that describe
subclasses of a particular major class; for example, given a major class of Peripheral,
minor class information further describes if that Peripheral is a keyboard, mouse,
or something else. According to the Bluetooth specification, “The major device
class segment is the highest level of granularity for defining a Bluetooth device. A
device’s main function determines its Major Class assignment.” Using Bluetooth
Class of Device information to represent devices in security policies likely maps
well to the high-level understanding of devices that humans and apps have.
2.5 BASTION-SGX
In this section we present BASTION-SGX: our Trusted I/O architecture for Blue-
tooth on SGX (Figure 2.10). BASTION-SGX is comprised of the following com-
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Figure 2.10: Overview of our Bluetooth Trusted I/O architecture. Our goal is to ensure data is
secured in its transportation between two endpoints: trusted software (E1) and a Bluetooth de-
vice (E4). We assume the path between the hub’s Bluetooth Controller and the device (E3-E4)
is secure via Bluetooth OTA security that exists today. Our work shows how I/O channels be-
tween trusted software and the trusted Bluetooth Controller (E1-E2) can be secured. Together,
these paths achieve our goal.
number of wirelessly connected devices. Specifically, the trusted software consists
of standard SGX software and a trusted app. The trusted hardware is an SGX-
enabled CPU and a Bluetooth Controller with our Trusted I/O extensions. Wireless
devices connect with the hub and communicate with apps.
2.5.1 Bluetooth Trusted I/O Controller
BASTION-SGX is centered around a Trusted I/O-enabled Bluetooth Controller,
which implements the following features: (1) monitor connection events and main-
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tain a Metadata Table to store information for connected Bluetooth devices and their
respective channels; (2) expose an API to support Trusted I/O-related interactions
with Host software; (3) filter packets in accordance with the Metadata Table; and
(4) apply cryptography to provide the desired security properties over a channel.
We discuss these components in greater detail next and in Figure 2.10.
Connection Event Monitoring & the Bluetooth Trusted I/O Metadata Table
The solutions we envision for the various challenges described in Section 2.4 rest in
our ability to obtain metadata about devices, and their respective HCI and L2CAP
channels. We assert that it is possible to obtain most of the necessary information
simply by extending the Bluetooth Controller’s firmware. (Our solution also relies
on information obtained from the trusted app via our new Trusted I/O-related APIs.
We discuss this information in the next section.) Specifically, BASTION-SGX realizes
new features to monitor HCI and L2CAP connection/disconnection events, and
maintain a Metadata Table that contains the information alluded to in Section 2.4.
Figure 2.11 provides a summary of the relevant HCI and L2CAP events, and the
metadata that the Controller captures.
When a Bluetooth device first connects with a hub device, the Controller
creates an HCI Connection Handle (CONN_HDL) that the client’s Host software can use
to communicate with that specific device. As an example, when a device connects,
the Bluetooth Controller generates an HCI Connection Request event to inform
Host software that a device wishes to connect. The device is described initially by its
Bluetooth Device Address (BD_ADDR) and Class of Device (COD). Upon completion
of the physical connection between the hub and device, the Controller generates an
HCI Connection Complete event that provides Host software with the CONN_HDL
that can be used for future communication with the device. At this point, the Host
and Controller have an active HCI connection that can be used for subsequent
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Figure 2.11: An example flow of a hub-device connection with a summary of the relevant HCI
and L2CAP connection-related events. These events are standard in Bluetooth’s HCI and
L2CAP protocols today. Our solution adds extensions to the Bluetooth Controller to monitor
and capture device- and channel-specific metadata during connection/disconnection events;
the result is a Trusted I/O-enabled Bluetooth Controller. The relevant metadata is shown in
parenthesis.
communications between the Host software and device.
Once connected, these entities can exchange L2CAP connection requests and
responses to create logical links for exchanging control and data packets. For
example, a device that sends a request to the Host to create a new L2CAP channel
sends two pieces of information: a REMOTE_CID and PSM. The Protocol/Service
Multiplexor (PSM) indicates the purpose of the channel; i.e., what protocol or service
will operate over the new L2CAP channel. The L2CAP channel has two endpoints:
one in the Host (LOCAL_CID) and one in the device (REMOTE_CID). While the Host
is free to assign any CID for its local endpoint, it does not control the CID that the
device uses for its endpoint. Thus, when new L2CAP channels are formed, the
Host software and device carry out an acknowledgement of the CID to be used for



















































Figure 2.12: A simplified example of the Trusted I/O Metadata Table.
By monitoring these HCI and L2CAP events, the Controller can be made
to capture and maintain fine-grained information about each connected device
(CONN_HDL, BD_ADDR), its logical channels (LOCAL_CID, REMOTE_CID), its type
(COD), and the protocols or services (PSM) operating over each channel. This in-
formation can then be used in accordance with security policies (Section 2.5.1) to
filter (Section 2.5.1) and secure packets (Section 2.5.1). A simplified example of the
Trusted I/O Metadata Table is shown in Figure 2.12.
Bluetooth Trusted I/O API
Trusted I/O features are aimed at giving trusted software the ability to create secure
channels to protect specific I/O data channels. Thus, in BASTION-SGX, security
policies (Section 2.3.4) are driven by the requirements of trusted software. There are
two issues worth considering here: first, how trusted software can configure security
policies within the Controller, and second, how trusted software can describe
security policies, based on metadata the Controller independently maintains.
Configuring Security Policies. The HCI can be used to address the first issue.
The HCI is already used for communication between the Host and Controller.
Furthermore, the HCI protocol supports an extensible interface, often referred to
as the Vendor Specific Debug Command (VSDC) interface. This interface enables
vendors to add non-standardized features to Bluetooth Controllers and to enable
apps to use those features. Thus, we can use this interface to support new Bluetooth
Trusted I/O APIs – such as policy specification APIs for adding and removing security
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policies – in Trusted I/O-enabled Bluetooth Controllers.
Class-of-Device Policy Specification. One approach to specifying security policies
is to identify a class of devices that should be secured along with a key (COD, KEY),
and rely on the Controller to determine which channels carry sensitive data versus
those that do not. As noted in Section 2.5.1, upon connecting, COD information
is exchanged; therefore the Controller can know the COD of each of its connected
devices. Furthermore, because PSM information is exchanged during the creation of
any L2CAP channel, the Controller can know the purpose of each L2CAP channel,
enabling it to identify (and subsequently secure) channels that carry user data
(using the policy’s KEY). This approach for defining security policies is conservative
in that it allows trusted software to secure I/O between it and any device matching
the COD in its policy.
Bluetooth Trusted I/O Filtering
The Bluetooth Trusted I/O Filter is responsible for (1) identifying packets containing
sensitive user data based on known devices (Section 2.5.1) and security policies
(Section 2.5.1), and (2) securing these packets (Section 2.5.1) using the policy’s KEY.
Thus, as L2CAP packets are transported between the Host and Bluetooth devices,
the filter examines each packet to determine if some security policy applies to that
packet. Essentially, given an L2CAP packet, PACKET, an HCI connection handle,
CONN_HDL, and information about the direction of the packet (host-to-device or
device-to-host), DIR, the filter must decide to either apply Trusted I/O security to
PACKET or allow it to pass through unaffected.
Each L2CAP PACKET (recall Figure 2.8) contains a CID and packet length
(LEN). Also, the Controller knows the CONN_HDL to which the PACKET belongs,
and which direction the packet is being transported. Therefore, the filter can check
the Metadata Table to see if the PACKET belongs to a secure channel and apply the
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appropriate security operations (encrypt, decrypt, etc.) over the PACKET’s payload
based on DIR. Note that the boundary of the PACKET’s payload can be determined
from the LEN field in the header of PACKET; all Trusted I/O security is applied to
the payload. We discuss this step next.
Bluetooth Trusted I/O Security
The details of the security applied to user data (e.g., encryption and decryption
algorithms, key sizes, MACs) are implementation and security-model specific. As
noted in Section 2.3, BASTION-SGX aims to provide confidentiality, integrity, replay
protection, and mutual authentication guarantees (G2 and G3). In BASTION-SGX,
any authenticated encryption algorithm can be used to secure the channel. Such
an encryption algorithm is applied to user I/O data within trusted software and
the trusted Controller so that the data can be routed in the normal way (G4) via
untrusted software; by securing the I/O data before moving it out of the trusted
software or Controller, we ensure the data is opaque to untrusted software (G1).
Furthermore, in doing so, we protect user I/O data against the malware attacks
defined in Section 2.3 – which raises the bar significantly from today’s solution.
Thus, assuming trusted software has a secure mechanism to share keys with the
Controller, BASTION-SGX can achieve its security goals. We note that this key-
sharing step is critical to Trusted I/O security, yet distinct from the contributions we
describe in this dissertation. In fact, there is nothing especially novel behind how
this key sharing can be done, and as such, is not an emphasis of this dissertation. To
convince the reader that this step is not an issue, we briefly describe two approaches
next.
Dynamic Key Provisioning. This approach requires further extensions to the Blue-
tooth Controller that enable it to attest itself to an enclave, enabling a Controller
to prove to an enclave that it is authentic Bluetooth hardware, executing authentic
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Bluetooth firmware; the attestation we envision is similar to what is proposed in
the USB Type-C Authentication Specification [70] and the PCIe Device Security
Enhancements Specification [58].1 These specifications define nearly identical au-
thentication architectures that allow USB and PCIe devices, respectively, to have
their identity and capability cryptographically verified. These architectures provide
a specific example where cryptographic verification can be used to subsequently
exchange secrets to set up a secure channel between software and a device; such
a channel, in our work, would be used by trusted software to configure security
policies (Section 2.3.4) within the Controller.
At a high level, these authentication architectures adapt common industry
paradigms (i.e., PKI) for identity and capability verification. Specifically, a trusted
root certificate authority (CA) generates a root certificate; the root certificate is used
by an authentication initiator (verifier) to verify the validity of signatures generated
by a device (prover) during authentication. The root certificate is also used to
endorse vendor certificates, which are then used to endorse some combination of
intermediate certificates and model certificates; these certificates are ultimately used
to endorse per-device certificates.
Authentication happens in two steps: (1) Authentication Provisioning, and
(2) Runtime Authentication. In the authentication provisioning step, the root certifi-
cate is provisioned to the authentication verifier (in our case, trusted software) to
enable the verifier to verify the validity of signatures generated by a device (in our
case, a Bluetooth Controller) during the runtime authentication step. Furthermore, a
public/private key pair is generated for each device; the private key is provisioned
into the device at the time of manufacturing along with a certificate that contains its
corresponding public key, along with a signature that can be verified using the root
1At the hardware level (i.e., within the hub), components connected with the CPU via PCIe,
USB, UART, etc., are commonly referred to as “parts” or “devices.” Thus, references to “devices” in
this context are distinct from how we use the word “device” throughout the rest of this dissertation,
which is to refer to Bluetooth devices.
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CA’s public key in the root certificate. In the runtime authentication step, the verifier
queries the device to obtain its certificate, and sends a unique challenge (nonce) to
the device; the device can authenticate its identity and capability by signing the
challenge along with other authentication data (e.g., a measurement of its firmware)
with its private key. The verifier can verify the device’s response/signature using
the device’s public key and the root CA’s public key (as well as any intermediate
public key), and use the result of its verification to make a trust decision.
Assuming the device (again, in our case this is the Controller) successfully
attests to its authenticity, standard protocols such as DAA-SIGMA [186] can be
used to share a secret and establish a secure channel between an enclave and the
Controller; the enclave can then use the secure channel to share Trusted I/O keys
with the Controller.
New Platform Capability. An alternative approach envisions a new platform
capability, similar to previously-envisioned capabilities. For example, the authors
of the Secure Input/Output Device Management patent [129] describe a scenario
similar to ours: a processor has secure execution environment support (e.g., SGX)
and wishes to establish a secure connection to an I/O controller. The I/O controller
includes an integrated Trusted I/O component that can receive (unencrypted)
requests to configure the Trusted I/O component. In the patent, the authors provide
details for how a USB controller can be equipped with trusted I/O capabilities
and how encryption keys can be established between an enclave and the USB
controller. Our work can use similar features for a Trusted I/O-enabled Bluetooth
Controller. This new capability would make secure key sharing a feature of the
platform (via ISA extensions), and allow enclaves to send Trusted I/O keys securely
to an authentic Bluetooth Controller.
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2.5.2 Trusted I/O Host Software
In BASTION-SGX, trusted apps are implemented as SGX enclaves. Trusted apps are
therefore subject to the same security model as SGX, and benefit from existing work
towards resources for enclave software development [96, 130]. Trusted software
uses enclaves to protect select code and data within the enclave, and uses our
Trusted I/O features to secure I/O data between itself and the Bluetooth Controller.
In theory, a trusted app can be quite simple. To create secure Bluetooth I/O
channels, a trusted app needs to configure security policies within the Controller
using the Bluetooth Trusted I/O API (Section 2.5.1). For each new secure I/O
channel, a trusted app should use a new symmetric key, which can be generated
using third-party libraries such as mbedTLS [20], for example. The trusted app can
then use one of the mechanisms described in Section 2.5.1 to securely configure
security policies (which include the key) into the Controller. A trusted app also
needs to perform cryptographic operations on incoming/outgoing data; the SGX
SDK [100] offers various functions to help developers with these sorts of operations,
though again, third-party libraries (e.g., [20]) can also be used.
In some cases there may be a need for additional trusted software (e.g., Trusted
Bluetooth Profiles) to support trusted apps that use Trusted I/O features. (See
Section 2.7 for an example.) In today’s solution, the OS and various drivers are
trusted, so it is not a problem to have them process and interpret the contents of
I/O packets to make them useful for apps. Our security model rules the OS and
these subsystems out of the TCB; our work is therefore unable to rely on them
for these services. Alternatively, a trusted app can opt to implement any data
processing/interpretation that is needed (as we do in our work). Both of these
options are viable.
We envision extending the existing SGX SDK [100] in future work to include
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our Bluetooth Trusted I/O extensions for SGX. Specifically, these further extensions
would implement common Bluetooth Trusted I/O operations such as key generation
and encryption/decryption for securing I/O data, a security policy API, and so
forth, alleviating the need for developers to implement these features in their apps.
2.6 Analytical Evaluation
In this section we present a analytical evaluation of BASTION-SGX. We are most
interested in two evaluating two aspects of our solution: the memory overhead
of managing additional metadata for Trusted I/O, and impact on network perfor-
mance (latency and throughput).
Trusted I/O Memory Overhead
Recall the metadata table from Figure 2.12. Each row in the table consumes at
most 32 bytes (BD_ADDR = 6 bytes, CONN_HDL = 2 bytes, LOCAL_CID = 2 bytes,
REMOTE_CID = 2 bytes, COD = 2 bytes, PSM = 2 bytes, KEY = 16 bytes). In practice,
Bluetooth controllers support connections from three to eight devices, though some
Bluetooth hardware is known to support as many as twenty devices.
Figure 2.13 illustrates that the memory overhead for our Trusted I/O solution
scales linearly with the number of channels requiring security. In a scenario common
to today, where no more than eight devices are connected with a hub, and each
device has only one channel that requires Trusted I/O security, the metadata table
that is maintained for our solution would consume a modest 8× 23 = 184 bytes of
memory. In fact, even if we envisioned a more capable Bluetooth controller that
supported up to 100 devices, the metadata table would consume just over 2K bytes
of memory. Ultimately, the cost of our solution in terms of additional memory
consumption is dependent on the hardware’s resources – specifically, the number
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Figure 2.13: Trusted I/O memory overhead. Memory consumed by the Metadata Table is ulti-
mately limited by the number of connected devices that the hardware supports. The memory
consumed scales linearly with the number of logical channels utilizing Trusted I/O security.
of connected devices that the hardware supports.
Trusted I/O Latency & Throughput
To obtain insights into the impact of BASTION-SGX on network performance, we
draw from measurements performed in related work [128, 76, 152]. In particular, we
utilize timing measurements for BLE data transfer, as well as encryption, decryption,
and MAC operations, which are used to protect data channels. For the purpose
of this analysis, let us suppose that two devices are already connected and we are
interested in computing the additional per-packet performance impact of Trusted
I/O.
To reason about the impact of Trusted I/O, observe that, for packet ingress, a
Trusted I/O-protected channel incurs the additional cost of a table look-up (negli-
gible), one packet (re-)encryption within the Bluetooth controller, and one packet
decryption in the receiving app. For packet egress, a Trusted I/O-protected chan-
nel incurs the additional cost of an encryption in the app and a decryption in the
Bluetooth controller. Thus, regardless of the destination of the packet, each data
46
Host A LL A LL B Host B





TIO Lookup + Decrypt
BT OTA Encrypt
Data
Figure 2.14: Trusted I/O Operation Overhead.
packet protected by Trusted I/O is encrypted and decrypted one additional time.
For clarity, this observation is illustrated in Figure 2.14.
Common approaches to measure throughput are to use Round-Trip Time
(RTT) or One-Way-Trip (OWT) Time. The RTT simply measures the elapsed time
between when a packet is sent from A to B and back. Assuming the delays in both
directions are approximately the same, the OWT is half of the RTT. Using RTT to
provide analytical insight into achievable throughput with Trusted I/O, one can (in
theory) send as much data as possible, apply the expected (average) latency, and
evaluate how much data gets through. This raises two questions: How much data
can be sent per second?, and What is the latency?
To proceed, we can use the following equation to calculate throughput:





where NconnInterval is the number of packets exchanged per connection interval,
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d is the amount of data per packet, and connInterval is how often two devices
communicate (in milliseconds; a minimum of 7.5 milliseconds and increases in
steps of 1.25 milliseconds).
The maximum application layer throughput for a connection between two
devices has be obtained in prior work through both simulation and mathematical
analysis [76]. To summarize: the theoretical data rate of Bluetooth varies depending
on the version. For instance, in Bluetooth v4.2, the maximum BLE data rate is
1Mbps. In practice, however, the data rate at the application layer is substantially
lower – the maximum theoretical application layer throughput is 236.7Kbps, but
real-world experiments suggest that the application layer throughput is more like
58.48Kbps [76]. This disparity is due to a variety of factors (e.g., protocol overhead,
connection interval (CI), Inter Frame Space (IFS), the number of devices in the
piconet, implementation limitations) that are beyond the scope of this analysis.
In a BLE connection, each device communicates with the other at least once
during a period known as the CI. By default, even when neither device has data to
send, each device will transmit an empty Link Layer packet. The minimum CI per
the Bluetooth specification is 7.5ms. Within the CI, devices are allowed to transmit as
many packets as desired, restricted only by the IFS (required time between packets),
and the fact that each packet sent fromA to B results in a response (ACK) from B to
A. While it is theoretically possibly to transmit more packets per CI, most devices
transmit at most four data packets per CI. Even in ideal scenarios (e.g., extremely
low Bit Error Rate (BER), using the smallest possible CI), past work evaluating
BLE observed that the average one-way trip latency is 1ms [76]. For reference, we
recreate figures (Figure 2.15) from PunchThrough’s article on BLE throughput [162],
which illustrates the maximum throughput, minimum connection interval, and
maximum number of packets per connection interval for various iOS and Android
devices.
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Figure 2.15: Examples of commodity devices and their maximum throughput, minimum con-
nection interval, and maximum number of packets per connection interval. We recreate these
figures using data obtained from PunchThrough’s article on BLE throughput [162].
BASTION-SGX is technically agnostic to the security parameters and oper-
ations for Trusted I/O. For illustration, however, let us assume a deployment of
BASTION-SGX uses strong, standard techniques to protect the channel, such as
AES-CTR, AES-CCM, or AES-EAX.2 Let us consider the use of AES-EAX. In recent
work evaluating the performance of cryptographic algorithms across various IoT
platforms and operating systems [152], it was observed that one encryption oper-
ation for AES-EAX consumes < 100µs of time on average for a message sizes of
less than 100 bytes. (The associated decryption displayed similar performance.)
Since each packet in Trusted I/O, regardless of ingress or egress, incurs the cost of
one additional encryption and decryption, which adds 200µs on top of the average
latency of a BLE packet.
Combining all of this information suggests that Trusted I/O adds approxi-
mately 20% overhead to the transfer of a single packet. Notice, however, that if
the average latency for BLE is 1ms, and Trusted I/O adds 200µs to protect a single
packet, and four packets are sent per CI,3 the total latency is still less than the CI.
2AES-CCM and AES-EAX are schemes for achieving Authenticated Encryption with Associated
Data (authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD). Counter Mode (CTR) is a mode of
operation that turns a block cipher into a stream cipher by including successive values of a counter
value.
3Past work has observed that the maximum number of packets per connection interval is
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Thus, the impact to latency is quite small, and since the number of data packets per
CI remains the same, there is no impact to the overall throughput.
2.7 Case Study: Securing Bluetooth I/O on Intel’s SGX
Here, we validate the Trusted I/O Controller and its role in our architecture (Sec-
tion 2.5.1). Specifically, we seek to validate: (1) that our metadata table can be built
and enables unique channel selection for Trusted I/O security; (2) that security
policies can be added/removed to/from the Controller by creating new Vendor Spe-
cific Debug Commands (VSDC); (3) that packet filtering can isolate data-carrying
packets and encrypt only packet data; and (4) that only the trusted app can recover
(decrypt) I/O data over the secure channel it establishes with the Controller.
To this end, we built a prototype of our architecture and an example trusted
app on an SGX-enabled platform running the Linux OS (Figure 2.16). The official
Bluetooth Host Software used by Linux is BlueZ [36]. In our current prototype, we
modified Bluetooth firmware that runs within an Intel Bluetooth Controller, adding
the features we describe in Section 2.5.1. We describe our prototype in more detail
next.
2.7.1 Implementation of the Trusted I/O Controller
On initialization of the Controller, we allocate space for the metadata table. We
added hooks into the existing firmware to monitor HCI and L2CAP connection/dis-
connection events, and update the metadata table accordingly. We also extended
the Controller to support two new VSDCs for adding/removing security polici-
ces: TIO_SET_KEY and TIO_CLEAR_KEY. As packets arrive in the Controller, the
dependent on the BLE stack and chipset, and is limited to four packets per interval on iOS and six
packets per interval on Android. Thus, even if it is theoretically possible to transfer more packets
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Figure 2.16: Adaptation of our Trusted I/O architecture to illustrate our prototype work.
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Controller looks up information about the packet (i.e., to which channel it belongs)
to determine whether further action is necessary (Section 2.5.1). We use the KEY
programmed via TIO_SET_KEY to secure the relevant channel between trusted
software and the Controller. Because the metadata table maintains information
about each connected device and all of their logical channels, our current imple-
mentation uses the presence of a KEY for a particular channel as a flag to indicate
whether that channel is currently a secure channel. Together, these steps enabled us
to validate the above-mentioned objectives.
2.7.2 Validating Trusted I/O
We also implemented a trusted app (TA). We specifically considered a TA that
prompts the user for a password and wants to ensure that password entry is secure.
We installed a privileged keylogger on the hub to verify that the channel is in fact
secure during password entry; the keylogger monitored all transactions over the
HCI and logged all HID data.
At the time a user enters the password field context, the TA generates a
symmetric key and uses the Bluetooth Trusted I/O API (Section 2.5.1) to send it to
the Controller, indicating that it wants to secure input from the connected keyboard
device. As a user types her password, the Bluetooth device generates packets
containing the key presses. Because the device and hub were previously paired,
they share a symmetric key and use it to protect user data in the OTA segment of
the I/O path.4 As L2CAP packets arrive in the Controller, the Controller uses the
OTA key to decrypt them. Without Trusted I/O, the Controller need only map the
link identifier to the HCI connection handle, and transport packets to the Bluetooth
Host software, which in turn routes the packets to the appropriate apps. With
4The OTA symmetric key is negotiated between the hub’s Controller and device’s Controller.
Host software (trusted or untrusted) does not have access to the OTA key.
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Trusted I/O, however, the Controller’s filter first checks to see whether the packet
belongs to a Trusted I/O channel (Section 2.5.1). If the packet belongs to a Trusted
I/O channel, channel security is applied (Section 2.5.1) using the KEY programmed
by the TA previously. If the packet does not belong to a Trusted I/O channel, no
channel security is applied. In either case, the packet is encapsulated within an HCI
packet and sent to Host software (and ultimately routed to the appropriate app)
via the normal transport (e.g., UART). When a TA receives packets, it decrypts and
verifies the contents.
One technical challenge that arises in our prototype work is the handling
of Human Interface Device (HID) input. Because HID devices are an important
part of modern computers, there are drivers and other middleware that help to
process and interpret HID data. For example, keyboard input is sent through a HID
subsystem that translates scan codes into text characters. In reality, this translation
is fairly simple, and the TA can implement it in its own code – indeed, the TA in
our prototype handles the translation itself. Alternatively, one can envision trusted
middleware that handles these sorts of standard operations. In light of this, we
need to prevent Host software from trying to interpret certain (HID) packets that
have been secured as part of a Trusted I/O channel.
In Bluetooth, HID packets are encapsulated within Bluetooth HID packets,
which are then encapsulated within L2CAP packets (recall Figure 2.8). The Blue-
tooth HID layer serves as a lightweight wrapper of the HID protocol defined for
USB; this enables the re-use of Host software that already exists to support USB-
based HID. By default, when a Bluetooth HID device connects, Host software
routes its HID packets through the relevant HID subsystems, processes the packet
contents, and then makes the data available to apps. To prevent the Host soft-
ware from routing Trusted I/O HID packets through these HID subsystems – and
erroneously interpreting packet contents – we installed a new Bluetooth profile:
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the Trusted I/O HID Profile. This profile is functional software that exists solely to
prevent premature interpretation of data, and instead, passes data to the intended
trusted software for handling. We emphasize that this “glue” software is not part
of our TCB: it is untrusted functional software that is needed only to prevent Host
software from incorrectly handling certain packets.
2.8 Related Work
Addressing the trusted path problem for Bluetooth I/O raises a number of chal-
lenges that we confront in this work. Our approach bears some resemblance to
the trusted path work by Zhou et al. [200]. They propose to build a trusted path
between a program endpoint (trusted app) and a device endpoint (I/O hardware);
they rely on a non-standard hypervisor to offer trusted-path isolation from un-
trusted software. In our work, we eliminate any need to rely on trusted drivers,
OSes, hypervisors, and so forth, for security; all data is secured within the Bluetooth
Controller and the trusted app, and is therefore opaque while in transit through
untrusted software. In another related work, researchers present SGXIO [189]. In
SGXIO, the trusted path must be built from a user app (enclave) to a Trusted I/O
driver, and from the driver to the respective I/O device. Again, this work relies
on a hypervisor to realize a secure binding between the Trusted I/O driver and
the actual I/O hardware. In our architecture, a specific I/O Controller (Bluetooth)
is modified, enabling an SGX app to create a secure binding with the Controller
directly.
2.9 Summary
In this chapter, we provide an in-depth analysis of Bluetooth and various challenges
in realizing Trusted I/O for Bluetooth. In response to those challenges, we present
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BASTION-SGX: a Trusted I/O architecture for Bluetooth on SGX. We also discuss
our prototype implementation of BASTION-SGX, which adds new, lightweight
features to the Bluetooth Controller and demonstrates its utility in securing user
data input from keyboard devices.
Our prototype examines an implementation of BASTION-SGX in a real-world
case study that effectively mitigates a priveleged keylogger malware. We implement
our solution primarily in firmware; to reduce performance costs, we recommend
implementing some (or all) of these operations in hardware. We also present an ana-
lytical evaluation of BASTION-SGX’s impact on memory and network performance.
Because the the maximum application-layer throughput supported by Bluetooth is
no more than a few kilobits per second, we show the Trusted I/O-related crypto-
graphic operations will not introduce any perceptible latency and will certainly not
































Figure 2.17: An overview of our system model and the threats to sensitive I/O data hub de-





In Chapter 1 we introduced the idea that many peripheral devices are expected to be
useful personal devices, to be secure against threats (such as malicious applications),
and to do all of this “on a budget.” In this chapter, we present our work on Amulet:
a software and hardware platform that enables developers to create secure and
efficient mobile health (mHealth) applications on resource-constrained devices, such
as wearable devices and other peripheral devices; our work focuses on how these
devices and their software can be composed and verified in a more trustworthy
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Figure 3.1: Overview of System Model and Amulet.
way, fortifying them from being compromised by errant applications that might
attempt to interfere with other applications or the underlying system itself.
Although the Amulet Platform has potential to support a broad range of appli-
cations, on a broad range of devices, we focus our design on mHealth applications
that run on a smartwatch form factor because they are increasingly prevalent, and
their need for a robust, secure, long-lived platform poses important design chal-
lenges. While we focus our attention on mHealth applications on smartwatches, our
contributions (Figure 3.1) can be generalized to any embedded platform (including
many IoT devices) that needs (1) to support the secure operation of a device with
one or more third-party applications, and (2) do so with extremely low power
consumption.
This chapter is a modified version of two of our papers that were published in
2014 and 2016, respectively: Amulet: A secure architecture for mHealth applications for




Wearable wristbands are increasingly popular devices for health and fitness sensing,
and the increasing variety of applications is driving the market from single-function
devices (like the Fitbit Flex) toward multi-application platforms (like the Apple
Watch or Pebble Time). These devices enable new sensing paradigms; they are worn
continuously, they can provide at-a-glance information to the wearer, and they can
interact through a body-area network with computers, smartphones, and other
wearables (such as an ECG chest strap) or even implantables (such as an implanted
insulin pump). Some existing devices are flexible and full-featured, with supportive
development environments, but have inadequate battery life (about a day). Most
others are single-purpose devices with better battery life that users cannot easily
reprogram or customize for different applications and conditions.
Although the line between “smartband” and “smartwatch” products is blur-
ring, we think of the former as having great battery life but limited flexibility, and
the latter as having programmability but limited battery life. Battery life is a critical
feature for mobile and wearable devices – by far the most-important feature as rated
by users of today’s smartphones and wearable gadgets [23, 182]. We aim to enable
devices that have the week-long or month-long battery lifetimes of a smartband
with the multi-application flexibility and full-featured development environment
of a smartwatch. To support multiple applications, especially in critical domains
like health, the platform must also provide strong security properties, including
isolation between apps. To realize these goals, wearables must effectively manage
energy, share resources, and isolate applications on low-power microcontrollers
that cannot support hardware memory management units (MMUs).
In this chapter, we present Amulet, an open source1 hardware and software
1You can find the open-source, open-hardware release of the Amulet Platform and its tools
at https://github.com/AmuletGroup/amulet-project.
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platform (Figure 3.2) for developing secure and efficient mHealth applications
on resource-constrained devices. (Detailed illustrations of the relevant software
architectures are shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.5; an illustration of the hardware
architecture is shown in Figure 3.7; images of our hardware prototype are shown
in Figure 3.8.) This platform, which includes the Amulet Firmware Toolchain,
the Amulet-OS Runtime, the ARP-View graphical tool, and our custom hardware
design, efficiently protects applications from each other without MMU support,
allows developers to interactively explore how their implementation decisions
impact battery life without the need for hardware modeling and additional software
development, and represents a new approach to developing long-lived mHealth
applications.
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Figure 3.2: An overview of the Amulet Platform and vision. Figure adapted from its initial
publication [181].
Devices with the properties that the Amulet Platform offers are of great in-
terest to research communities in sensing, health, and other domains. In fact, we
note that the Amulet Project has stimulated follow-on work by others including
developing mHealth applications [37, 38, 39], new techniques and systems to secure
mHealth data [80, 88] (between clinician and patients, or coaches and athletes, for
example), user studies and human-computer interaction (HCI) studies [137], sensor
design [159], further enhancements to the underlying design and security of the
platform [106, 86], and patents [109].
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3.1.1 Contributions
The Amulet work that we present in this dissertation was done as part of the Amulet
Project: a multi-year, multi-disciplinary collaboration between researchers from
Dartmouth College and Clemson University.2 As such, and for the purpose of this
dissertation, we understand that it is necessary to distinguish my contributions
from the contributions of others on the Amulet Project. The contributions of the
platform as a whole have been discussed in our past work [139, 91]. For clarity, a
break-down of my contributions on this project are detailed next.
As a member of the Amulet Project (2014-2016), I made significant contribu-
tions to the design, implementation, and evaluation of the system and its security
properties. Specifically, this dissertation highlights the following contributions:
1. Collaborated with others to design the Amulet software stack (see Figure 3.3),
including the “Amulet APIs” used by applications, “Core Services” offered
by the platform, and the interface with the physical components (“Board
Support”). Based on the Amulet software stack, I collaborated with others to
implement the Amulet-OS Runtime, a multi-application runtime system for
resource-constrained wearables that is built on a low-power variant of the QP
runtime [114].
2. Collaborated with others to design and implement the Amulet Firmware
Toolchain (AFT), a firmware-production toolchain that guarantees application
isolation (Section 3.3.3 and Section 3.5). Though work on what is now the
AFT was started by Andrés Molina-Markham (Dartmouth), Bhargav Golla
(Clemson), and Jacob Sorber (Clemson), I re-wrote and significantly extended
their initial work. Specifically, I implemented the Resource Profiler (which
2Many people that I refer to in this section have moved on to other schools or companies. For
this reason, I note their original affiliation.
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profiles system and per-app memory and energy usage), the ARP-View (an
app development tool that visualizes the Resource Profiler’s findings for app
developers), the Authorization Module (which performs compile-time analy-
sis of apps according to Amulet security goals), and the compiler translations
(which inserts lightweight runtime checks for apps, among other things).
3. Collaborated with Josiah Hester (Clemson) and David Kotz (Dartmouth) to
design the resource models (Section 3.4). Based on these resource models, I
implemented the Resource Profiler to aggregate the data needed to compute
the models, and implemented the models in the ARP-View.
4. Collaborated with Josiah Hester (Clemson), Tianlong Yun (Dartmouth), and
Andrés Molina-Markham (Dartmouth) to evaluate a prototype Amulet. Wor-
thy of note is the evaluation of battery lifetime, the accuracy of the Resource
Profiler predictions, and the system overhead (Section 3.6). This work also
led to two user studies: one investigating the utility of our ARP-View tool to
developers while developing a continuous sensing app, and one investigating
the feasibility of using Amulet as a platform for continuous monitoring appli-
cations in human subject research. While I did not directly participate in the
running of either study, I designed and implemented the tool studied in the
former, and supported the app developer of the latter.
In all of this work, I would be remiss if I did not specifically acknowledge the
exemplary work of fellow doctoral-student researchers, Josiah Hester (Clemson)
and Tianlong Yun (Dartmouth), who also made significant contributions to the
overall design, implementation, evaluation – and ultimately – success of the Amulet
Platform. Furthermore, I acknowledge the efforts of George Boateng, Eric Chen,
Emily Greene, David Harmon, and Anna Knowles – Dartmouth undergraduates
with whom I worked – that helped to demonstrate the viability of the Amulet
62
Platform through developing interesting apps and uses of Amulet. Last, but cer-
tainly not least, I acknowledge the direct leadership and technical support of David
Kotz (Dartmouth), Jacob Sorber (Clemson), Ryan Halter (Dartmouth), Ron Peterson
(Dartmouth), Andrés Molina-Markham (Dartmouth) – without whom this project
would not have achieved the success that it did.
3.2 Background & Motivation
In this section we provide relevant background on mHealth wearable devices and
mHealth applications.
The current generation of mHealth wearables, such as the Fitbit Flex and the
Withings Pulse, are single-application devices that focus on specific health goals
like physical activity or sleep quality. These devices run one application, created
by the device developers; they cannot run multiple applications nor be extended
with applications from third-party developers. As a result, an individual with
multiple health-monitoring goals may need to wear many such devices. Amulet
intends to encompass many of these single-application devices by combining input
from a variety of internal and external sensors such as heart rate, skin conductance,
physical activity, and air quality. Amulet would allow interested adults to customize
their wearable device with the applications that are relevant to their health needs
and lifestyle. Meanwhile, “smartwatches” like the Apple Watch and the Samsung
Gear are general-purpose wrist wearables that support multiple applications and
third-party developers. Neither class of devices address our goals, for several
reasons.
First, we are not convinced that all users want a general-purpose large-screen
smartwatch with a battery life measured in hours. Our architecture aims to enable
smaller wristbands (and other constrained wearables) with battery lifetimes mea-
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sured in weeks or months and support for critical and sensitive applications like
those related to chronic disease and behavioral health.
Second, developer tools for these wearables are in their infancy. Battery
lifetime (i.e., amount of time between battery charges) is a critical concern for any
wearable; although some developer frameworks provide general guidelines for
writing efficient applications, developers are unable to accurately predict how their
applications will perform when deployed. The Amulet Platform includes tools that
forecast battery lifetimes and an application’s resource usage. More importantly,
these tools help developers conceptualize how their design decisions impact energy
consumption and identify specific opportunities for improvement.
Third, current solutions do not provide open-source hardware and software;
the Amulet Platform is fully open-source and open-hardware, enabling new oppor-
tunities for innovation by health and technology researchers alike.
Finally, the Amulet platform is noteworthy for its focus on security. While a
device that can run third-party applications is inherently more difficult to secure
than unmodifiable single-application devices (i.e., many IoT devices today), most
current wearable devices that run third-party applications are not designed with
security in mind (for example, the Pebble Watch). Newer wearables, including most
smartwatches, provide limited support for third-party applications and run a heavy-
weight operating system (such as Android’s Wear OS or The Linux Foundation’s
Tizen, for example) at high energy cost and with little emphasis on security. Our
proposed software architecture, Amulet, can run multiple third-party mHealth
applications simultaneously and provides strong security properties.
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3.3 System Overview
In this section we discuss our goals for the Amulet Platform, and outline the two
major building blocks of the Platform: the Amulet-OS and the Amulet Firmware
Toolchain (AFT).
3.3.1 Amulet Goals
We designed Amulet to support a multi-developer, multi-application vision, aiming
at four goals not faced by single-purpose wearables, single-developer wearables, or
power-hungry platforms that need to be recharged daily.
Goal 1: Multiple Applications. Amulet platforms enable sensing applications written
by third-party developers, even on resource-constrained wearable devices. The Amulet
Platform masks the complexity of embedded-system development, and supports a
variety of internal and external sensors, actuators, and user-interface elements. Since
users are unlikely to wear multiple single-function devices, the Amulet Platform
aims to support multiple concurrent applications.
Goal 2: Application Isolation. Amulet platforms isolate applications from each other
and from the system. With multiple concurrent applications, sensitive user informa-
tion must be protected and applications must be prevented from interfering with
the system or other applications. Amulet uses creative compile-time and run-time
isolation mechanisms to achieve these properties on ultra-low-power microcon-
trollers that do not provide memory virtualization or memory protection. In this
dissertation we focus on memory isolation and resource management.
Goal 3: Long Battery Life. Amulet platforms enable wearable devices with battery life
measured in weeks. Today’s multi-application wearable devices have poor battery
life, including research devices like ZOE [113] and commercially significant de-
vices like the Apple Watch [13]. Even the longest-lived commercial devices, like
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the Pebble [150], have lifetimes measured in days. When wearables can run for
weeks or months, new applications are enabled and users are likely to benefit from
applications that support long-term 24/7 health monitoring and interventional
behavior change. The Amulet hardware supports ultra-low-power operation and
longer battery lifetimes, and the Amulet Platform helps developers see how their
application’s behavior influences battery lifetime.
Goal 4: Resource-usage Prediction. Amulet platforms include tools that provide in-
teractive analysis of resource usage, including energy impact and memory usage for
applications and the underlying system. Existing tools for third-party application
developers on wearable platforms are very limited, focused on documenting best
practices and measuring resource usage of running applications; they do not pro-
vide compile-time, app-developer tools for predicting the battery impact of an
application or combination of applications.
We next describe our initial implementation, focusing on the above goals in
two parts: the Amulet-OS and the Amulet Firmware Toolchain (AFT).
3.3.2 Amulet-OS
The Amulet-OS software architecture (Figure 3.3) achieves all the above goals
by providing a low-power, event-driven programming model, a rich API, and
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Figure 3.3: The Amulet-OS software stack; applications access core services through the
Amulet API layer.
Event-driven programming
Many sensing-based applications, including the health-oriented applications that
motivate our work, tend to remain idle waiting for user interaction or new sensor
data. Thus, Amulet uses an event-driven programming model to simplify developer
tasks and enable low-power operation. Each application is represented as a state
machine with memory; that is, each application consists of a set of states (the boxes
shown in Figure 3.4) and transitions between states (the arrows shown in Figure 3.4),
as well as a small set of persistent variables. Each transition is triggered by the arrival
of an event, which themselves result from expired timers, user interactions like a
button press, or data arriving from internal and external sensors. Applications can
specify optional event handlers for each state and each event type. Handlers are
non-blocking functions that may consume data arriving with the event, update
application variables, call Amulet APIs, or send events, in any combination.
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Figure 3.4: An example state machine for a simple event-driven application.
This state-machine approach makes application state explicit, easing analysis
and optimization. Application code, state, and variables are kept in persistent
storage. Handlers run to completion, so there are no threads with stack-based state
information to preserve between events, let alone across processor reboots. The
Amulet-OS leverages this simplicity for deep power savings; when there are no
events to handle, the processor can go into deep sleep or even shut off. The Amulet
Firmware Toolchain leverages this structure to enable the analysis and profiling
tools described in the next section. This approach is also a major advantage over
the alternative of running a larger operating system, such as embedded Linux or a
real-time OS, in which applications are represented as processes or threads with
complex state and limited opportunity for deep sleep. (For more information, see
Section 3.7.)
Amulet API
Amulet-OS provides an application programmer interface (API) that allows for
sensing, storage, signal processing, communication, timing, and user interaction.
As with any OS, this API provides abstraction (hiding low-level complexities like
interrupt vectors, analog-digital converters, and radio communication) and resource
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management (isolating apps from each other and allowing them to share data and
devices). Amulet-OS simplifies data gathering by providing applications the ability
to subscribe to internal and external sensors; multiple applications can share a single
data stream, each receiving an event when new data arrives. Amulet-OS also
includes a logging API so applications can log sensor information to files on an
internal microSD card, and a timer API so applications can arrange for an event
in the future. Finally, the API provides applications access to interface elements
(display, LEDs, buzzer, buttons, and capacitive touch, in our implementation) and
multiplexes access across apps. These APIs call into the Amulet-OS core services
shown in Figure 3.3. All such calls are non-blocking because event handlers must
run to completion; where needed, a response is delivered to the application later as
an event.
The Amulet-OS is more of a lightweight run-time system than an operating sys-
tem, but nonetheless supports multiple applications on a low-power microcontroller
without memory protection or management. Thus, Amulet uses compile-time anal-
ysis to support application isolation and access control, and to minimize its memory
footprint. These challenges are the focus of the Amulet Firmware Toolchain.
3.3.3 Amulet Firmware Toolchain (AFT)
The Amulet Firmware Toolchain (AFT), shown in Figure 3.5, manages the analysis,
translation, and compilation of firmware. By building a custom firmware image for
each user, the AFT can optimize the image for the user’s device and its applications.
Here, we focus on two critical AFT roles: application isolation and resource pro-
filing. First, the AFT ensures that applications can only access Amulet hardware
by sending a well-formed request to the Amulet-OS core via the Amulet API, and
prevents malicious or buggy applications from reading or modifying the memory of
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Figure 3.5: Architecture of the Amulet Firmware Toolchain, showing the steps in producing
the firmware image for a given Amulet device.
developer can predict her application’s resource usage. The following text refers to
the numbered steps illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Analysis and Translation
Our approach leverages compiler-based translation and static analysis: application
developers pass their code to the Amulet Firmware Toolchain, which translates
and analyzes the source code, rejecting any code that is either not well formed or
70
violates the isolation principle (Goal 2). Application designers implement Amulet
state machines using a simple variant of the C programming language, “Amulet C,”
which offers programmers familiar programming constructs and facilitates efficient
code generation, while excluding many of C’s riskier features (Section 3.5.4). These
modifications, and the addition of loop invariants and automatic annotations by
the AFT, allow rigorous analysis of an application’s memory safety. The AFT uses
static-analysis tools to examine the code to identify memory-safety violations and
present the developer with compile-time errors. The AFT inserts run-time validation
code where static analysis is inconclusive; for example, the AFT inserts code for
array-bounds checking when the array index is not computable at compile time.
The Translator also implements authorization policies that define which ap-
plications can access which resources. For example, these policies may say that
a fall-detecting application may subscribe to data from the accelerometer, that an
emergency-response application may write a file to the SD card, or that the EMA
application may use the buttons and the display. By addressing these policies at
the time of application translation and analysis, the AFT can flag illegal access at
compile time, and insert run-time checks only when needed. The resulting code is
smaller, faster, and safer. Along with the applications, a list of application services
are supplied in a configuration file. The AFT uses this list to determine if applica-
tions call functions that are not permitted, and to determine which set of drivers
need to be included for this set of apps, to reduce code size.
Amulet Resource Profiler (ARP)
Although our experiments in Section 3.6 characterize the performance of the Amulet
hardware and software under a representative application workload, and those
results show it is possible to develop efficient applications for the Amulet hardware,
new application developers may not have access to the inner Amulet hardware or
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to our measurement infrastructure. With effective compile-time tools that predict an
application’s resource usage, developers can effectively manage critical resources
and protect the user’s experience even when combining applications from many
developers.
The Amulet Resource Profiler (ARP) tool leverages the other modules in
the Amulet Firmware Toolchain to predict an application’s resource usage; here,
we focus on memory and energy. Profiling these resources gives insight into the
application’s impact on battery lifetime, and the application’s impact on constrained,
shared, device computing resources. Lifetime is the most important consideration
for a wearable device; thus, giving developers insight on how their design decisions
affect lifetime is of great value to the developer and the user. The ARP captures
information about each application’s code space and memory requirements, using a
combination of compiler tools and static analysis. To profile energy, the ARP builds
a parameterized model of the application’s energy consumption, as described in
the next section. The results are then exported for use by the ARP-View.
ARP-View
This interactive tool presents developers a graphical view of the resource profile and
sliders that allow them to immediately see the battery-life impact when they adjust
application parameters. The tool guides developers towards a better understanding
of their application and enables them to explore trade-offs of different design
decisions. See Figure 3.6 for a snapshot of the ARP-View in action.
In ARP-View, developers are presented with an annotated visualization of
their application that resembles their original finite-state machine. Annotations on
edges (representing state transitions) provide immediate feedback about the rate
in which that event handler executes and the energy usage of that particular event



































































































































































































































































































scaled to simulate a particular handler running more/less frequently (Rt); this
allows developers to evaluate the impact of specific application activities on the
overall battery lifetime.
For perspective, ARP-View imports the device profile for information about
the device (such as battery and memory capacity) obtained earlier by the Profiler;
see the next section for more details.
Merge, Compile, Link
The next step in producing a final firmware image, referring back to Figure 3.5, is
for the AFT to merge the desired set of applications, then compile and link them
with the Amulet-OS code. For Amulet we leverage an event-driven programming
framework (QP) [114] that automatically generates the C code for state transitions
from each application’s state diagram. The AFT Merger combines this C code
with the translated application code (now in C), and the underlying event-driven
application framework, into a single C file. This file is compiled and linked with
the Amulet-OS code, incorporating only the system components needed for this
particular set of applications. (We anticipate users will select applications for their
personal Amulet device from a store hosting applications from many developers –
an “App Store” – and which compiles a custom firmware image comprising their
selected applications.)
The result of the AFT pipeline is a single firmware image for upload or distri-
bution. The AFT is currently agnostic about methods for delivery of the firmware;
we acknowledge that the delivery method (perhaps through the above-mentioned
App Store or some other cloud service) involves complex security and privacy
concerns.
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Table 3.1: Model notation.
Device profile
Md storage capacity of data memory
Mc storage capacity of code memory
EB energy capacity of full battery
E` average energy consumed by a line `
E f average energy consumed by one call to API function f
P0 baseline power draw
Ps average power draw for subscription to sensor s
S the set of all sensors on this device
F the set of all API functions available in Amulet-OS
Application parameters
A the set of all applications on this device
a an application in the set of all applications; a ∈ A
f a function in the set of all Amulet API functions; f ∈ F
Fa the set of all API functions used by application a; Fa ⊆ F
s a sensor in the set of all sensors; s ∈ S
Sa the set of sensors used by application a; Sa ⊆ S
t transition t in the set of all application transitions, T
Ta the set of all transitions in application a; Ta ⊆ T
L the set of all lines of code outside Amulet-OS
` line of code in the set of all lines of code; ` ∈ L
N`,t number of times line ` is executed by transition t
N f ,t number of times function f is called in transition t
Rt rate transition t executes (transitions per second)
Energy estimates
Et estimated energy of each occurrence of transition t
Ea estimated energy consumed by application a
EA estimated energy consumed by set of applications A
3.4 Resource Model
As noted above, the Amulet Resource Profiler (ARP) constructs a predictive energy
and memory model for each application. For clarity, we first discuss the modeling
and prediction for a single application (Section 3.4.2), and then conclude this section
with an extension of the model to accommodate multiple applications (Section 3.4.3).
Before delving into this discussion, we detail the assumptions we make in our
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resource model. The notation for our model is summarized in Table 3.1.
3.4.1 Model Assumptions
To predict resource usage we make the following assumptions in our resource
model:
1. The baseline power P0 captures the baseline power draw of our custom board,
the display, the buttons, the scroll wheel, the haptic buzzer (off), and the LEDs
(off).
2. The radio chip consumes its baseline power when it is inactive; all additional
costs of its activity related to external sensors, and its internal accelerometer,
are captured by the relevant sensor-subscription power draw Ps. The radio
chip incurs no other energy.
3. The application chip consumes its baseline power when it is inactive, and
we assume it is sleeping whenever no application code is running. All other
app-board energy is captured by API calls E f , lines of code E`, or sensor
subscriptions Ps.
4. All powers P are an average power draw over time.
5. Power drawn by input devices (buttons, scroll wheel) are included in the
baseline power.
6. Energy consumed by active output devices (LED, buzzer) costs are captured
by the E f where f is an API function using those devices.
7. Display (static) cost is buried in the baseline P0.
8. Display (change) cost is captured by the display-affecting API calls.
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9. We currently ignore data-dependent conditional statements and loop condi-
tions.
10. N`,t includes lines of code in the exit block of the source state, the main block
of the transition, and the entry block of the destination state; all three blocks
execute (in sequence) when the transition occurs.
3.4.2 Single Application Model
The ARP proceeds in four phases, which we describe next.
Phase I: Import Device Profile
The ARP imports a device profile, specific to the target Amulet model but indepen-
dent of any particular application. The device profile lists the amount of energy
consumed for each API call and for other fundamental operations, based on em-
pirical measurements collected earlier on a given hardware and system software
configuration. Each Amulet component (sensor, user-interface element, storage,
and processor) must be represented in the model as an instantaneous energy cost.
Each component has different states, each drawing different amounts of power, that
must also be captured. The energy cost of each API call must be captured in the
form of average power.
Altogether, the device profile includes information about the device capacity
(memory, battery), empirically derived measures of average energy consumed E f
for each Amulet API function f , the average energy consumed E` for executing
a specific line of C code `; and the average power draw Ps for a subscription to
sensor s (see Table 3.1). Energy is measured in joules (J); power draw is measured
in watts (J/s).
A device profile would be prepared and provided by the Amulet manufacturer
with each new hardware and Amulet-OS release. The AFT (Section 3.3.3) can assist
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by automatically producing the code to create this profile by generating a specially
instrumented Amulet Device Profiler app that exhaustively tests each of the Amulet
API functions that draw significant amounts of energy, for example, sampling the
Gyro, writing to the SD card, or turning on the radio. Using simple monitoring
hardware, Amulet manufacturers can gather these statistics once and distribute the
profile to application developers for their own testing, similar to current Android
manufacturer practice [9].
Phase II: Analyze Code
The ARP examines the application’s state diagram – a graph in which nodes repre-
sent states and directed edges represent transitions from one state to another. The
result is a set of transitions Ta for application a. For each transition t ∈ Ta the ARP
identifies all non-system code executed when transition t occurs (using static analy-
sis to count the number of executions N`,t of each line of code `, summing across
loop iterations and recursively examining code in helper and library functions).
That is, N`,t counts the number of times line ` will be executed during the handling
of transition t, accounting for loops and function calls.3 Similarly, for each transition
t the ARP determines the number of times the code for transition t will invoke
each Amulet API function f , which we denote N f ,t. Finally, the ARP examines
the sensor-related API calls to identify the set of sensors Sa to which application
a subscribes. The constraints of Amulet C (no recursion, no pointers, no dynamic
memory allocation) make this static analysis feasible.
3We count lines of code as a proxy for code complexity; to improve accuracy we could use the
code generator to count instructions of assembly. Since instruction execution has a relatively small
impact on power consumption, our implementation assumes E` to be the same for all lines of code;
we focus on modeling the API calls and sensor usage.
78
Phase III: Construct Model
The ARP constructs a parameterized model of the total energy cost for the app. For
each transition t, it estimates the average energy consumed Et for an occurrence of






N f ,tE f (3.1)
If the app subscribes to any sensors to feed it sensor data, we must also account for




Finally, the Amulet hardware incurs a baseline power draw when it is inactive;
we use P0 to represent the average power draw of the baseline system (the microcon-
trollers, the display, and the input devices). Because Amulet-OS has no background
activity, this baseline power draw represents all of the Amulet-OS power draw not
captured in the above equations.
To estimate the total energy consumption for application a, the ARP needs
to know how often each transition t will occur. While some of these rates may be
discerned from static analysis on the code, for others the ARP needs advice from the
developer – which the developer provides through annotations on the app’s state
machine. These rates Rt are the ‘knobs’ for the energy model – knobs the developer
can tweak to explore the power draw for various design options (for example, the
period of a timer that duty-cycles a key part of the application behavior). The total
energy consumed for application a, over a time period τ, is thus predicted from the
baseline power and the above equations, factoring in the rate of every transition t:






Over a week, then, application a consumes a fraction of the total battery capacity,
Ea(ω)/EB, where ω = 1 week; we leverage this calculation in our evaluation below.
Phase IV: Count Memory Usage
Every application requires memory for storage of its code and its data; like any
embedded system, low-power wearable platforms have severely limited memory
space. After parsing the application’s code and generating its firmware image, the
ARP reports the amount of memory to store the application’s code and determines
an upper bound on the amount of data memory consumed by the application.
These numbers are presented as fractions of Mc and Md. An application’s data
memory comprises global variables and local variables (on the stack). Amulet C
does not allow dynamic memory allocation, so the ARP easily counts the size of all
global variables; Amulet C does not allow recursion, so the ARP can compute the
maximum stack depth (including local variables).
3.4.3 Extending the Model to Multiple Applications
The ARP is also capable of estimating the energy consumption for some mix of
applications A. (Figure 3.6 shows one app’s state diagram along with total energy
consumption for all apps.) To estimate the total energy consumed by A, we cannot
simply sum the energy consumed by all of the individual applications. That is, the
total is not simply ∑a Ea, because we need to avoid double-counting the baseline
power draw as well as the sensor subscriptions (which are shared across all apps).
Instead, we need to account for the union of all sensors used by the mix of apps:
SA =
⋃
a∈A Sa. The total energy consumed for the application mix A is therefore
estimated by a variant of Equation 3.3:









We developed an Amulet reference device and implemented the Amulet-OS and
Amulet Firmware Toolchain software described above. In this section we describe
the details of each, as well as nine applications we wrote to demonstrate and
evaluate the Amulet Platform.
3.5.1 Amulet Device Prototype & Ultra Low Power Operation
A detailed description of the hardware prototype and the low-power capabilities of
the Amulet was discussed in detail in our SenSys’16 paper [91]; we refer the inter-
ested reader to Section 5 of our paper. Suffice it to say that the hardware prototype
includes a variety of interesting sensors (e.g., microphone, light sensor, temperature
sensor, gyroscope, accelerometer), storage options (e.g., SRAM, FRAM4, microSD),
and I/O components (e.g., buttons, capacitive touch sensors, LEDs, a haptic buzzer,
a small display), and we use a variety of techniques to operate an MSP430FR5989
microcontroller (the main computational device where applications run) and a
Nordic nRF51822 (where radio-based communications, such as BLE, are managed)
in a way that enables us to achieve low-power operation. (The hardware architec-
ture of the prototype is shown in Figure 3.7, and images of the perspective and
interior views of our prototype are shown in Figure 3.8.) We exclude these details
here as they are not necessary to understand the more security-focused work that
we highlight in this dissertation.
4FRAM (Ferroelectric RAM) is an increasingly common non-volatile memory technology that
offers persistent storage without power, and is 100 times faster than flash memory; during use,




















Figure 3.7: The hardware architecture of our two-processor Amulet prototype: the MSP430
runs applications, and the nRF51822 manages communication.
Figure 3.8: Perspective and interior views of our open-hardware wearable device (circa 2016),
part of the open-source Amulet Platform. The platform supports development of energy-
efficient, body-area-network sensing applications on multi-application wearable devices.
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3.5.2 Amulet-OS
We implemented the Amulet-OS run-time system on top of the QP event-driven
framework [114]. As shown in Figure 3.3, the Amulet architecture (and our im-
plementation) has three major layers: (1) a board-support layer, running directly
on the hardware and abstracting some of the hardware-dependent nuances; (2) a
set of core services that provide core functionality like networking, time, logging,
and power management; and (3) a set of application services accessible through
a thin set of functions in the Amulet API. The AFT static-analysis tools recognize
Amulet API functions and verify an application’s authorization to use specific ap-
plication services (much as Android uses the Manifest file to determine application
permissions).
The Amulet-OS is fully event-driven: there are no processes or threads, so all
application code runs to completion without context-switching overhead. Indeed,
an application’s code is comprised only of event handlers, and all such handlers ex-
ecute quickly (enforced by static analysis and OS-imposed time limits, and enabled
by non-blocking Amulet API functions). Quick interrupt and event handlers allow
the system to stay in low-power sleep mode most of the time. For the purposes of
our experiments below, and to support the Amulet Device Profiler app, Amulet-OS
can toggle GPIO pins when executing application event handlers, Amulet API
functions, or interrupt handlers; our external measurement chassis (Section 3.6)
monitors these pins to derive detailed energy and temporal measurements about
application and system modules.
3.5.3 Amulet Apps
We implemented nine applications to demonstrate and evaluate the Amulet Plat-
form. Amulet application developers construct their applications using the QP
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Figure 3.9: Screenshots of six of the nine applications we implemented.
event-based programming framework. Following QP, each application is defined
as a finite-state machine; for each possible state, the application can respond to a set
of events by providing a handler function for each type of event. We used vanilla
QP with the non-preemptive kernel (version 5.3), and required applications to use
the Amulet API to request services from Amulet-OS. Screenshots of six applications
(apps) are shown in Figure 3.9.
The QP framework exports the application in the XML-based QM format,
which embeds all of the programmer-supplied C code along with information about
the application’s finite state machine.
3.5.4 Amulet C
As mentioned earlier, application isolation is an important goal of the Amulet Plat-
form. To achieve application isolation without the support of memory-management
hardware, and without incurring excessive run-time overhead, the AFT conducts
most application isolation at compile time. Applications (that is, their handler
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functions) are written in a custom variant of C that removes many of C’s riskier
features: access to arbitrary memory locations (pointers), arbitrary control flows
(goto statements), recursive function calls, and in-line assembly. Since array access
in C is implemented using equivalent pointer operations, we modified the array
syntax so that arrays can be passed to functions explicitly ‘by reference’ (not as
pointers). In Amulet C, arrays also have an associated length that allows for run-
time bounds checking whenever access behaviors cannot be adequately checked
statically. Although this approach imposes some effort on the developer (to adapt
their code for Amulet C) it allows us to estimate the runtime of code executed in the
state machine, giving tighter bounds on energy predictions made by the Amulet
Resource Profiler.
3.5.5 Amulet Firmware Toolchain
We implemented the AFT as a series of programs that translate, analyze, validate,
and profile apps. Each application includes (1) a state machine, (2) event handlers
(written in Amulet C), and (3) attributes specifying the application’s global variables.
The QP framework combines application information into XML-formatted QM
files. AFT tools are written in Java and use its built-in XML libraries to parse the
submitted apps. Our tools translate the Amulet C code to safe C code using a
modified C grammar and the ANTLR parser generator [12]; they then use the
Frama-C static analysis framework [30] to ensure that array and other memory
accesses are valid, that problematic integer operations do not occur (e.g., division
by zero), and that programming techniques such as recursion, goto statements, and
pointers (including unary address operators) are not employed. Also noteworthy
is the fact that the AFT tools verify an application’s permissions based on an XML
file that lists application services that the application is permitted to use. Violations
against Amulet C coding rules and non-authorized requests to the core API trigger
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AFT compile-time errors.
After all these steps, applications are merged together into a single QM file,
which is then converted to C using QP. Immediately before the merge, all applica-
tion resources (e.g., variables, handlers, helper functions) are isolated by mapping
them to a unique namespace based on the application’s name (no two applications
installed on the system can have the same name). This code is then compiled and
linked using Texas Instrument’s open-source GCC for MSP430. This firmware im-
age can then be installed onto the application chip (MSP430) of our Amulet device
prototype.
3.5.6 Resource Profiler
We implemented the Amulet Resource Profiler (ARP) in Java and integrated it
with the other tools of the Amulet Firmware Toolchain (AFT). After validation and
translation, the ARP uses an ANTLR-generated parser to extract model parameters
from the application’s code and QM file. Specifically, from the application code it
extracts estimates of lines executed per transition (N`,t), sensor subscriptions (Sa),
and Amulet API calls (Fa and N f ,t). From the QM file it extracts the state machine
and its transitions (Ta), and the developer’s annotations about transition rates (Rt).
From the firmware’s symbol table it extracts the code size for both the application
and the core, and the amount of FRAM memory used by the application and the
core.
Separately, the ARP uses the Amulet Device Profiler app, and the measurement
chassis described in the next section, to extract the parameters for the device profile
(Table 3.1). The Device Profiler application also informs the ARP about the scaling
factors for certain operations, allowing for fine-grained estimates of function cost
(for example, assigning lower energy costs to drawing a 2x2 rectangle as opposed to
drawing a 128x128 rectangle). The Resource Profiler combines these measurements
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to build a parameterized model of the energy cost for each application, following
Equation 3.3. Our prototype hardware has two kinds of internal memory: SRAM
used for the execution stack and local data, and FRAM used for code and global
data; thus our ARP implementation reports on SRAM and FRAM usage (rather
than code and data usage as in Section 3.4).
3.5.7 The Amulet Resource Profiler Developer View
Our developer-facing tool, ARP-View, leverages the ARP’s fine-grained data about
the structure and behavior of applications to (1) give developers insight into how
certain user actions, sampling rates, and blocks of code consume energy, enabling
developers to make concrete the links between certain parts of code and energy
draw; and (2) provide meaningful battery-lifetime estimates for an application or
suite of applications. The ARP-View currently presents a wealth of information
including system and OS level details (e.g., FRAM available and its usage), sliders
to adjust event frequency and view results in real-time, and the battery impact
(percentage of battery consumed per week) and lifetime in days for a selected
application as well as an entire suite of applications. Our implementation provides
real-time feedback to the developer regarding application impact on the battery
by running a daemon process that monitors application files and re-profiles ap-
plications upon detecting changes to those files; note that application translation,
analysis, validation, and profiling all happens prior to actually compiling the source
code and, thus, runs fast even on common laptop and desktop machines. Providing
memory stats to the developer via the ARP-View requires compiling all of the ap-
plication/system code and parsing the resulting binary, which incurs a noticeable –
but small – amount of time (approximately 1-2 seconds) on common laptop and




In this section we evaluate the performance of Amulet-OS and the Amulet Firmware
Toolchain against the goals from Section 3.3.1. Goal 1 (Multiple applications) and
Goal 2 (Application isolation) are met by design of Amulet-OS and the Amulet
Firmware Toolchain. We thus focus on an experimental evaluation of Goal 3 (Long
battery life) and Goal 4 (Resource-usage prediction). We examine (1) the battery life
of a typical Amulet device, (2) the accuracy of the Resource Profiler’s predictions,
and (3) the various sources of overhead.
3.6.1 Experimental Setup
A detailed description of the experimental infrastructure that allowed us to collect
precise controlled measurements of the Amulet system (and its applications), with-
out incurring measurement artifacts or overhead on the Amulet itself, is discussed
in detail in our SenSys’16 paper [91]; we refer the interested reader to the first part
of Section 6 of our paper. Suffice it to say that we developed nine applications
(apps) for use in the evaluation of Amulet (Table 3.2), selected to represent a range
of compelling applications and exercise many of the features available in the current
prototype. Furthermore, we built a programmable chassis (and made minor modifi-
cations to system code) that allowed us to stimulate the user interface and trigger
state changes in the applications under test. Thus, we could automatically and
repeatably test the Amulet prototype under controlled and consistent conditions.
3.6.2 Battery Lifetime Under Various Application Workloads
In this section we quantify the average power draw of our Amulet prototype for
multiple loads. We represent this power draw in terms of battery lifetime using
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Table 3.2: Amulet applications used for evaluation.
Application Name Description BLE? Sensors Log? UI elements
Clock Display time of day and temperature No Temp. No Display, Buttons
Fall Detection Detect falls using the accelerometer No Acc. No Display, Buttons
Pedometer Record number of steps walked No Acc. No Display
Sunlight Exposure Monitor exposure to light over time No Light No Display
Temperature Monitor ambient temperature over time No Temp. No Display
Battery Logger Monitor, display, and log battery statistics No ADC Yes Display, Buttons
Heart Rate Monitor and display heart rate from BLE sensor Yes HR (external) No Display, Buttons
Heart Rate Logger Monitor, display, and log HR statistics Yes HR (external) Yes Display, Buttons
EMA Deliver surveys to users No No Yes Display, Buttons, Touch
the 110 mA h battery currently encased in the prototype. (Larger batteries up to
570 mA h are used in current smartwatch products [177].) We acknowledge that
the accuracy of battery lifetime estimates depends heavily on battery wear, quality,
leakage, and other factors. These estimates serve to place the actual measured
power draw in an understandable form.
For our first experiment, we installed a firmware image containing a single
application and measured the average power draw using the measurement chassis.
We used the programmable chassis to emulate user sessions, where a ‘session’ lasted
as long as it took to exercise states in the critical path of an application. We repeated
this experiment for each of the nine applications, for a single session, determining
average power by summing the energy of the session and dividing by the time. The
results of this experiment are shown in Figure 3.10. This figure shows the power
draw of an application was highly dependent on the hardware components used,
and the frequency of their use, further motivating the use of ARP-View. Lifetimes
for all of the apps exceeded two weeks.
On our current prototype, an application load comprising Clock, Fall Detec-
tion, Pedometer, Sun Exposure, and Temperature would allow an Amulet battery
to last more than four months. With constant BLE communication to the heart-rate
sensor (we used commercial Zephyr and Mio heart-rate sensors) our Amulet’s
power draw allows for nearly a two-month battery life. Two energy-hungry appli-























































































Figure 3.10: Average power draw for each app on the current prototype. The expected life-
time with the 110mAh battery is shown above each bar.
to the microSD card, drastically reducing battery life. The EMA application leaves
the capacitive touch sensor on continuously, further reducing lifetime. By duty
cycling the capacitive touch sensor and reducing logging operations or moving
those operations to Bluetooth, lifetimes could be increased.
To determine the effect multiple applications have on the device lifetime, we
assembled a firmware image that included three applications (Clock, Heart Rate,
and Fall Detection), and measured the steady-state power draw as above. With this
configuration, using the accelerometer, Bluetooth communication, and updating
the display, the expected lifetime was 39 days. In summary, an Amulet with
applications using on-board sensors will last for many months, an Amulet using
an external BLE sensor feeding regular heart rate data will last for 1-2 months, and
applications making heavy use of the logging operations or capacitive touch features
will last for a few weeks. This lifetime enables long-term usage for many application
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domains. This lifetime is equal or better than the manufacturer-listed lifetimes of
popular consumer platforms, such as the Pebble, FitBit, Apple Watch, and many
others. (Direct comparisons are difficult, of course, because these products have
different battery sizes and different purposes.) In any case, the Amulet Platform
seeks to enable energy-focused development regardless of device. Our current
prototype device sits comfortably in the high end of the lifetime wearable spectrum,
enabling us to develop interesting apps with long lifetimes.
3.6.3 Accuracy of Amulet Resource Profiler Predictions
Recall that the Amulet Resource Profiler (ARP) tool predicts the effect of an appli-
cation on the battery lifetime of an Amulet device. Specifically, ARP predicts the
app’s total energy cost per week, which can be used to determine the impact an
application has on the battery lifetime. To evaluate the accuracy of these predictions,
we compared the ARP battery-impact prediction, for each app, with the actual
battery impact computed from the measured average power draw presented in
Figure 3.10.
Each app’s event frequencies were set to match the event frequencies used
by our programmable chassis in collecting the measurements that resulted in in
Figure 3.10. For some apps, specifically Clock, Temperature, and Sun Exposure,
these event frequencies were gathered from the developer’s code. These apps sense
intermittently, on a timer whose value is set by the developer inside the code for a
transition. These apps only respond to the timer, not to user or environmental input,
so their energy impact depends completely on the timer value. Event frequencies
were set carefully for Apps like Pedometer and Fall Detection, but their energy
impact was dominated by the Amulet’s baseline energy, paired with the number
of times they compute over a series of acceleration values. Table 3.3 presents the
predicted (and observed) percent impact on battery life, for each application, along
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Table 3.3: ARP battery-%impact predictor.
Application Name Obs. Pred. Error Error
( µW) ( µW) ( µW) (%)
Clock 72.73 77.45 4.72 6.1
Fall Detect 81.20 89.21 8.01 9.0
Pedometer 120.47 129.98 9.51 6.3
Sun Exposure 79.19 85.13 5.94 7.0
Temperature 88.37 92.89 4.52 4.9
Heart Rate 316.16 320.34 4.18 1.3
Battery Log 984.10 1089.63 105.53 9.7
Heart Rate Logger 1223.11 1318.68 95.57 7.2
EMA 253.07 265.05 11.98 4.5
Multi 430.01 438.86 8.85 2.0
with the percent error in the ARP prediction. (We quantify the error as the difference
between expected average power draw and observed average power draw.) The
results indicate that our Resource Profiler was reasonably accurate at estimating the
battery life for these applications.
Applications can have different battery lifetimes depending on the amount
of user interaction, the data rates or sensing schedules, the environment, and
of course, the choices the developer makes in implementation. We capture four
types of events in the ARP: (1) User interaction, (2) Data delivery, (3) Timers, and
(4) Programmer-defined. While data delivery events are static (sensor subscription
schedules are determined beforehand in our current system), each of the other three
can be modified by the developer to explore the effect on battery lifetime. The ARP
predictions are heavily dependent on the accuracy of the underlying device profile.
Small measurement errors in generating the device profile can compound as event
frequency increases. The ARP has trouble quantifying certain types of operations.
For instance, the energy required for microSD card writes is heavily dependent on
the size of the write. The ARP does not currently account for parameter length in
SD writes, contributing to the higher error for applications that use SD functions
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(Battery Log, HR Log). Nonetheless, in our experiments, the highest error rate was
only 9.7%, and we expect it will improve.
However, most developers will not care if their application is predicted to last
90 days and instead lasts 80 or 100 days; they care about how the code they write,
and the frequency of events, proportionally affect the lifetime. Of course, further
tests ‘in the wild’, with a wider variety of apps, will be necessary to generalize this
conclusion.
3.6.4 Amulet Overhead
We also conduct experiments to understand the overhead of the system.
Runtime
Energy consumption is significantly impacted by the fraction of time the application
microcontroller (MSP430) is active; the rest of the time it can be in a low-power
deep sleep mode. The MSP430 is active whenever it is running application code
(handler) or system code (Amulet-OS and QP system code). (In modern operating
systems, this is termed system time, whereas time spent running application code is
termed user time.) The former time (system time) is overhead, from the application’s
point of view. To measure this overhead, we instrumented the Amulet-OS to trigger
I/O pins whenever it (1) puts the system to sleep, (2) was active and executing
Amulet-OS code, and (3) was active and executing application code. We then used
our measurement chassis to obtain precise measurements of the time spent in each
mode, for each of our applications, as shown in Table 3.4. For each application
listed, we ran three short sessions while the application was conducting its normal
duty cycle, but not being triggered by user-interface events. For all apps this meant
polling sensors, and waking up for timer events. The low temporal overhead of
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Table 3.4: Temporal overhead.
Application Name %Sleep %OS %App
Clock 98.1 0.9 1.0
EMA 98.2 1.0 0.8
Heart Rate 91.1 0.9 8.0
Pedometer 93.8 2.2 4.0
Pedometer+HR 87.5 1.9 10.6
Pedometer+HR+Clock 85.4 2.8 11.8
0.9-2.8% confirms the efficiency of our approach.
Memory
Amulet-OS uses a portion of the limited memory space available to applications,
limiting the quantity and size of apps that can be installed in a single firmware
image. In our prototype, applications and the OS must share the limited FRAM
memory space (128 KB). For a firmware image comprising five applications that
used most of the functionality available, Amulet-OS consumed 55.91 KB of the
128 KB available FRAM code space, while applications consumed 14.48 KB; the OS
consumes nearly half of the current FRAM. Meanwhile, Amulet-OS claims 1.078 KB
of SRAM, leaving 0.922 KB of SRAM for applications; recall that apps use SRAM
only for their execution stack, and only when actively executing an event handler;
only one application is active at a time. Moreover, FRAM and SRAM are continuous
on the MSP430; we anticipate making larger blocks of FRAM available (to be treated
as RAM) to the app.
The memory and runtime overhead of our Amulet implementation – while
sufficient to develop multiple interesting apps on constrained hardware – could be
improved. Memory limitations could be sidestepped by adding 256KB of external
FRAM on a secondary storage board to “swap” applications. We expect runtime




Our SenSys’16 paper [91] also featured insights into two user studies: one in-
vestigating the utility of our ARP-View tool to developers while developing a
continuous-sensing app, and one investigating the feasibility of using Amulet as a
platform for continuous-monitoring applications in human-subject research. While
I did not directly participate in the running of either study, I designed and imple-
mented the tool studied in the former, and supported the app developer of the latter.
Both studies were approved by our Institutional Review Board (IRB).
The takeaways from these studies are encouraging. Namely, the first user
study involved recruiting ten students with at least some experience with low-
power embedded systems. Participants were taken through an exercise of mapping
out an embedded system application that required some sensing task. Subsequently,
each participant was provided with our ARP-View tool and asked to repeat the
exercise. Through a structured interview at the end of the study, the investigators
found that our tool was helpful to developers, obtaining feedback that our tools
provide rich insight into their decisions and how these map to energy cost within
their application.
A second user study involved recruiting six medical-school students to par-
ticipate in a study that was investigating the feasibility of using Amulet as a tool
for conducting Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) studies – often used in
behavioral-medicine research. This preliminary study was intended to evaluate user
acceptance of the Amulet wearable, and technical feasibility of multi-source data
collection (i.e., EMA, HR data, and battery stats) with an mHealth EMA application.
While there were some issues with the prototype (specifically the device’s case),
this early study demonstrated the feasibility of the Amulet prototype for EMA, and
for continuous-monitoring applications on human subjects.
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Overall, these studies serve to highlight that our work on the Amulet Platform
is a promising approach for designing platforms and devices that make it easy for
application developers to develop applications, that are useful in healthcare and
health research, and that all of this can be done on a platform designed with security
in mind. For more information on these user studies, we refer the reader to our
paper for more details [91].
3.7 Related Work
The collection of software and hardware techniques in Amulet draw extensively
from the wireless sensor-network literature. In this section we address related work
in open wearable platforms; software architectures for sensor-focused devices and
other constrained devices; approaches for isolating the execution of application
code; and techniques for modeling an application’s energy and resource usage.
3.7.1 Open Wearable Platforms
Current commercial platforms such as Pebble, Android Wear, and Apple watchOS
only document best practices and measure resource usage of running applica-
tions [149, 8, 14], and are closed source, closed hardware, or both. Other open
platforms were being developed concurrently with Amulet as the wearable hard-
ware ecosystem evolved; some of these projects have been discontinued, such as
Sony’s Open SmartWatch Project [179] and the Angel Sensor [10]. Others projects
and platforms are still being developed, such as BLOCKS [183] and ZWear [201],
but they are not entirely open to users or developers, or do not address one or more
of the Amulet goals.
Little information about their developer tools are available; none of them
appear to provide compile-time, app-developer tools for predicting battery life for a
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given app or combination of apps, and none are engineered to give battery lifetime
measured in months. Hexiwear [94] is completely open source and open hardware,
and built for the mbed platform. However, it lacks comprehensive developer tools
that allow application isolation and evaluation of energy costs. Hexiwear was
not built specifically for low-power operation like Amulet. The choice of high-
powered components like a color OLED screen and ARM Cortex-M4 make lifetimes
significantly less than the Amulet.
Wearable platform such as ZOE [113], Mercury [122], and Opo [97] have been
designed by the research community to address specific sensing problems, or to
explore specific research areas (like BodyScan [68]).
In contrast, Amulet provides open-source hardware and software in a general
platform allowing wearable system designers to innovate at both the operating
system and application level – importantly, Amulet provides a tool that gives appli-
cation developers insight into the tradeoffs between energy and utility. The Amulet
Firmware Toolchain and Resource Profiler provide novel capabilities essential to
app development for long-running multi-application multi-developer wearables.
3.7.2 Software Architectures
Software architectures and operating systems exist for sensor networks and the
Internet of Things, including TinyOS [116], Contiki [65], RIOT OS [26], and mbed
OS [18]. TinyOS programs are written in a dialect of C (nesC), Contiki programs
are written in a subset of C, and mbed OS programs are written in C++. Amulet
programs are currently written in a subset of C but the techniques could be extended
to support a subset of C++. SafeTinyOS [56] allows for the static analysis of code
to improve reliability and programmer confidence in a solution for single TinyOS
applications. Amulet uses similar static analysis techniques to provide application
isolation and energy prediction for multiple applications. All but RIOT OS are
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event-driven (like Amulet), and only one (mbed OS) provides application isolation
and access control.
The mbed OS provides app isolation using the target processor’s Memory
Protection Unit (MPU). (Hardin et al. recently demonstrated [86] that a similar ap-
proach is viable on the MSP430, which is the primary app processor for the Amulet.)
The mbed OS uses a single-threaded execution model for objects written in C and
C++, which is similar to Amulet’s state-machine approach (although mbed plans to
add multi-threading in the future). Security is managed using the mbed OS uVisor
which allows setting and altering fine-grain permissions and memory access for
system modules and objects, offering object isolation. However, the mbed OS only
offers this isolation on ARM Cortex-M3, M4 and M7 microcontrollers with a Mem-
ory Protection Unit (MPU), all of which are larger, higher-power microcontrollers
than the target processors for Amulet. It may be possible to use our Amulet-OS
techniques to extend mbed OS security for smaller microcontrollers.
Amulet’s architecture combines high- and low-power components to achieve
our lifetime, performance, and availability goals. This design is similar to other hier-
archical power-management systems [180, 28, 1] that seek to provide resource-rich
computing platforms with wide dynamic power ranges, by combining a hierarchy
of functional “tiers” into a single integrated platform. By using the right tier for
the right task, and aggressively powering off high-powered tiers when not needed,
these platforms are able to combine high performance and network availability
with low average power consumption and long battery life.
None of the other IoT frameworks in development appear to offer the multi-
application and app-isolation features of Amulet.
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3.7.3 Application Isolation
Traditionally, hardware memory management units (MMUs) prevent applica-
tions from interfering with each other and with core system functions. Software
fault-isolation techniques extend the MMU by isolating malicious code and have
been implemented for x86 and ARM architectures [169, 198, 199] or require hard-
ware (MMU) support. All of these approaches require hardware (MMU) support
not available on low-power processors, and incur significant runtime overhead.
They are not tenable on the constrained hardware platforms that enable long-lived
wearable deployment.
Language-based techniques provide a more efficient alternative, by changing
the programming model [102, 71] to make dangerous actions impossible or easy
to detect, and using a combination of compile-time static analysis and inserted
run-time checks to detect the dangerous actions that remain [51, 56]. The Amulet
architecture (at the time of our work) builds on these techniques, with a new focus
on safely combining multiple applications without hardware memory-protection
support and providing insight into each apps’ share of system resources.
We note that, recently, Hardin et al. [86] presented a memory-isolation tech-
nique that improves upon our security isolation for Amulet. Specifically, in their
work they leverage both compiler-inserted code and MPU-hardware support to
realize efficient isolation without resorting to language limitations.
3.7.4 Energy and Resource Modeling
Previous research on energy modeling for constrained devices has focused on tech-
niques for smartphones and wireless sensors. Tools like Sandra [135], eDoctor [123],
Eprof [147], Carat [146] and PowerForecaster [134] help users make decisions about
energy efficiency at install time, observe the effect of use from day to day, or di-
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agnose abnormal battery drain. Other research has tried to identify how users
and batteries interact – investigating the battery mental model of users [69]. These
works focus on meeting user needs while ARP-View is focused on enabling the
developer. Further, these systems are all in-situ; gathering information about usage
and then presenting information to the user. However, integrating these tools with
ARP-view could provide interesting avenues for future work.
Developer-focused tools have also emerged for smartphones. Tools have
focused on identifying energy bugs at compile time [192], in-situ energy metering
using kernel additions for energy model building [196], and then using those models
to predict smartphone lifetime [105]. These tools, if carefully applied to constrained
wearable platforms, could complement the developer insights gleaned from the
Amulet Resource Profiler and ARP-view.
Other tools profile changes in the frequency and amount of system calls as
a proxy for hardware profiling, to estimate changes in application energy effi-
ciency [2]. Some tools estimate energy cost per line of source code [119]. These
tools provide insight for the developer into energy usage and efficiency, but are not
tuned to the specific needs of wearable development. Wearable applications are
more energy constrained than cell phones, and rely on periodic sensing activities
for their function. The developer must be able to easily identify energy expensive
code segments that are periodically executed. This is why ARP-view exposes timers
to the developer, allowing them to manipulate the frequency of sensing actions in a
GUI, without additional profiling or emulation steps.
Simulation and emulation techniques have attempted to provide forecasts
of energy usage, starting with tools from the wireless sensor network literature
like Power TOSSIM [174]. WattsOn [138] extends the idea of emulation to provide
insights and what-if analysis for Android applications, after running the application
in an emulator. WattsOn specifically focuses on empowering developers to under-
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stand energy efficiency, and is most closely aligned with the goals of ARP-view.
However, WattsOn is phone-focused, and does not account for periodic sensing
tasks that are crucial to wearable operation. Nor does it provide real-time feedback
on code and duty cycling changes. Wearables require special attention to be paid to
periodic sensing tasks, timing and duty cycling, and costs of each API function. The
Amulet Resource Profiler seeks to empower wearable developers without requir-
ing specialized hardware knowledge, or costly profiling and emulation, all while
accounting for sensing and user-interaction costs.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter we present our work on the Amulet Platform, which comprises
a toolchain (the Amulet Firmware Toolchain) and runtime (the Amulet-OS) for
development of secure and resource-efficient applications on low-power multi-
application devices, such as wearable devices. In our past work [139, 91] we
demonstrated that our platform offers developers security (e.g., application iso-
lation) and feedback to empower them to develop resource-efficient applications.
In this chapter we specifically emphasize security-related aspects of the Amulet
platform and – to some extent – its usability.
In our work, we designed, implemented, and evaluated a system (and tech-
niques) that provide application security guarantees in a way that is cognizant
of its impact on energy and memory consumption. Our specific contributions
presented in this chapter include substantial contributions to (1) the design and
implementation of Amulet’s software stack and runtime system, (2) the design
and implementation of Amulet’s firmware-production toolchain that guarantees
application isolation, (3) the design and implementation of resource models that are
deployed in Amulet’s developer tools; these models aid developers in developing
secure and efficient applications, and (4) an experimental evaluation of Amulet.
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Figure 3.11: An overview of our system model and the threats to apps and data on peripheral





In the preceding work, we have primarily focused on prevention – how devices
and networks can be composed to provide trustworthy foundations for Wireless
Personal Area Networks (WPANs). While these efforts are necessary, they are
not enough by themselves. If history is our guide, at some point the adversary
will be successful in compromising the system or network. The question then
becomes: now what? We argue that prevention (through hardening devices and
networks, for example) is not enough, and that there must exist some mechanism
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to detect inauthentic interactions between applications and nearby devices. Such
a mechanism could, for instance, alert users to potential risks and take actions to
mitigate those risks. We address this challenge in this chapter.
At its core, we envision a system that wants to determine whether all of the
devices in question are still authentic. Or in other words, are they still in desirable
state, running code they are intended to be running, and operating (behaving) in the
normal, expected way? Unfortunately, verifying this property is not as straightfor-
ward as one would hope. In Section 4.2 we present background information and
related work towards this direction. This brief survey also helps to motivate our
approach (Section 4.4) to verifying device authenticity and – ultimately – securing
WPANs.
4.1.1 Overview of our Approach
To verify trustworthy behavior between apps and devices as they interact, we
present our approach: Verification of Interaction Authenticity (VIA). VIA introduces
models that characterize typical, authentic interactions (network communication)
between apps and devices. The modeling techniques used in VIA are inspired by
past work in anomaly detection and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) [104, 124,
188, 112, 82, 32, 48, 46, 121, 95, 140, 141]. Our implementation of VIA resides within
a trusted region of a Bluetooth host (e.g., within a trusted OS; within the Secure
World on a TrustZone-enabled platform; within an Enclave on an SGX-enabled
platform) and requires privileged access to all network traffic to and from the
Bluetooth host. Access to all ingress and egress network traffic enables VIA to
construct hierarchically-segmented models based on n-grams and other features
extracted from packet headers and payloads.
VIA is distinct from past work in multiple ways. For instance, past work has
primarily focused on IP-based communications [82, 133], Wi-Fi [176], ZigBee [197],
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and Z-Wave [197]; focused solely on a particular platform, such as Samsung Smart-
Things [197]; or requires invasive modifications to each Internet of Things (IoT)
device [75, 141, 42], which is rarely (if ever) practical. (Indeed, not a single device
in our testbed of more than 20 smart health and smart home devices is “open” to
modifications.)
In its current form, VIA is completely agnostic to higher-level protocol seman-
tics and internal device state. VIA’s models are only concerned with constructing
models for typical communications, which can be used as a reference to verify
consistency with these models in future interactions.
Furthermore, unlike other approaches to capturing Bluetooth network traffic,
VIA does not require additional hardware or depend on unreliable techniques to
sniff Bluetooth connections over-the-air [5, 84, 31]. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first academic work that makes use of raw Bluetooth HCI traces collected
on a smartphone – which only requires access to the easy-to-enable HCI logging
feature under the Android “Developer Options.” (This access does not even require
the phone to be rooted.) In our current implementation, all HCI logs are written
to the SD card and are easily accessible via the Android Debugger Bridge (ADB)
utility.
VIA is also the first in-depth work to focus on characterizing Bluetooth devices
based solely on Bluetooth network communications. Given the market dominance
of Bluetooth and its increasing popularity for IoT use cases, we believe this work
has broad applicability to areas of active research, such as mobile security and
trustworthy computing.
4.1.2 Assumptions
We reiterate that that VIA resides on the Bluetooth host, within a trusted region































Verification of Interaction Authenticity
Figure 4.1: Overview of System Model and VIA.
to and from the Bluetooth host. Indeed, our larger vision is that VIA would be
deployed within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), such as an Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) Enclave on IA platforms [100], or within the “Secure
World” on Arm platforms [19], or integrated directly into firmware within an I/O
controller, alongside our work described in Chapter 2.
For simplicity, VIA can be viewed as a trusted third party that resides within
the Host, and sits between apps running on the Host and the devices that connect
with these apps. Thus, for illustrative purposes, we visualize VIA as sitting among
the lowest layers of a Bluetooth host system (Figure 4.1). (This topic is discussed in
more detail in Section 4.3).
4.1.3 Contributions
VIA is a novel approach to verifying and enforcing trustworthy behavior within
WPANs. We make the following contributions:
• We collected and present a new, first-of-its-kind dataset, which captures
Bluetooth HCI traces for app-device interactions between more than 20 smart-
health and smart-home devices. (According to a recent survey [3] and much
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effort to find any sort of dataset on Bluetooth network traffic, there appear to
be no such Bluetooth datasets; we believe this dataset is extremely valuable in
its own right). To equip future researchers with better data for investigation,
our new dataset will be made publicly available after this dissertation is
published.1
• We contribute extensions to open-source Bluetooth analysis software to en-
hance the available tools for practical exploration of the Bluetooth protocol
and Bluetooth-based apps. To equip future researchers with better tools for
investigation, the Vagrantfile and Dockerfile for the respective VirtualBox
VM and Docker Container will be published along with our dataset. Further-
more, most of the code we wrote is already publicly available: btsnoop2 and
bluepy.3
• We present a novel modeling technique (hierarchical segmentation) for charac-
terizing and verifying authentic BLE app-device interactions.
• We present an experimental evaluation of our new modeling technique, which
presents strong evidence that our technique can realize effective characteri-
zation of, and distinction between, smart devices within WPANs for smart
homes and smart healthcare.
4.2 Background & Related Work
The peripheral devices that we consider are essentially nothing more than embed-
ded systems (which have been around for decades) coupled with some networking





(or a few) created by the device developers; they generally cannot be extended
with applications from third-party developers. Thus, typical solutions for pro-
tecting systems, such as installing third-party security software (e.g., antivirus
software, security agent software), are not applicable; in fact, in some cases – such
as in FDA-approved medical devices – altering the software might invalidate the
certification!
This limitation – not being able to modify the peripheral devices – has gener-
ated a lot of interest and work in non-invasive approaches to measuring the state
of devices, and using the measurement results to determine whether devices are
authentic. The detection of non-authentic devices (through measurements that
indicate non-authentic device behavior) may be an indication of the presence of
threats to other personal devices or networks; by detecting such threats, there is an
opportunity to take some action to secure personal devices and networks. In the
remainder of this section, we discuss some of these non-invasive approaches and
relate them to our approach.
4.2.1 Authentication
The overarching objective of our work (the verification of authentic interactions
within WPANs) is largely motivated by past work in authentication [108, 57, 144,
74, 24, 126, 125, 133, 33, 99, 141, 127]. Authentication is a process to verify (i.e.,
establish the truth of) an attribute value claimed by or for a system entity [173]. In
computer systems and networks, authentication is used to verify that a person (or
another system) is in fact who or what it claims to be. This relates to our work in
that VIA attempts to verify that apps and devices interact in a way that is consistent
with what they claim to be. Generally speaking, authentication can be achieved in
one of two ways: identification or verification.
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Identification
A system that performs identification attempts to recognize a specific entity and
distinguish it from other entities in a known population. In this way, the task of
identification is a one-to-many matching problem; i.e., the output of an identification
system is a single identity or class contained within the population.
To perform identification: First, the system collects (or otherwise obtains)
many samples from the population (e.g., models for app-device communications
within a population of apps and devices). Later, when an unknown entity presents
itself to the system, it is the system’s responsibility to determine which member of
the population matches that entity.
Verification
A system that performs verification either accepts or rejects an entity after examin-
ing some input information about the entity’s claimed identity. In this way, the task
of verification is a one-to-one matching problem; i.e., the output of verification is
binary: accept or reject.
To perform verification: First, the system collects (or otherwise obtains) an
identity and model for a particular entity, and stores it. Later, when an entity
presents itself to the system and asserts its identity, it is the system’s responsibility
to verify that the presentation matches the model for that identity.
4.2.2 Traffic Analysis & Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
Wireless traffic analysis systems and Intrusion Detection Systems have a long and
rich history [104, 124, 188, 112, 81, 32, 11, 17, 46, 131, 33, 95, 75, 197, 4, 166]. Gen-
erally speaking, wireless traffic analysis systems and Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) continually monitor computers or networks, collecting data (e.g., system
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calls, network communication), extracting quantifiable features from this data, and
applying a variety of techniques to analyze the data in search of signs of anomalies
or compromise.
With respect to IDSs, there are traditionally two broad categories of IDS with
respect to where they are located: Host-based IDS (HIDS) and Network-based IDS
(NIDS) [75]. HIDS are generally software located on the system being monitored,
and typically monitor only that system. NIDS are often physically separate devices
located somewhere “upstream” in the network of the system(s) being monitored;
NIDS generally monitor many separate systems on a common network.
NIDS are advantageous in the context of our work because their presence
is generally transparent to the systems being monitored, which means we could
deploy a NIDS to monitor peripheral devices, for example, without needing to
modify them in any way. (This assumes that peripheral network traffic is routed
through a network device – such as a smartphone or other hub device – where
a NIDS is deployed, or that the NIDS has access to all network traffic, e.g., by
sniffing an area of interest.) Because of this advantage, we focus our attention on
Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems.
There is an extensive collection of work on both categories of IDS. (In fact,
there are even additional categories such as hybrid and distributed IDS that exist as
well, which combine both host-based and network-based IDS data – from multiple
sources – into one system.) A more thorough discussion of IDS, however, is beyond
the scope of this dissertation; we refer the interested reader to two recent surveys
on this topic [95, 75]. We can also recommend a slightly dated, but nonetheless
insightful, brief history and overview of intrusion detection [104].
There are also two broad categories of IDS with respect to how intrusions are
detected [178]: “systems relying on misuse-detection monitor activity with precise
descriptions of known malicious behavior, while anomaly-detection systems have a
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notion of normal activity and flag deviations from that profile.” Both approaches
have their strengths and weaknesses.
Misuse detection defines patterns (“signatures”) for malicious behavior, and
scans a data stream for matches, looking for evidence of known attacks [104]. Misuse
detectors generate few false positives4 (i.e., a flag is only raised if the exact signature
is matched), which is desirable, but they are only capable of detecting known
attacks that have a well-defined signature; worse, introducing slight variations into
known malware can often cause signature-based detection mechanisms to miss
even “known” attacks (i.e., unknown devices or networks would lead to higher
rates of false negatives).
Anomaly detection uses models of expected behavior (generally obtained after
some training phase), and interprets deviations from this “normal” behavior as a
problem [104]. It is worth noting that an inherent assumption of anomaly detection
is that attack behavior differs from normal behavior. One advantage of anomaly
detectors is that they are capable of detecting unknown attacks. Also, it may be
possible to represent the models in an efficient way, making real-time anomaly
detection possible. Unfortunately, anomaly detectors are also known for having
high false-positive rates (i.e., not all anomalies are an attack).
Both misuse detection and anomaly detection have their own strengths and
weaknesses. In this dissertation we opt to explore techniques commonly used
to realize anomaly-based detectors for one key reason: Authentic interactions
may take varied forms. Rather than attempt to craft precise signatures for every
possible interaction – as misuse detectors attempt to do – we prefer techniques
4According to some experts, this is a common statement in the literature, but it is not generally
true. In practice, signature-based detection works well within the context of the specific networks
and devices used to collect data and develop these signatures. When new devices (devices not
observed during the creation of signatures) are introduced into the mix, the false-positive rates of
misuse detectors may increase. Similarly, signatures generated based on data from one network may
give rise to increased false-positive rates when applied to a different network. This only serves to
strengthen our interest in anomaly detectors over misuse detectors.
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that are capable of modeling normal behaviors, and deviations from those normal
behaviors.
Due to the simplicity of peripheral devices, which generally serve a well-
defined purpose and perform well-defined and often repetitive tasks (i.e., low
variability), we believe applying anomaly-based monitoring to networks of these
devices (such as Bluetooth devices and networks) may work well. Furthermore,
given the scale of personal networks (dozens of devices, as opposed to hundreds or
thousands of devices), it may be possible to at least help a user identify a specific
problematic device that has raised a flag in the anomaly detection system, enabling
them to respond in some way (e.g., search online for known problems, report the
device to the manufacturer, stop using the device, or perhaps even throw the device
away).
4.2.3 Side-Channel Measurement & Analysis to Detect Malware
Side-channel analysis has also been widely explored [107, 44, 27, 25, 55, 175, 194, 72,
187]. In particular, we have obtained invaluable insights from work that has used
side-channel analysis as an approach to detect malware. Indeed, recent work that
inspired some of our thinking proposed measuring unintentional side-channels of
medical devices, such as power consumption, to infer the state of the device [55].
Their theory is that the power consumption of computing devices scales closely
with system workload. By measuring power consumption at a (specialized) power
outlet, they can use these measurements as a proxy for computing activity (often
referred to as behavior) and detect problems, including malware. As in our situation,
this approach works well when devices perform well-defined, repetitive tasks that
should exhibit little variation from one run to another. Furthermore, this approach
is non-invasive: it can work without modifying the target device since the side-
channel measurement and analysis can be done at the power outlet. However,
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this solution requires the devices to be continuously powered via their specialized
power outlet to detect malware. In our context, peripheral devices are not always
(or ever) line-powered. If these devices are line-powered, it would be quite easy for
malware to monitor the power state of the device, conceal itself while line-powered,
and continue operation when disconnected from line power.
In light of this work, we believe that it may be possible to accurately model
the well-defined (and often repetitive) network communications that occur in
WPANs, such as Bluetooth networks. In fact, given devices that perform well-
defined and often repetitive tasks, we believe that a device’s communications may
serve as a proxy for its computing activity. Under this assumption, it may be
possible for a classifier to accurately detect a divergence from models for authentic
communication, which may be indicative of a device whose firmware has changed,
or of the presence of an inauthentic device masquerading as a legitimate device.
A core assumption of this approach is that such “problems” lead to network
traffic that does not fit the normal profile. Given an understanding of common
malware (such as those enumerated in Figure 4.2), our intuition leads us to believe
that an infected peripheral device will produce abnormal network activity (down-
loading files, creating new channels, opening ports, probing the mobile device, etc.)
that can be detected at the hub device (to which it connects).
4.3 System, Network, and Security Model
In this dissertation we consider WPANs that consist of multiple peripheral devices
that connect with a central hub device (recall Figure 1.1). As discussed in Chapter 1,
we focus on personal hub devices and peripheral devices (IoT devices)5 in this work,
5Technically both peripheral devices and hub devices are IoT devices, but “IoT device” is most
often used to refer to devices that fall under the umbrella of peripheral devices; the new, smart,
network-capable “things” that connect with applications or services over the Internet via a hub
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A Malware Samples Used to Test WattsUpDoc
Malware Activity Devices
almanahe Download and execute files Compounder
autorun Open port and IE instances Compounder
bamital Disable system programs Substation
bredolab Download other malware, crash system, unhook API Compounder
delf Allow remote access Compounder
dorkbot Download other malware, Initiate DOS attacks, Steal personal info Compounder
fakeav Download other malware, Ransomware Compounder
kolab Spam IRC channels Both
mabezat Infect host files Substation
ramnit Run malicious routines Substation
sality Infect and delete host files Both
sillyfdc Disable services Both
virut Infect host files, create backdoor Both
zbot Steal personal info, create bot Both
cryptic Download other malware Compounder
Table 4: Windows malware representing unusual device behavior.
[14] HART, G. W. Nonintrusive appliance load monitoring. Proceed-
ings of the IEEE 80, 12 (Dec. 1992).
[15] JANA, S., AND SHMATIKOV, V. Abusing file processing in mal-
ware detectors for fun and profit. In IEEE Symposium on Security
& Privacy (May 2012).
[16] KHAN, M. M. H., ET AL. Diagnostic powertracing for sensor
node failure analysis. In IPSN (Apr. 2010).
[17] KIM, H., SMITH, J., AND SHIN, K. G. Detecting energy-greedy
anomalies and mobile malware variants. In MobiSys (June 2008).
[18] KOCHER, P., JAFFE, J., AND JUN, B. Differential power analy-
sis. In CRYPTO (Aug. 1999).
[19] KRAMER, D. B., BAKER, M., RANSFORD, B., MOLINA-
MARKHAM, A., STEWART, Q., FU, K., AND REYNOLDS,
M. R. Security and privacy qualities of medical devices: An
analysis of FDA postmarket surveillance. PLoS ONE 7, 7 (July
2012), e40200.
[20] LIU, L., YAN, G., ZHANG, X., AND CHEN, S. Virusmeter:
Preventing your cellphone from spies. In RAID (Sept. 2009).
[21] RAINS, T. Operating system infection rates: The most common




[22] SCHWEITZER ENGINEERING LABORATORIES, I. SEL-3354
Embedded Automation Computing Platform: Instruction Man-
ual, Jan. 2011.
[23] SYMANTEC CORPORATION. Malicious code trends.
https://www.symantec.com/threatreport/topic.
jsp?id=malicious_code_trends&aid=top_malicious_
code_families, Loaded July 2012.




[25] U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. ICS-ALERT-
12-046-01A—Increasing threat to industrial control systems,
Oct. 2012.
[26] U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION. Reminder from
FDA: Cybersecurity for networked medical devices is a shared
responsibility. http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm189111.htm, Nov. 2009.
[27] U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION. Cy-
bersecurity for medical devices and hospital net-




[28] VALDES, A., AND CHEUNG, S. Communication pattern
anomaly detection in process control systems. In IEEE Confer-
ence on Technologies for Homeland Security (May 2009).
11
WattsUpDoc, Fu et al. 
Figure 4.2: Examples of malware samples representing unusual device behavior [55].
but note that these conce ts extend to other d vices under a similar network model.
(We elaborate on our system a d network model, and discuss how these concepts
generalize, below.) This approach – having all IoT devices connect wi h a p rson l
hub – has many advantages with respect to security and privacy; for inst nce,
data stored on such a hub (e.g., within the Databox [67]) can be tightly controlled,
enabling people to determine with whom (or what) their personal data is shared.
Hub devices in WPANs are often mobile devices (e.g., martphones) but
need not be mobile; rather, the role of this device is a system that runs end-user
applications and serves as a gateway for IoT devices to access the Internet. In
fact, this central gateway device might be a popular home “hub” device6, such as
Amazon Echo [6], Apple Ho ePod [15], or Google Home [79]; or a dedicated health
hub device, such as the HealthGo Mini [66]. A more traditional home gateway
device, such as a home Wi-Fi access point (AP), could also be a hub. Few Wi-Fi APs
today, however, run end-user applications or include WPAN technologies such as
device. For this reason, when we refer to IoT devices in the text, we specifically refer to peripheral
devices that are distinct from hub devices such as smartphones.
6Indeed, these popular consumer devices are the canonical “IoT gateway” devices of today.
114
Bluetooth, which makes APs somewhat different as compared to the hubs that we
generally consider throughout this dissertation.
IoT devices may interact with more than one hub device. For example, a
home’s IoT devices may be controllable by all of the members of the family that
occupy the home; each member may have their own personal hub device. For the
sake of simplicity in the following text, we restrict our discussion to the scenario
where multiple IoT devices connect with a single hub device.
IoT devices rely on the hub device as means to access the Internet (to upload
data to services, or to interact with other IoT devices, for example) and to interact
with the user (by presenting data to the owner/operator of the hub device). The
hub devices rely on IoT devices as a means to collect data (health data from a worn
device, for example) and to act on the environment (administer medication via an
implanted insulin pump, for example).
In light of this context, our work explores the viability of deploying anomaly-
detection and intrusion-detection techniques within a hub device at the center of a
WPAN. We develop VIA models, which are deployed within the hub device, that
use access to network traffic to and from its connected IoT devices to verify the
authenticity of interactions within the WPAN. VIA uses network-traffic analysis
and anomaly-detection techniques (such as those in Section 4.4) to infer deviations
from normal interactions between (apps running on) hub devices and nearby IoT
devices.
In the remainder of this section we describe our security model, which consists
of our assumptions and trust model, the anticipated threats and adversaries, and
the goals of our solution.
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4.3.1 Assumptions & Trust Model
We assume that any personal hub and IoT devices – when initially deployed – are
deployed in a secure environment without any malware. This provides a window
of time in which to train VIA models.
Many IoT devices are deployed in, and generally exist in, a secure environment
(such as a home), which offers reasonable protection from physical threats; network-
based threats may still be an issue, however. Furthermore, depending on the
mobility of these devices, they may not always reside in the secure environment.
For example, wearable devices such as a fitness band or heart-rate monitor may
be worn out of the home. Likewise, hub devices such as smartphones, which are
frequently carried by people wherever they go, often leave the confines of the home
for extended periods of time. These realities may create an opportunity for an
adversary to compromise a hub or peripheral device.
We assume that IoT devices do not support the addition of third-party security
mechanisms, such as antivirus, anti-malware, or any other security-related software
agents. Furthermore, IoT devices have limited resources (per our definitions of
peripheral devices stated in Section 1.1), such as energy, processing power, and
memory. Hub devices are generally less constrained in terms of these resources, but
any software deployed on a hub device should still be conscious of its impact on
energy consumption, memory footprint, network usage, and so forth.
We assume VIA will be deployed within a Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE). Some hub platforms come equipped with a TEE, such as SGX [100] or
TrustZone [19] (recall Chapter 2). On such a platform, VIA may be safely deployed
within a TEE (e.g., [111]), ensuring that VIA can reliably operate even if other system
components (e.g., the OS) are compromised. For clarity, we depict potentially































Verification of Interaction Authenticity
Figure 4.3: Illustration of the VIA threat model and our solution.
Last, we assume that an adversary knows how VIA works (i.e., they may
understand the models used to distinguish anomalous behavior from normal be-
havior). Even with this knowledge, however, our theory is that malicious activity
on the part of the adversary will result in abnormal activity – and network traffic –
that can be observed by VIA. (See Section 4.3.2 for more discussion on this topic).
4.3.2 Threats & Adversary Model
The ultimate goal of the adversary is to compromise IoT and hub devices to steal
sensitive data (e.g., personally identifiable information (PII), medical information,
financial credentials), commandeer resources (e.g., device’s computing resources),
tamper with data (e.g., inject false data into applications or services), and to prop-
agate itself (i.e., to leverage the compromised devices to carry out attacks against
other devices). To clarify our threat model further, we describe two types of threats
that our work specifically aims to address: inbound threats (peripheral-to-hub) and
outbound threats (hub-to-peripheral). We then clarify the scope of our work and the
types of adversaries we hope to address with this work.
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Inbound Threats
Consider a malicious device that comes into close proximity (i.e., within Bluetooth’s
wireless radio range) of a target hub device. Here, a malicious device may be a
cloned device, which is an attacker-controlled device that has cloned the identifiers
of another device (MAC address, UUID(s), device name) with the objective of
establishing a connection with the target hub device in an attempt to attack it. Or
it may be a compromised device, which is a legitimate user-owned device that has
been compromised by the attacker, and is now under the attacker’s control. Again,
the objective of the attacker here may be to use this device to attack the target hub
device; or more specifically, applications that run on the hub device.
Outbound Threats
Consider a malicious application present on the victim’s hub device, which has the
ability to access the Bluetooth interface. For example, on Android, this is as simple
as an application having the Bluetooth and Bluetooth_ADMIN permission —
two permissions that are claimed by almost all Bluetooth-capable applications [144].
Such a malicious application may, for example, use its access to the Bluetooth
interface to attack nearby IoT devices.
Scope & Limitations
As has been ceded in past work [55], our work does not aim to address targeted
threats launched by determined, well-funded adversaries. We acknowledge that
an adversary with detailed knowledge of any defense mechanisms could in theory
design an attack to specifically thwart or evade that defense mechanism. Fortunately,
targeted threats appear to be rare [55]. Thus, as others have done (e.g., [55]), we
focus our attention on garden-variety threats (e.g., generic malware that targets a
vulnerability present in a large class of devices), which are a clear and present
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danger to hub and IoT devices.
Furthermore, it is important to note that VIA seeks to identify abnormal be-
havior by monitoring network communications (interactions). Because our work
concentrates on behavioral features, our system will likely have a hard time de-
tecting any difference between two devices that behave in similar ways, but run
on physically different devices/hardware. For example, consider a model which
accurately characterizes a heart-rate monitor used in remote patient care. Now
consider an imposter heart-rate monitor device under the control of an attacker
that “behaves correctly” (e.g., reports heart-rate values in a reasonable range) but
is intentionally sending high heart-rate values (perhaps to convey a high resting
heart rate to a medical record system, which may result in higher insurance costs
due to high-risk health indicators). This imposter is in scope for our work, but we
admit that we would not easily (or at all) be able to detect this sort of “attack” since
the device is behaving within its normal profile. Thus, regardless of the underlying
device/hardware – which may need to be verified by other means, such as plat-
form attestation (e.g., [24]) – we only propose to identify authentic behavior vs.
non-authentic behavior based on features related to communication between the
devices.
Since our understanding of most of the previously-seen malware is that it
does not operate in such a subtle manner (e.g., [55]), we suspect that attacks like
the one described above are rare (or even nonexistent). The attacks that we are
familiar with – and the attacks that we anticipate are common – are less subtle
(recall Figure 4.2), and our models should be successful in detecting attacks that
exhibit similar characteristics. Indeed, these are the attacks that lead to more
compromised devices, or that enable theft of data; these are the attacks that pose
significant risk to the security and privacy of end-users and their data.
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4.3.3 Goals
The overall goal of this work is to investigate the viability of applying anomaly-
based intrusion-detection techniques to WPANs, such as Bluetooth networks. More
specifically, our goals are to:
• Increase user-awareness of threats in WPANs by providing a means for hub
devices to detect abnormal interactions between devices in the network, and
report this to the user.
• Increase hub device security by protecting apps on the hub device from
malicious IoT devices.
• Increase IoT device security by protecting IoT devices from malicious apps
on a hub device.
4.4 Verification of Interaction Authenticity
In this section we present Verification of Interaction Authenticity (VIA), our approach
to verifying trustworthy interactions (network communications) between devices
within WPANs (Figure 4.4). Here, we focus on the task of verification to introduce
a new mechanism for ensuring that apps and devices continue to interact in a
way that is consistent with prior observations (and is, with reasonable confidence,
authentic and therefore trustworthy). Deviation from authentic interactions will
result in failed verification, enabling devices to take action and mitigate potential
network threats.
At a high level, our larger vision for VIA is that it will be deployed within a hub
and work by monitoring all network traffic to and from connected devices. When a




















Figure 4.4: Overview of the VIA pipeline: (1) Establish connection between devices. (2) Ob-
serve peer device identity claim (e.g., BD_ADDR and LTK) at the time the connection is estab-
lished. (3) Based on the previous step, load the appropriate verification model. (Verification
models can be learned as-needed or fetched from a trusted source, such as a device manu-
facturer.) (4) Monitor app-device interactions (parse and segment packets, compute n-grams,
perform verification). (5) Depending on the verification result: if the interaction is deemed au-
thentic, allow interaction to continue and repeat verification; otherwise, take action, such as
alert user or disconnect app and device.
such as unique Bluetooth device addresses (BD_ADDR) and secret information
that can be used later for authentication (LTK). Based on this information, an
appropriate normality model can be loaded to perform verification. (Verification
models can be learned as-needed or fetched from a trusted source, such as a device
manufacturer; see Section 4.6.2 for more discussion on bootstrapping initial VIA
models.) Going forward, VIA can monitor all app-device communication (i.e.,
parse and segment packets, compute n-grams, perform verification), and determine
whether the interactions are trustworthy. If the interactions are successfully verified
as being authentic, interactions will be permitted to continue, and verification will
be repeated again at some point in the near future; otherwise, VIA will take action,
such as alert the user or terminate the connection between the offending app and
device. (See Section 4.6.2 for more discussion of response strategies.)
Toward this vision, in this work we study the use of n-grams (Section 4.4.1) and
our new methodology for model separation, hierarchical segmentation (Section 4.4.2),
to build and validate VIA models. In future work we will use the building blocks
we present below to fulfill our larger vision. In Section 4.6.2 we discuss some of the
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challenges and opportunities surrounding a real-world deployment of VIA in the
future.
4.4.1 Using N-grams for Network Traffic Modeling & Analysis
Our approach to model network traffic is to create models based on the contents of
packets (headers and/or payloads).7 Attacks commonly try to exploit vulnerabilities
in services or applications by delivering maliciously crafted payloads; or, in the
case of packet headers, attacks may try to exploit vulnerabilities in how the headers
are parsed and interpreted. By modeling aspects of normal packets, it is possible to
detect deviations in packet content that may indicate an attack.
To model a normal packet, some past systems (e.g., PAYL [188], PCkAD [11]),
have used n-grams. To describe data in terms of n-grams, we adopt the definition
presented by Wressnegger et al. [191] and summarize it below. Each data object
x first needs to be represented as a string of symbols from an alphabet, A, where
A is often defined as bytes or tokens. For example, in modeling network packets,
we simply consider a packet (or part of a packet, such as the packet headers or the
packet payload) as a string of bytes. By moving a window of n symbols over the
string of bytes in each packet x, we can then extract all substrings of length n. These
substrings (n-grams) give rise to a map to a high-dimensional vector space, where
each dimension is associated with the occurrences of one n-gram. Formally, this
map φ can be constructed using the set S of all possible n-grams as,
φ : x→ (φs(x))s∈S with φs(x) = occ(s, x)
where the function occ(s, x) simply returns the frequencies, the probability, or a
binary flag for the occurrences of the n-gram s in the data object x.
7This approach assumes that relevant packet contents are accessible to VIA – i.e., non-encrypted.
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Past work has shown that even for small n (e.g., n = 1), n-grams can be
an extremely effective in modeling traffic patterns in a manner that is efficient,
accurate, and resilient to mimicry attacks [188]. (In a mimicry attack, the attacker
(1) takes control of a network device, and (2) successfully executes a payload
while mimicking normal behavior. Thus, if an exploit sequence is contained in the
normal profile, the attack will go undetected.) Attempts to improve upon simple
1-gram models have shown only slight improvements. For instance, past work has
shown that slightly higher detection rates, and slightly lower false-positive rates
can be achieved [11], but these improvements come at the expense of increased
computational complexity, or the use of additional preprocessing that imposes
domain knowledge. Furthermore, Angiulli et al. suggest that there is an inherent
trade-off in building n-gram models where n > 1: greater values of n lead to
higher false-positive rates, whereas 1-gram models have been shown to have lower
detection rates (but not by much).
Ultimately, 1-gram models are simple, effective, and have low false-positive
rates, which is a good starting point for investigating the viability of applying
anomaly-detection techniques for verification of authentic traffic within Bluetooth
networks. Thus, in this work, we use 1-grams to build models based on byte-
frequency distributions observed over a sequence of one or more Bluetooth packets.
The resulting models can then be used to verify future network communications.
4.4.2 Hierarchical Segmentation
A single model trying to characterize all packets has been shown to lead to an
ineffective, monolithic model. Therefore, it is necessary to learn a variety of models
that separate traffic into different groups, where similar types of traffic can be
associated and compared. Past work analyzing IP traffic (e.g., [188]) learns separate
models using a combination of destination port, packet payload length, and packet
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direction (inbound or outbound).8 Thus, if there were 5 ports and 10 different
payload lengths for each port, their approach would learn 50 separate models for
inbound traffic and 50 separate models for outbound traffic.
This approach is problematic for Bluetooth-based WPANs. For instance, some
of the conventional notions (e.g., ports) are not directly applicable. We observe,
however, that model separation based on ports is effectively meant to separate
models based on the underlying protocol and semantics of interactions within the
context of a specific protocol. Therefore, to capture specific semantics of underlying
protocols in Bluetooth, we introduce our approach to model separation based on


















Figure 4.5: Hierarchical segmentation of the Bluetooth protocol stack for VIA models.
As we traverse the hierarchy illustrated in Figure 4.5 from left to right, we
move “up the stack” in Bluetooth. The root of the hierarchy corresponds to the
Host Controller Interface (HCI) layer – the lowest layer of the Bluetooth protocol in
8PAYL and related systems also describe solutions to common edge cases that can be problematic.
For example, they describe approaches to merge models in the event of sparse training data.
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which we can reliably capture Bluetooth network traffic.
The HCI protocol is made up of four different types of packets: command
packets (CMD), which contain directives or requests from Host software; event
packets (EVT), which contain responses to CMD requests or notifications of network
events (e.g., connection requests); asynchronous data packets (ACL), which are
used for higher layers in the Bluetooth protocol to exchange data; and synchronous
data packets (SCO), which are primarily used for streaming data, such as audio. In
our testbed of more than 20 smart-health and smart-home devices, not one of those
devices ever exchanged SCO packets. Thus, VIA models only make use of CMD,
EVT, and ACL packets.9
Packets in the HCI protocol can flow in one of two directions. Packets that flow
along the entry path into the hub are referred to as ingress packets, and packets that
flow along the exit path from the hub are referred to as egress packets. Because the
direction of a packet is an important characteristic of the packet, shorthand notation
is commonly used. Specifically, an ingress packet’s direction is also referred to as
d2h (device-to-host), since the direction of the packet is oriented from a device
towards [to] the host. An egress packet’s direction is also referred to as h2d (host-
to-device), since the direction of the packet is oriented from the host toward [to] a
connected device.
Each of the CMD, EVT, and ACL packets have substantially different char-
acteristics in terms of directionality and packet length, examples of which can be
seen in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7. CMD packets are unidirectional and flow ex-
clusively from the Host to the Controller (h2d); the lengths of these packets are
generally quite small, likely because the HCI protocol defines a a limited set of
valid commands, most with few parameters. EVT packets flow exclusively from the
9Our approach to modeling should be applicable to SCO packets as well, but we have not had
an opportunity to study SCO traffic to date. It is likely that devices with microphones or speakers
will make use of SCO traffic, but none of the devices in our testbed had either.
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Controller to the Host (d2h); the lengths of these packets are highly variable. ACL
packets are bi-directional and can flow in either direction between the Host and
Controller (h2d or d2h); these packets primarily transport application-layer data
communicated between devices. We note that there tends to be more variability
in ingress ACL packets. We see these differences between CMD, EVT, and ACL
packets as meaningful features for creating separation between VIA models.
To illustrate the characteristics described above as seen in our dataset, we
compiled all of the packets from all of the parsed trace files for a particular device
(in this case, the Omron upper-arm blood-pressure monitor) and plot (Figure 4.6,
Figure 4.7) the distribution of observed packet types, lengths, and directions. Note
that while these plots are for a specific device, other devices show similar trends:
most or all packets are 50 bytes or less; there are a few packet lengths that are
frequently observed; the lengths of HCI EVT packets are highly variable while the
lengths of HCI CMD packets are relatively small; and, there is more variability in
the lengths of HCI ACL packets sent from a peripheral device to an app on the hub
device as compared to the lengths of packets sent from the app to the peripheral
device.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of HCI packet lengths by packet type and direction. HCI command
packets (CMD) are generally small, and only egress from the perspective of our network
traces. HCI event packets (EVT) are highly-variable in length, and only ingress from the per-
spective of our network traces. HCI data packets (ACL) are bi-directional and exhibit more
variance on the ingress path.
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of HCI packet lengths and their observed frequencies. The sizes
of packets observed in our dataset are small for the most part, and many packets are rep-
resented by a small number of packet lengths. This supports our approach of hierarchical
segmentation that takes packet length into account as well.
Additional differences can be seen within each of the HCI packet types, es-
pecially ACL packets. Notably, ACL packets transport Logical Link Control and
Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) packets, which is a layer that provides features such
as packet segmentation and retransmission. The primary function of the L2CAP
protocol is to provide a reliable transport for Bluetooth applications. Above the
L2CAP layer, we identify three critical protocols that can be used for further model
separation: the Attribute Protocol (ATT), the Signaling Protocol (SCH), and the
Security Management Protocol (SMP). It is through these protocols that devices can
perform authentication, establish connections and logical channels, and exchange
user data.
Commands (CMD) and events (EVT) are specified by an opcode and event
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code, respectively. While there are nearly 300 HCI commands and events, they are
grouped into several categories based on their function (e.g., configuring the Con-
troller, requesting information about the Controller or nearby devices, discovering
devices, establishing connections). Different groups of opcodes (OGF in Figure 4.5)
lead to one form of separation for models composed of CMD packets. Event packets
are not so easily separated; in our current work, packet length appears to be the
best attribute for separation among event packets.
To summarize, VIA uses several features to learn models: a combination of
n-grams, packet type, packet length, and packet directionality. These features enable
VIA to create models that are highly effective in recognizing network traffic that
is consistent with previously-learned authentic communications for interactions
between a particular app/device pair, and to distinguish among the interactions for
different app/device pairs. To give the reader some intuition for the features used
in VIA, Figure 4.8 illustrates an overlay of the n-grams generated from more than
30 different traces10 over time between a Kinsa thermometer and its companion
application. Figure 4.8 provides compelling evidence for the viability of VIA as
a solution for verifying trustworthy behavior within WPANs. We provide more
quantitative evidence in Section 4.5.
10A trace is a packet capture consisting of all packets that are observed between the time that
a hub and peripheral device establish and terminate a connection. For more information on the
collection of traces, see Section 4.5.1.
129
Figure 4.8: Example of normalized byte frequencies for HCI traces.
4.4.3 Model Selection & Verification
After models have been created, VIA can perform verification. To perform verifica-
tion, VIA scans each packet according to the hierarchical segmentation described
above, and selects a representative model for verification. Next, VIA computes the
byte-value distribution of the relevant segment of the new packet and compares
the result against the chosen verification model. If a new packet (or sequence of
packets) is consistent with the verification model, VIA deems the interaction to be
authentic. In Section 4.5, we discuss the use of off-the-shelf classifiers that can be
used to determine whether a new packet is consistent with the verification model.
The description above is a slight simplification of how verification is per-
formed. In reality, packets exchanged in Bluetooth communications are usually
quite small. For example, in Bluetooth version 4.0 and 4.1, the maximum Attribute
Protocol (ATT) payload is 20 bytes.
From preliminary experiments, we found that learning and verification works
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best using a sequence of packets. For example, Figure 4.9 illustrates n-grams
produced from examining the first b bytes of a concatenated sequence, where b
equals 10, 50, 100, and nearly 300, respectively. In this example, the HCI trace
captures all of the packets that were exchanged between the companion app and
device (thermometer) connected and exchanged data about a measurement taken
from the device. Clearly, using more packets will provide more information for
model learning and verification. In our work we chose to use all of the available
bytes in a network trace11 to learn and evaluate our models, which equates to a few
minutes of network activity per trace.
11The decision to use all of the bytes in a network trace is appropriate here because of how we
constructed the traces, which we describe in detail in Section 4.5.1. In short, each trace contains
bytes from only a short period of time (3-10 minutes) in which an app-device pair connect, exchange
data, and disconnect. In future work, we will perform a more in-depth examination of the data to
determine an optimal duration that should be used for building a model.
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Figure 4.9: Example of the information gained from aggregating varying amounts of bytes
from a trace before learning models or performing verification. Specifically, these subplots
illustrate the n-grams that are produced from examining the first b bytes of a concatenated
sequence, where b equals 10, 50, 100, and nearly 300, respectively. (In the last subplot, only
297 bytes are shown because only that many bytes were exchanged at the ACL/L2CAP layer
during this particular network trace.)
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4.5 Evaluation
In this section we study the use of n-grams and our new methodology for model
separation in Bluetooth (hierarchical segmentation) as a promising approach for ver-
ifying app-device interactions over time. To evaluate the viability of our approach,
we assembled a testbed (Figure 4.10) of two distinct device categories (smart-health
and smart-home devices) consisting of 9 different device types, and 20 devices in
total (Table 4.1). From this testbed, we produced a novel dataset of more than 300
Bluetooth network traces (Section 4.5.1), which will be made public following the
publication of this dissertation.12
The remainder of this section describes our experiments that use the traces
collected from our smart-device testbed. The primary thrust of our experiments is
to show that our approach can produce models capable of differentiating between
sufficiently dissimilar devices. (We examine various interpretations of dissimilar,
such as devices that differ by type, manufacturer, and instance.) Separation between
devices is one way of verifying app-device interactions; in other words, interactions
for similar devices are classified to a specific class, whereas different interactions
are classified into a different class (or classes).
Throughout our experiments, we use multi-class classifiers (e.g., Random
Forest) to classify a sequence of packets into an appropriate class, and evaluate the
performance of the classifiers by conducting a stratified 10-fold cross validation.
4.5.1 Experimental Setup
In this section we discuss the details of our testbed and dataset, how we triggered
and captured authentic interactions between apps and devices, and details about
our data pre-processing and analysis.
12https://crawdad.org/dartmouth/bluetooth-hci
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A New Smart-Health and Smart-Home Testbed & Dataset
To evaluate our approach it was first necessary to assemble a testbed of devices.
We focus on two broad categories of smart devices that are common for WPAN
scenarios: smart-health devices and smart-home devices. We carefully selected
devices to ensure that our testbed was composed of diverse devices, in terms of their
functions; yet, we also wanted to study similar devices to evaluate the limitations of
our approach to modeling, and the abilities of our models to differentiate between
similar devices. In the text below, we describe devices by their type (which refers to
a device’s functionality and purpose), make (which refers to the manufacturer of the
device), and model (which refers to an identifier, such as a name or number, that is
used to distinguish among devices made by the same manufacturer).
At the time this work was conducted, our testbed consisted of 20 Bluetooth-
enabled, smart-health and smart-home devices: two weight and body composition
scales, each from different manufacturers; five blood-pressure monitors, from three
different manufacturers;13 three heart-rate monitors (two of which have identical
make and model), from two different manufacturers; one pulse oximeter; one
TENS unit (a unit is technically made up of two distinct Bluetooth devices); two
glucose monitors, from two different manufacturers; two thermometers (same
make, different models); two smart locks, each from different manufacturers; and
two identical smart environment sensors (same make and model). A summary
of the smart devices in our testbed is presented in Table 4.1; a photo of some of
these devices is shown in Figure 4.10. Also, a summary of the mobile apps used to
interact with the smart devices in our testbed is shown in Table 4.2.
13The blood-pressure monitors present any interesting case study. Not only does our dataset have
three devices of the same type from three different manufacturers, but also, the monitors measure
blood pressure at two different locations on the body: upper arm and wrist.
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Figure 4.10: A photo of our smart-health and smart-home devices.
Data Collection: Capturing HCI Traces
Using our testbed, we collected a large number of network traces (more than 300
in total) that captured interactions between 20 distinct devices with 13 different
smartphone apps. Here, a trace refers to a packet capture consisting of all packets
that are observed between the time that a hub and peripheral device establish and
terminate a connection; an interaction refers to a semantically meaningful exchange
of packets between a hub and peripheral. As a result of these definitions, an
interaction, in general, can be thought of as a subsequence of a trace. Based on how
we constructed our traces (recall Section 4.4.3), however, a trace and an interaction
are effectively equivalent in our experiments.
The above-mentioned smartphone apps were installed on a Nexus 5 smart-
phone running Android 6.0.1 (“Marshmallow”), API level 23, kernel version 3.4.0.
Along with executing the apps, the smartphone also served as our primary device
for data collection. To capture HCI traces, we enabled the Bluetooth HCI snoop
log developer option. (This feature is a common developer option introduced in
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Table 4.1: List of Bluetooth-enabled smart devices that make up our testbed.
Identifier Device Model
Smart Health
Scale-RENPHO RENPHO Smart Bluetooth Body Fat Scale
Scale-Gurus Bluetooth Smart Body Fat Scale by Weight Gurus
BPCuff-WR-iHealth iHealth View Bluetooth Wrist Blood Pressure Monitor
BPCuff-UA-iHealth iHealth Feel Bluetooth Upper Arm Blood Pressure Monitor
BPCuff-UA-OMRON OMRON Evolv Wireless Upper Arm Blood Pressure Monitor
BPCuff-WR-OMRON OMRON 10 Series Wireless Wrist Blood Pressure Monitor
BPCuff-UA-Choice Choice Wireless Blood Pressure Monitor, Upper Arm
HRMonitor-CH-Polar-1 Polar H7 Wearable Heart Rate Monitor (Chest)
HRMonitor-CH-Polar-2 Polar H7 Wearable Heart Rate Monitor (Chest)
HRMonitor-CH-Zephyr Zephyr Wearable Heart Rate Monitor (Chest)
PulseOx-iHealth iHealth Air Wireless Fingertip Pulse Oximeter
TENS-OMRON OMRON Avail Dual Channel TENS unit
Gluco-iHealth iHealth Wireless Smart Blood Sugar Test Kit
Gluco-Choice Choice Wireless Blood Glucose Monitor
Therm-Oral-KINSA KINSA QuickCare (oral smart thermometer)
Therm-Ear-KINSA KINSA Smart Ear (in-ear smart thermometer)
Smart Home
SmartLock-August August Smart Lock Pro + Connect (3rd Gen.)
SmartLock-Schlage Schlage Sense Smart Deadbolt
EnvSensor-Inkbird-1 Inkbird combo mini Bluetooth (temp/hum) sensor
EnvSensor-Inkbird-2 Inkbird combo mini Bluetooth (temp/hum) sensor
NOTE: Numbers are used in the identifier to distinguish between multiple instances of devices. Two
letters are used in the identifier (between the device type and manufacturer) to denote the placement of a
device where there are multiple options: WR = Wrist, UA = Upper Arm, CH = Chest.
Android 4.4. It is interesting to note that using this feature does not even require
rooting the phone.) The HCI snoop log captures all Bluetooth HCI packets to a
binary-encoded file, which it writes to an SD card; the log format resembles the
Snoop Version 2 Packet Capture File Format described in RFC 1761 [45].
Each trace captured interactions between one app-device pair. Specifically,
each trace captured all communications observed at the HCI layer (and therefore all
protocol layers above the HCI layer). For each app-device pair we collected at least
10 traces, each of which included 3-10 minutes of network activity.
We observed that our traces also contain ambient network activity, such as
advertisements from nearby devices not in our testbed. We filtered out this ambient
activity by simply “ignoring” certain HCI EVT packets; as a result, ambient network
activity does not interfere with our ability to learn verification models.
136




Weight Gurus Weight Gurus scale
iHealth MyVitals iHealth blood-pressure monitors, pulse oximeter
OMRON Connect OMRON blood-pressure monitors
Choice Blood Pressure Choice blood-pressure monitor
Polar Beat Polar and Zephyr heart-rate monitors
OMRON TENS OMRON TENS unit
iHealth Gluco-Smart iHealth blood-glucose meter
AgaMatrix Diabetes Manager Choice blood-glucose meter
Kinsa Kinsa oral and ear thermometers
Smart Home
Schlage Home Schlage smart deadbolt
August Home August smart lock
Engbird Environment sensors
Bluetooth Dev/Test Apps
nRF Connect General BLE exploration
Light Blue Explorer Schlage smart deadbolt
BLE Peripheral Simulator August smart lock
Emulating Normal App-Device Interactions
We gathered HCI traces by manually using the apps and devices in our testbed to
emulate a wide variety of normal app-device interactions. The actions we performed
consisted of: navigating the “official” smartphone app14 and exercising features
that trigger network communication with a corresponding device, as well as acting
upon the devices in such a way that triggers communication with its corresponding
smartphone app.
It was not our intention to discover and exercise every functional feature (and
thus every BLE service or characteristic) of a particular app/device. Rather, it
was our intention to observe typical features and interactions between devices and
their official app, which could be used to construct normality models suitable for
performing verification in future app-device interactions.
Our current stance is that any network activity (authentic or inauthentic,
14With the exception of the heart-rate monitors, each device had a single “official” smartphone
app to which it would connect.
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benign or harmful) that deviates significantly from our normality models should
fail verification, which provides an opportunity for further investigation or some
other response to mitigate potential harm. In future work we will explore differences
between benign and authentic anomalies (e.g., genuine app-device communication
that occurs in response to a rare event, such as a heart attack), and anomalies that
are potentially harmful or inauthentic.
Data Pre-processing
Prior to analysis we applied pre-processing to each raw trace file. At the time of our
experiments, the pre-processing code was executed on a VM running Kali Linux,
kernel version 4.14.
Data pre-processing is necessary to generate an intermediate file with per-
packet features and labels. More specifically, after collecting each HCI trace (an
HCI snoop file), we moved the raw file from the smartphone to a local VM using
the Android Debugger command line tool (adb). We reset the HCI snoop file on
the smartphone between each trace so that each HCI snoop file contained only
packets belonging to interactions between a particular app-device combination
(recall Section 4.5.1); we refer to this as an app-device session.
To parse HCI traces, we extended two open-source projects: btsnoop 15
and bluepy. 16 Our extensions extend the parsing of the HCI protocol and other
protocols that the HCI protocol encapsulates; namely, we extract features for each
packet within the HCI traces, such as packet types, lengths, endpoint identifiers,
protocol semantics, and segmented headers and payloads belonging to higher-level
Bluetooth protocols (e.g., the Attribute Protocol (ATT), the Security Management
Protocol (SMP), the Signaling Protocol); and, because each trace captured a single




to/from. Finally, these features and labels were written to CSV-formatted files for
subsequent (offline) analysis.
Data Analysis & Model Validation
We conducted our analysis using a collection of custom-written Jupyter Note-
books [103]. To enable others to easily reproduce our findings, we wrote a custom
Dockerfile that automates the process of building a consistent Docker [63] container
environment that is suitable for loading our dataset and running our Notebooks. At
the time of this work, our Jupyter Notebooks were executed on a Docker container
running atop Linux, kernel version 4.9.125.
In our analysis, we loaded the pre-processed files into m× n matrices, where
the rows are the observations (packets) in the trace, and the columns are the features
(e.g., packet types, lengths, raw packet bytes) parsed from the raw trace files.
Upon loading a processed trace file, we segmented each packet according to the
hierarchical segmentation methodology described in Section 4.4.2 (specifically, recall
Figure 4.5), and computed n-grams over the packet bytes in the respective segments.
To be clear, for each leaf of hierarchical segmentation, our approach produces a
256-dimensional vector.
To learn models, we experimented with various multi-class classifiers (e.g.,
Random Forest), and different “branches” within hierarchical segmentation, to
classify a sequence of packets into one of multiple classes. (In our experiments
we examined various definitions for classes, such as separate classes for each
device type, type and make, and instance.) In the subsections below, we present
experimental results for the multi-class Random Forest classifiers, which were
trained and validated with n-grams computed from the HCI→ACL→L2CAP→ ·· ·
branch of hierarchical segmentation.
To evaluate the models produced by the Random Forest classifier examined in
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this work, we conducted a stratified 10-fold cross validation that repeatedly split our
dataset into training and testing subsets, and measured the classifier’s performance.
The classifier was trained with n-grams and class labels from a training set. After
training, we used the trained models to predict a class label for each sample in a
corresponding test set (i.e., the n-grams computed from a new trace) and compared
the predicted label to the actual label.
Due to limitations of our dataset, such as imbalances in the class sizes, we
employed model validation techniques (n-fold cross validation and stratification)
to ensure that our analysis was accurate and reliable. N-fold cross validation
averages the performance of a classifier over multiple partitions (folds) of the data,
which mitigates the effects of an (un)favorable partition (and potentially unreliable
conclusions about the performance of the classifier). Stratification ensures that the
various folds maintain a balanced distribution of the represented classes when
partitioning the data.
In our evaluation, we used off-the-shelf classifiers (e.g., Random Forest) built
into scikit-learn [151], a popular python package for machine learning. In our
evaluation, we use classifiers that can be applied both as binary classifiers (two
classes) and multi-class classifiers (more than two classes). While we evaluated
VIA using a few such classifiers, we focused our attention on the Random Forest
classifier because they are generally easier to interpret and explain, they are non-
parametric (so there is no need to worry about outliers or whether the data is
linearly separable), and they are fast and scalable (so there is generally less concern
with parameter tuning). Because this work is more concerned with validating the
approach, and not so much fine-tuning the underlying machine learning classifiers,
these attributes make the Random Forest classifier a reasonable starting point.
In the binary classification experiments, classifiers labeled samples as the
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target class (“positive” class) or the other class (“negative” class).17 In the multi-class
classification experiments, classifiers labeled samples according to a target class that
the sample most closely resembled.
To report our results, we use the following performance measures, which are
useful for evaluating our classifiers in performing both binary classification and
multi-class classification tasks:
• Precision is the ratio of correctly predicted positive observations to the total




• Recall is the ratio of correctly predicted positive observations to the total
number of observations that are actually in the positive class. A perfect




• F1-score is the weighted average of precision and recall. A perfect classifier
performs at 100%.
F1-score =
2 ∗ (precision ∗ recall)
precision + recall
In the above definitions, tp refers to true positives, tn refers to true negatives,
fp refers to false positives, and fn refers to false negatives. The precision and recall
provide insights into the types of errors that the classifiers make, which is preferable
over simply reporting the number of misclassified samples. Accuracy is another
17We use “positive” here because this intuitively maps to a successful identification/verification,
whereas “negative” (or “other”) intuitively maps to an unsuccessful identification/verification.
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common performance measure, but accuracy alone can yield misleading results
(e.g., when classes are imbalanced). The F1-score generally provides a more robust
measure of the performance of a classifier; for this reason, we opt to report the
F1-score and not the accuracy.
Reproducibility
To promote open access research and reproducibility of this scientific work, and to
equip future researchers with better tools for investigation into Bluetooth, we will
release the Vagrantfile and Dockerfile for the respective VirtualBox VM and Docker
container, as well as our dataset, after this dissertation is released. Our extensions
to the two open-source projects mentioned above are already publicly available (see
links in footnotes 15 and 16).
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4.5.2 Overview of Experiments & Results
We evaluated VIA in terms of two fundamental approaches to authentication (re-
call Section 4.2.1); specifically, we evaluated VIA’s ability to perform identification
(one-to-many matching) and verification (one-to-one matching) tasks. Moreover,
we evaluated VIA’s ability to perform these tasks at different granularities. In
our evaluation we considered three granularities of separation between devices:
by device type, by device type and make, and by specific device instance.18 The
specific classification granularities and the corresponding labels are summarized
in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: A list of class labels by classification granularity.
Granularity (# of Labels) Labels
Device Type (9) Scale, BP-Monitor, HR-Monitor, Pulse-Ox, TENS,
Glucose-Meter, Thermometer, Smart-Lock, ENV-Sensor
Device Type+Make (15) Scale-RENPHO, Scale-Gurus, BP-Monitor-iHealth, BP-
Monitor-OMRON, BP-Monitor-Choice, HR-Monitor-












NOTE: Numbers are used in the identifier to distinguish between multiple instances of devices.
18We do not evaluate the granularity of device type, make, and model (device-type-make-model)
here. While it may seem a natural next step, our testbed did not contain enough examples to provide
a meaningful evaluation at this class granularity. We refer the reader to Section 4.5.5, where we
evaluate VIA using subsets of devices from our testbed that do have variance in device model.
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Our results can be summarized as follows:
• Identification Tasks: VIA successfully identified devices by device-type with
an F1-score of 94% or higher in all cases. VIA successfully identified devices by
device-type-make with an F1-score of 94% or higher in all cases. VIA successfully
identified devices by device-instance with an F1-score of 91% or higher in most
cases.
• Verification Tasks: VIA successfully verified that specific network communi-
cations belong to a target device-type class with F1-score higher than 91% in all
cases. VIA successfully verified that specific network communications belong
to a target device-type-make class with F1-score higher than 91% in all cases.
VIA successfully verified that specific network communications belong to a
target device-instance class with F1-score higher than 93% in all but one case.
We also conducted experiments to examine the cases where the F1-score is
lower (e.g., environment sensors), and concluded that these cases arise because
VIA, in some instances, confused distinct instances of otherwise identical devices
(i.e., same device type, make, and model) or devices that are nearly identical (i.e.,
same device type and make). We discuss our findings in more detail below.
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4.5.3 Identification Experiments & Results
In this section we present our evaluation of VIA in terms of its ability to perform
identification tasks. Specifically, we considered three different granularities of
separation between devices (noted above), and evaluated VIA’s ability to correctly
identify devices at each of the three granularities.
Identification is a multi-class classification task (recall Section 4.2.1): a device’s
identity is initially unknown, and (depending on the experiment) VIA seeks to de-
termine the device-type, device-type-make, or device-instance of a device by examining
the app-device network communications. First, VIA obtains many samples from
a population of devices. Each device has an identity in the form of a BD_ADDR
(though other forms of identity are possible, such as LTK), as well as a set of typical
network interactions. While other strategies are possible, and other features may
provide useful information, in our work network interactions are currently repre-
sented with n-grams. Without loss of generality, we refer to some representation of
typical network interactions as a device profile.
When VIA observes a new network interaction between an app and device
with an unknown identity, VIA can use its device profiles to identify the device
from the original population. Simply put, VIA monitors network communications
to formulate a profile for the observed traffic, and then examines its collection
of device profiles to determine the device profile that best matches the unknown
device’s profile. The unknown device is assigned the identity that corresponds to
the device profile it most closely resembles.19
In identification tasks, successful identification is defined as a classification
19To date, we have not yet evaluated how VIA performs when presented with an unknown device
(i.e., a device not seen in training). In VIA’s current design, any observation from an unknown
device will be classified to the most similar device class from the training set, which is not ideal.
One solution to this issue is to implement a confidence threshold. If the threshold is not exceeded,
VIA would classify the observation as “unknown," meaning that the observation does not look
sufficiently similar to any device in its known population of devices. We plan to add and evaluate
this enhancement to VIA’s identification capabilities in future work.
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into the correct (positive) target class; classification into any other class is recorded
as an unsuccessful identification (negative). The results for VIA and the multi-class
classification tasks are summarized in Table 4.4, Table 4.5, and Table 4.6.
Identification Task #1: Classification by Device Type
In this experiment we investigated whether VIA can identify the specific device
type (device-type) to which a new sample belongs. To accomplish this goal, we
assigned each trace a label according to the type of device (recall Table 4.3). Our
testbed consisted of 9 unique classes for device type (i.e., we created distinct classes
where devices are separated by type; devices of the same type shared a label). We
then conducted a stratified 10-fold cross-validation using models learned from data
labeled by device type. The cross-validation results for each of the 9 device-type
classes are summarized in Table 4.4 and visualized in Figure 4.11. In the device-type
identification tasks, VIA achieved an F1-score of 94% or better in all device-type
classes.
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Device Type Precision Recall F1-score
BP Monitor 1.00 1.00 1.00
Environment Sensor 0.89 1.00 0.94
Glucose Monitor 1.00 0.96 0.98
HR Monitor 1.00 1.00 1.00
Pulse Oximeter 1.00 1.00 1.00
Smart Lock 1.00 1.00 1.00
Smart Scale 1.00 1.00 1.00
TENS Unit 1.00 1.00 1.00
Thermometer 1.00 0.97 0.98
Table 4.4: The precision, recall, and F1-score for each device type (device-type) class. The
corresponding confusion matrix is shown in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.11: Confusion matrix for classification of devices by type (device-type). While our
smart-device testbed contained 20 devices in total, some devices are functionally similar
(same type). In this experiment, our testbed was separated into 9 different classes based on
device type. This confusion matrix shows the success of classification when devices were
combined into a class if they were of the same type.
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Identification Task #2: Classification by Device Type+Make
In this experiment we investigated whether VIA can identify the specific device
type and make (device-type-make) to which a new sample belongs. To accomplish
this goal, we assigned each trace a label according to the specific device type and
make to which it belongs (recall Table 4.3). Our testbed consisted of 15 unique
classes for device type and make (i.e., we created distinct classes where devices
were separated by type and make; devices of the same type and make shared a
label). We then conducted a stratified 10-fold cross-validation using models learned
from data labeled by their device type and make. The cross-validation results for
each of the 15 device-type-make classes are summarized in Table 4.5 and visualized
in Figure 4.12. In the device-type-make identification tasks, VIA achieved an F1-score
of 94% or better in all device-type-make classes.
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Device Type & Make Precision Recall F1-score
BP Monitor - Choice 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - Omron 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - iHealth 1.00 1.00 1.00
Environment Sensor - Inkbird 0.89 1.00 0.94
Glucose Monitor - Choice 1.00 1.00 1.00
Glucose Monitor - iHealth 1.00 0.91 0.95
HR Monitor - Polar 1.00 1.00 1.00
HR Monitor - Zephyr 1.00 1.00 1.00
Pulse Oximeter - iHealth 1.00 1.00 1.00
Smart Lock - August 0.95 1.00 0.98
Smart Lock - Schlage 1.00 0.95 0.98
Smart Scale - Gurus 1.00 1.00 1.00
Smart Scale - Renpho 1.00 1.00 1.00
TENS Unit - Omron 1.00 1.00 1.00
Thermometer - Kinsa 1.00 0.97 0.98
Table 4.5: The precision, recall, and F1-score for each device type and make (device-type-make)
class. The corresponding confusion matrix is shown in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Confusion matrix for classification of devices by type and make (device-type-
make). While our smart-device testbed contained 20 devices in total, some devices were func-
tionally similar (same type) but may or may not have been made by the same manufacturer. In
this experiment, our testbed was separated into 15 different classes based on type and make.
This confusion matrix shows the success of classification when devices were combined into a
class if they were of the same type and make.
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Identification Task #3: Classification by Device Instance
In this experiment we investigated whether VIA can identify the specific device
(device-instance) to which a new sample belongs. To accomplish this goal, we
assigned each trace a label according to the specific device to which it belongs
(recall Table 4.3). Our testbed consisted of 20 unique classes based on the number
of distinct device instances (i.e., we created a distinct class for each distinct device
instance, even if the devices were the same type, make, and model). We then
conducted a stratified 10-fold cross-validation using models learned from data
labeled by their device instances. The cross-validation results for each of the 20
device-instance classes are summarized in Table 4.6 and visualized in Figure 4.13. In
the device-instance identification tasks, VIA achieved an F1-score of 91% or better in
nearly all device-instance classes. Indeed, the only cases where VIA performed worse
were tasks where VIA had to distinguish between nearly identical devices (same
type, make, and model). We discuss this observation further in the Discussion
section below.
152
Device Instance Precision Recall F1-score
BP Monitor - Choice (Upper Arm) 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - Omron (Upper Arm) 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - Omron (Wrist) 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - iHealth (Upper Arm) 1.00 0.92 0.96
BP Monitor - iHealth (Wrist) 0.94 1.00 0.97
Environment Sensor - Inkbird (1) 0.33 0.14 0.20
Environment Sensor - Inkbird (2) 0.50 0.78 0.61
Glucose Monitor - Choice (1) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Glucose Monitor - iHealth (1) 0.91 0.91 0.91
HR Monitor - Polar (1) 0.92 1.00 0.96
HR Monitor - Polar (2) 1.00 1.00 1.00
HR Monitor - Zephyr (1) 1.00 0.92 0.96
Pulse Oximeter - iHealth (1) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Smart Lock - August (1) 0.91 1.00 0.95
Smart Lock - Schlage (1) 1.00 0.90 0.95
Smart Scale - Gurus (1) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Smart Scale - Renpho (1) 1.00 1.00 1.00
TENS Unit - Omron (1) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Thermometer - Kinsa (Ear) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Thermometer - Kinsa (Oral) 1.00 0.94 0.97
Table 4.6: The precision, recall, and F1-score for each device instance (device-instance) class.
The corresponding confusion matrix is shown in Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.13: Confusion matrix for classification of devices by instance. Our smart-device
testbed contained 20 devices (distinct instances) in total. In this experiment, our testbed was
separated into 20 different classes based on the number of distinct device instances. This




In our evaluation of VIA’s ability to perform identification tasks, it is important
to understand that the F1-score is lower in the device-instance evaluation because
similar devices are in both the positive and negative classes. For example, the
Environment Sensor devices present the one case where the F1-scores are well below
90%. We chose to include examples of identical devices (i.e., same device type,
make, and model) in this testbed to study this specific case: how well does VIA
perform correct identification when some devices are highly similar (or identical, as in this
case)? Unsurprisingly, these identical devices run the same software, on different
(but similar) hardware, which yields profiles for app-device communications that
are nearly identical. As a result, VIA confused these devices when performing
identification.
One could conclude that VIA’s ability to perform identification is best done
at the granularity of device-type or device-type-make; however, we urge the reader
to consider the consequences of this conclusion. For example, the consequence of
identification at this granularity is that VIA may not be able to distinguish between
different instances of devices with the same type, make and model. Furthermore,
we would be remiss to not point out that VIA’s perceived success in performing
identification – specifically in distinguishing between different instances of de-
vices – may be exaggerated by the fact that our testbed contained few devices that
shared the same type, make and model – the cases where VIA is most likely to be
confounded.
In light of these observations, we conclude that further analysis is needed to
better understand the strengths and limitations of VIA. To this end, we performed
additional experiments with subsets of the highly-similar devices that we did have
in our testbed. We present our findings in Section 4.5.5.
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4.5.4 Verification Experiments & Results
In this section we present our evaluation of VIA in terms of its ability to perform
verification tasks. As before, we considered three different granularities of separa-
tion between devices (noted above), and evaluated VIA’s ability to correctly verify
devices at each of the three granularities.
Verification is a binary (two-class) classification task (recall Section 4.2.1): a
device’s identity is known or observed a priori, which enables VIA to load a target
identity for comparison. After examining newly-observed app-device network
communications, VIA either accepts or rejects that the observations are sufficiently
similar to the target identity. As mentioned above, we considered three different
definitions (granularities) for identity: device-type, device-type-make, or device-instance.
To accomplish verification, VIA first obtains many samples from a population
of devices and learns a specific classifier for each device. Each device has an identity
in the form of a BD_ADDR (though other forms of identity are possible, such as LTK),
as well as a set of typical network interactions, which makes it possible to train a
classifier that recognizes that device. While other strategies are possible, and other
features may provide useful information, in our work network interactions are
currently represented with n-grams. Without loss of generality, we refer to some
representation of typical network interactions as a device profile.
When VIA observes a new network interaction between an app and device
with a known identity, VIA (1) uses the identity to load the appropriate classifier,
and (2) uses the classifier to determine whether or not the new communications
are sufficiently similar to the target identity. Simply put, VIA monitors network
communications, obtains a claimed-identity for app-device interactions, loads the
corresponding classifier (which was obtained from training using the device profile
for the target identity, henceforth referred to as the verification profile), formulates a
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profile for newly-observed traffic (the test profile), and uses the classifier to conduct a
verification procedure that determines whether the test profile is sufficiently similar
to the verification profile.20 In the end, VIA’s verification procedure relies on the
classifier to classify new observations into one of two classes: the target class or the
other class. If the interactions are actually from a device that matches the identity
of the target identity, the interactions should be classified to the target class, and
VIA accepts the observations as being authentic. If, however, the observations are
classified to the other class, VIA rejects the observations and and deems them to be
inauthentic.
In the experiments conducted in the following sections, we repeatedly fixed a
single class to be the target class and combine all other classes into a single other class;
this formulation creates the desired two-class classification problem.21 We then
evaluated the verification results produced by VIA using the following definitions.
A successful verification is defined as a classification of observations belonging to
the target class into the target class (true positive), or a classification of observations
belonging to the other class into the other class (true negative). An unsuccessful
verification is defined as a classification of observations belonging to the target class
into the other class (false negative), or a classification of observations belonging
to the other class into the target class (false positive). The results for VIA and the
binary-class classification tasks are summarized in Table 4.7, Table 4.8, and Table 4.9.
20Thus, VIA’s ability to determine whether observations are ‘sufficiently similar’ with past
observations is dependent on the underlying classifier that is used, and the classifier’s ability to
create a distinct decision boundary between the target class and the other class. (Recall Section 4.5.1.)
21To date, we have not yet evaluated how VIA performs when presented with an unknown device
(i.e., a device not seen in training). In VIA’s current design, any observation from an unknown
device will be classified to the class it most closely resembles; ideally this class would be the other
class, but since the unknown observation is represented in neither the target class nor the other class,
VIA’s behavior in this scenario is unknown. One solution to this issue is to implement a confidence
threshold before allowing an observation to be classified into the target class. If the new observation
does not exceed the confidence threshold, VIA would classify the observation into the other class,
meaning that the observation does not look sufficiently similar to the target class for verification. We
plan to add and evaluate this enhancement to VIA’s verification capabilities in future work.
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Verification Task #1: Classification by Device Type
In this experiment we investigated whether VIA can verify that a new sample
belongs to a specific device type (device-type). To evaluate verification by device
type, we re-labeled data (recall Table 4.3) according to a one-vs-all strategy: We fixed
one device type (e.g., BP Monitor) to be the target class for verification, and grouped
the remaining device types into an other class; traces associated with the fixed-type
were labeled as members of the target class, and all other traces (associated with all
of the other types) were labeled as members of the other class. After re-labeling the
data using the one-vs-all strategy, we conducted a stratified 10-fold cross-validation
using models learned from the re-labeled data. We repeated this process 9 times
to produce results where each device type was fixed as the target class. The cross-
validation results for each of the 9 device-type classes are summarized in Table 4.7
and visualized in Figure 4.14. In the device-type verification tasks, VIA achieved an
F1-score of 91% or better in all device-type classes.
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Device Type Precision Recall F1-score
BP Monitor 1.00 0.96 0.98
Environment Sensor 1.00 0.94 0.97
Glucose Monitor 1.00 0.96 0.98
HR Monitor 1.00 0.91 0.95
Pulse Oximeter 1.00 1.00 1.00
Smart Scale 1.00 0.90 0.95
Smart Lock 1.00 1.00 1.00
TENS Unit 1.00 0.83 0.91
Thermometer 1.00 0.97 0.98
Table 4.7: The precision, recall, and F1-score for one-vs-all verification by device type
(device-type). The corresponding confusion matrices are shown in Figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.14: Confusion matrices for one-vs-all verification by device type (device-type). While
our smart-device testbed contained 20 devices in total, some devices were functionally similar
(same type). In this experiment, our testbed was separated into 9 different classes based on
device type. The confusion matrices show the success of verification when one type was fixed
and all other types are combined into a single class.
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Verification Task #2: Classification by Device Type+Make
In this experiment we investigated whether VIA can verify that a new sample be-
longs to a specific device type and make (device-type-make). To evaluate verification
by device type and make, we re-labeled data (recall Table 4.3) according to a one-vs-
all strategy: We fixed one device type and make (e.g., BP Monitor - iHealth) to be
the target class for verification, and grouped the remaining device types and makes
into an other class; traces associated with the fixed type and make were labeled as
members of the target class, and all other traces (associated with all of the other
types and makes) were labeled as members of the other class. After re-labeling the
data using the one-vs-all strategy, we conducted a stratified 10-fold cross-validation
using models learned from the re-labeled data. We repeated this process 15 times to
produce results where each device type and make was fixed as the target class. The
cross-validation results for each of the 15 device-type-make classes are summarized
in Table 4.8 and visualized in Figure 4.15. In the device-type-make verification tasks,
VIA achieved an F1-score of 91% or better in nearly all device-type-make classes.
Indeed, the only cases where VIA performed worse were tasks where VIA had to
perform verification when similar devices (e.g., blood-pressure monitors) were in
both the target class and the other class. We discuss this observation further in the
Discussion section below.
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Device Type & Make Precision Recall F1-score
BP Monitor - Choice 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - iHealth 0.75 0.93 0.83
BP Monitor - Omron 1.00 1.00 1.00
Environment Sensor - Inkbird 1.00 0.94 0.97
Glucose Monitor - Choice 1.00 0.88 0.93
Glucose Monitor - iHealth 1.00 0.91 0.95
HR Monitor - Polar 1.00 0.91 0.95
HR Monitor - Zephyr 1.00 0.83 0.91
Pulse Oximeter - iHealth 1.00 1.00 1.00
Smart Scale - Gurus 1.00 0.90 0.95
Smart Scale - Renpho 1.00 0.90 0.95
Smart Lock - August 0.87 1.00 0.93
Smart Lock - Schlage 1.00 0.86 0.92
TENS Unit - Omron 1.00 0.92 0.96
Thermometer - Kinsa 1.00 0.97 0.98
Table 4.8: The precision, recall, and F1-score for one-vs-all verification by device type and
make (device-type-make). The corresponding confusion matrices are shown in Figure 4.15.
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Figure 4.15: Confusion matrices for one-vs-all verification by device type and make (device-
type-make). While our smart-device testbed contained 20 devices in total, some devices were
functionally similar (same type) but may or may not have been made by the same manufac-
turer. In this experiment, our testbed was separated into 15 different classes based on type
and make. The confusion matrices show the success of verification when a type and make
was fixed and all other types and makes were combined into a single class.
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Verification Task #3: Classification by Device Instance
In this experiment we investigated whether VIA can verify that a new sample
belongs to a specific device (device-instance). To evaluate verification by device
instance, we re-labeled data (recall Table 4.3) according to a one-vs-all strategy: We
fixed one instance (e.g., Environment Sensor - Inkbird (1)) to be the target class
for verification, and grouped the remaining device instances into an other class;
traces associated with the fixed instance were labeled as members of the target
class, and all other traces (associated with all of the other instances) were labeled as
members of the other class. After re-labeling the data using the one-vs-all strategy,
we conducted a stratified 10-fold cross-validation using models learned from the
re-labeled data. We repeated this process 20 times to produce results where each
device instance is fixed as the target class. The cross-validation results for each of the
20 device-instance classes are summarized in Table 4.9 and visualized in Figure 4.16.
In the device-instance verification tasks, VIA achieved an F1-score of 93% or better in
nearly all device-instance classes. Indeed, the only cases where VIA performed worse
were tasks where VIA had to perform verification when nearly identical devices
(e.g., environment sensors, heart-rate monitors) were in both the target class and the
other class. We discuss this observation further in the Discussion section below.
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Device Instance Precision Recall F1-score
BP Monitor - Choice (Upper Arm) 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - iHealth (Upper Arm) 1.00 0.92 0.96
BP Monitor - iHealth (Wrist) 1.00 0.88 0.94
BP Monitor - Omron (Upper Arm) 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - Omron (Wrist) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Environment Sensor - Inkbird (1) 0.20 0.14 0.17
Environment Sensor - Inkbird (2) 0.40 0.22 0.29
Glucose Monitor - Choice (1) 1.00 0.94 0.97
Glucose Monitor - iHealth (1) 1.00 0.91 0.95
HR Monitor - Polar (1) 1.00 0.45 0.62
HR Monitor - Polar (2) 1.00 0.09 0.17
HR Monitor - Zephyr (1) 1.00 0.83 0.91
Pulse Oximeter - iHealth (1) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Smart Scale - Gurus (1) 1.00 0.90 0.95
Smart Scale - Renpho (1) 1.00 0.90 0.95
Smart Lock - August (1) 0.87 1.00 0.93
Smart Lock - Schlage (1) 1.00 0.90 0.95
TENS Unit - Omron (1) 1.00 0.92 0.96
Thermometer - Kinsa (Ear) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Thermometer - Kinsa (Oral) 1.00 0.94 0.97
Table 4.9: The precision, recall, and F1-score for one-vs-all verification by device instance
(device-instance). The corresponding confusion matrices are shown in Figure 4.16.
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Figure 4.16: Confusion matrices for one-vs-all verification by device instance (device-instance).
Our smart-device testbed contained 20 devices (distinct instances) in total. In this experiment,
our testbed was separated into 20 different classes based on the number of distinct device
instances. The confusion matrices show the success of verification when a specific device
instance was fixed and all other instances were combined into a single class.
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Discussion
In our evaluation of VIA’s ability to perform verification tasks, it is important to
understand that the F1-score is lower in the device-type-make evaluation and the
device-instance evaluation because similar (sometimes nearly identical) devices are in
both the target and other classes. For instance, when attempting to verify an iHealth
blood-pressure monitor in the device-type-make evaluation, there are blood-pressure
monitors in both the target class (all iHealth blood-pressure monitors) and other
class (Choice and Omron blood-pressure monitors). As another example, when
attempting to verify an Inkbird environment sensor in the device-instance evaluation,
there is one instance of an environment sensor in both the target class (Environment
Sensor - Inkbird (1)) and other class (Environment Sensor - Inkbird (2)). As we noted
above in the discussion of identification tasks, these particular observations are not
surprising. The similar devices – and indeed the nearly identical devices – operate
in similar ways, and in some cases even run the same software, on different (but
similar) hardware. It is therefore unsurprising to observe that VIA confused these
devices when performing certain verification tasks.
One could conclude that VIA’s verification is best done at the granularity
of device-type; however, we urge the reader to consider the consequences of this
conclusion. For example, the consequence of verification at the granularity of device-
type is that VIA may not take into account important distinctive features that arise
from devices with different make, model, or instance. Furthermore, we would be
remiss to not point out that VIA’s perceived success in performing verification may
be exaggerated by the fact that our testbed contained few devices that shared the
same type, make and model – the cases where VIA is most likely to be confounded.
In light of these observations, we conclude that further analysis is needed to
better understand the strengths and limitations of VIA. To this end, we performed
additional experiments with subsets of the highly-similar devices that we did have
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in our testbed. We present our findings in the next section.
4.5.5 Similarity Experiments & Results
Our previous experiments show that our models are exceptionally accurate in many
identification and verification tasks, but they also illustrate interesting cases where
our models may not perform well. In the experiments we discuss next, we examine
cases where devices were highly similar (e.g., same device type, same device make,
same device model).
Blood-Pressure Monitors
For this experiment, we used five different blood-pressure monitors from three
different manufacturers (Omron, iHealth, and Choice) and conducted a comparative
analysis among the five devices. We trained and evaluated models based on these
five classes, similar to the identification tasks above. The cross-validation results
are summarized in Table 4.10 and visualized in Figure 4.17.
It is clear from the confusion matrix in Figure 4.17 that our models result
in highly-accurate classification. In other words, our approach shows coherent
differentiation between the models learned for devices from different manufacturers.
It is also evident, however, that there was confusion between similar devices made
by the same manufacturer. In other words, similar types of devices made by the
same manufacturer may result in highly similar device profiles. For instance, in
this experiment, we used two blood-pressure monitors from iHealth; one takes
measurements from the wrist (WR) while the other takes measurements from
the upper arm (UA). From the observed network traffic between the iHealth app
and the iHealth blood-pressure monitors, these devices appeared to be nearly
identical. (See Figure A.2 and Figure A.3 in Appendix A for detailed depictions of
their respective device profiles.) A similar discussion applies for the Omron WR
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and UA devices. This result suggests that VIA will have difficulty distinguishing
between devices of the same type, made by the same manufacturer. This outcome
is not unexpected, however. It makes sense that device makers would use similar
hardware and software (perhaps even the same hardware and software) to build
their various devices. Thus, our takeaway is that VIA is able to verify that traces
belonging to similar devices from the same manufacturer are consistent with a
previously learned model. Indeed, if we were to collapse the confusion matrix
in Figure 4.17 down to separation by manufacturer, we would see perfect separation.
We conclude that even though the devices themselves are similar in terms
of the function they provide to the end-user (blood-pressure measurements), this
experiment demonstrates that VIA can reliably distinguish between functionally-
similar devices that are made by different manufacturers. This strongly suggests
that it would be difficult for adversaries to successfully masquerade themselves as
authentic devices at the same time that they carry out any other nefarious actions
(since even highly similar devices are rarely misclassified).
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Blood-Pressure Monitor Instance Precision Recall F1-score
BP Monitor - Choice (Upper Arm) 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - Omron (Upper Arm) 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - Omron (Wrist) 1.00 1.00 1.00
BP Monitor - iHealth (Upper Arm) 1.00 0.92 0.96
BP Monitor - iHealth (Wrist) 0.94 1.00 0.97
Table 4.10: The corresponding precision, recall, and F1-score for the confusion matrix shown
in Figure 4.17.
Figure 4.17: Confusion matrix for classification of blood-pressure monitors. Our smart-device
testbed contains five different blood-pressure monitors from three different manufacturers, with
a variety of measurement locations (i.e., wrist vs. upper arm monitors).
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Environment Sensors
For this experiment, we used two Inkbird environment sensors to investigate VIA’s
ability to distinguish among distinct instances of the same device (i.e., devices that
are identical in their hardware, firmware, and software). We trained and evaluated
models based on these two classes, similar to the identification tasks above. The
cross-validation results are summarized in Table 4.11 and visualized in Figure 4.18.
It is clear from the confusion matrix in Figure 4.18 that VIA struggled to
distinguish between these highly similar devices. Once again, this result is not
surprising. These devices are identical in terms of their software and hardware;
it therefore makes sense that these devices would exhibit similar communication
patterns and packet contents. While this does point to a limitation of VIA’s ability to
distinguish between distinct devices, we argue that this result does not undermine
the value of VIA. Because our objective is to verify the authenticity of interactions
between apps and devices, the results presented in Table 4.5 and Table 4.8 are much
more representative of the value of VIA in practice; i.e., confusion between profiles
for an app and two devices that appear to function and communicate in nearly
identical ways does not pose an immediately obvious threat to a WPAN.
Heart-Rate Monitors
The Polar heart-rate monitors in our testbed presented another opportunity to
investigate VIA’s ability to distinguish among distinct instances of the same device.
Further experiments with these devices, however, produced no new insights from
what was discussed above. For this reason, we omit the table that summarizes the
precision, recall, and F1-score, as well as the corresponding confusion matrix.
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Environment Sensor Instance Precision Recall F1-score
Environment Sensor - Inkbird (1) 0.43 0.43 0.43
Environment Sensor - Inkbird (2) 0.56 0.56 0.56
Table 4.11: The corresponding precision, recall, and F1-score for the confusion matrix shown
in Figure 4.18.
Figure 4.18: Confusion matrix for classification of environment sensors. Our smart-device




In summary, we believe these results demonstrate that our approach to modeling
authentic app-device interactions can provide a reliable means for verifying the
authenticity of future interactions between devices once an initial (authentic) model
is learned/obtained. There are a myriad of ways that we can further explore the
dataset we presented in this section. Similarly, there is still much that we can
do to evaluate VIA and its viability as a mechanism to ensure more trustworthy
interactions between devices in WPANs over time. This work is a starting point
for future research, and would benefit from continued exploration to provide more
insight into the extent to which VIA can improve the trustworthiness of interactions
within WPANs.
4.6 Discussion
In this section we add interesting insights from this work, discuss some of the
challenges and opportunities surrounding real-world deployments of VIA, as well
as limitations of our present work.
4.6.1 Observations of Channel Security “In The Wild”
By collecting traces from more than 20 Bluetooth devices we were able to make
interesting observations about the type of security used in devices that were manu-
factured relatively recently (all devices in our testbed were manufactured in 2016 or
later).
Using Encryption in Higher-Level Protocols for Data Security
Wang et al. observed that uniform byte-frequency distributions are observed in
n-grams computed from packet payloads where the underlying channel is en-
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crypted [188]. Through manual observation of the many HCI traces we collected,
we were able to identify interesting patterns consistent with the use of encrypted
channels (or lack thereof). Namely, from our analysis we found that only two
devices (the smartlocks) in our entire testbed use encryption for communications
above the link layer. This result is especially surprising considering the fact that
the majority of the devices in our testbed communicate personal health data, which
can be stolen or tampered with within the Host while in transit between the apps
and devices. Indeed, this finding reinforces the importance of the work presented
in Chapter 2.
While our observations were the result of manual inspection of HCI traces, in
the future we can employ common entropy tests22 to analyze whether Bluetooth-
based WPAN devices make use of encryption at higher protocol layers. In the
same vein of our work (making WPANs more trustworthy), it may be useful (e.g.,
enforcing security policies) to know whether connected devices are using encryption
at higher protocol layers.
Using Encryption in Lower-Level Protocols for Data Security
Since we have access to all traffic across the HCI, we can observe (from software)
which devices and connections make use of over-the-air security features. This is
done by observing the HCI command opcodes that are used to negotiate and estab-
lish channel security at the lower layers of the Bluetooth protocol. As stated above,
this information may prove useful for evaluating or improving the trustworthiness
of WPANs.
22High entropy is indicative of less information in data; less information in data is generally
achieved through explicit obfuscation of the data, for example using encryption.
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4.6.2 Challenges & Opportunities for Real-World Deployment
This section discusses some of the challenges and opportunities surrounding a
real-world deployment of VIA. This section also helps to shed light on how we
believe our current work should be extended to meet our larger vision of using VIA
as an approach to improve the integrity and security of WPANs.
Bootstrapping: Obtaining Initial Verification Models
In practice, a deployment of VIA must address how initial verification models are
obtained. We envision two likely approaches (recall Figure 4.4): One approach is to
learn verification models on-the-fly. For example, when a new, previously-unseen
peripheral device connects with a hub running VIA, some number of initial interac-
tions can be used to learn the models for authentic interactions. After this initial
phase, the learned models can be used for performing verification of subsequent
interactions.
Another approach is to obtain verification models from a trusted source, such
as a device manufacturer or software/firmware vendor. These models could be
fetched based on device identifiers that are exchanged when two devices initiate a
connection establishment procedure. Similar to on-the-fly learning, after the appro-
priate model(s) have been retrieved, they can be used for performing verification
of subsequent interactions. We note that this approach is gaining traction today:
for example, Manufacturer Usage Descriptions (MUDs) [115] is a proposed IETF
standard for formally specifying the expected network behavior of an IoT device.
MUD exploits a similar observation that we do: IoT devices (generally) perform a
limited set of functions, and therefore have a recognizable communication pattern
that can be represented by a model (referred to as a MUD profile in the context of
MUD).
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Both approaches have trade-offs. Models that are learned on-the-fly may only
capture a small subset of all the possible normal interactions, which may lead to
false positives later on; this approach, however, ensures that VIA can always create
and have access to verification models when needed. Models that are fetched from
a trusted source may be better models for subsequent verification since domain
experts are able to build the models; this approach, however, requires participation
from the original device and software vendors (i.e., they must be willing to exercise
all of the normal interactions to create models, and provide an infrastructure to
share the models), as well as high-availability access to the trusted source(s) (since
new devices could be encountered at any time). A robust deployment of VIA will
likely support both approaches, relying on more robust models fetched from trusted
sources when they are available, and learning models on-the-fly as needed.
Model Updates
Software and firmware on the various devices within WPANs will be updated at
some point, which may change the underlying characteristics for what authentic
interactions look like. Given this reality, it will be necessary to have a mechanism to
update verification models over time. In Bluetooth-based WPANs, we envision a
strategy for model adaptation based on the “Services Changed” feature defined in
the Bluetooth specification [35] (Vol. 3, Part F, Section 3.2.6). The Services Changed
feature exists so that one device (a BLE attribute server) can indicate to its connected
devices (BLE attribute clients) that services have changed (i.e., added, removed,
or modified).23 Furthermore, the Services Changed procedure requires that clients
acknowledge that they received the server’s indication. In the context of our work,
23The real reason this feature exists seems to be for performance. Attribute handles are expected
to be stable for each device across subsequent connections, which allows clients to cache information,
using less packets (and less energy) to retrieve attribute values after a first discovery. The Services
Changed feature is a way for the server to inform a client that server attributes have changed (e.g.,
after a firmware upgrade), so that a client can repeat the service discovery procedure.
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this explicit service-update feature can be used to trigger VIA to fetch an updated
model from a trusted source, or re-train models on the fly (e.g., using the next five
interactions to learn updated verification models).
Response Strategies
Our work thus far focuses on techniques to verify authentic interactions, but an open
challenge is how to best respond when verification fails. Current strategies that we
are considering are to: “flag” the device and increase the verification requirements
to make them more strict going forward; discard data that is not from a verified
source; alert the user (e.g., mobile notification, SMS, email, auto-generated report to
technical auditor); disconnect the app/device connection; and temporarily disable
the network interface altogether.
One concern with the practical deployment of VIA is that false positives (i.e.,
failed verification that is not due to malicious activity) could deny a user access to
a device or app that is needed at a critical time. To mitigate such usability issues,
VIA’s responsive actions could initially be more lenient and become more aggressive
if there is continued deviation from a verification model over time. For instance, a
device may first be flagged and inspected in more detail; if verification continues to
fail, the system may then generate an alert, then disconnect an app/device, then
temporarily disable the relevant network interface to prevent further exploitation
possibility, and so forth.
Diagnosing Issues
Today, detection schemes, such as those deployed in IDSs, are generally only used
in settings where dedicated technical staff can examine network logs and diagnose
issues in their networks. The staff can, for example, identify the affected devices
and patch them or remove them from the network. This approach does not translate
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to WPANs where non-technical people are responsible for managing their own
devices and networks and diagnosing issues.
One possible solution is to depend on device manufacturers, app developers,
or other trusted third-party diagnostics services to provide assistance. This ap-
proach could be similar to sharing crash reports with software vendors – a common
practice today – allowing an end-user to actively confirm that they want to share in-
formation produced by VIA’s analysis when some issue is detected. This approach
has the added benefit that it incorporates the expertise and domain knowledge of
those most familiar with authentic behavior of devices and applications to aid in
diagnosis and improving VIA’s models.
Complimentary Approaches
There are other ways to provide guarantees over the integrity and trustworthiness
of connections between devices. One approach is to use an encryption protocol
between two parties to protect the confidentiality and integrity of a channel between
them. This approach, however, will fail if the secret key is ever divulged (e.g.,
if one device is compromised and a key is stolen). Furthermore, this approach
requires that all devices support the same encryption protocol, which may require
implementation changes to many peripheral devices.
Another approach is to use PHY-layer sensing and techniques for device
fingerprinting. This approach is similar to our approach in that its primary aim
is to learn specific characteristics (e.g., clock skews) of nearby devices [16, 193]. A
previously-learned fingerprint can be used to verify that devices encountered in the
future are or are not devices with a known fingerprint. One issue with this approach
is that it requires access to PHY-layer sensing, which is not ubiquitously available.
Indeed, to support PHY-layer sensing, many devices would need new hardware
or firmware that provides access to PHY-layer information. Another issue with
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PHY-layer sensing is that it cannot necessarily detect if the same device (and radio)
is being used by malware instead of authentic software; in this case, the device
hardware and its PHY-layer features have not changed, but the previously-created
trust relationships between devices can still be abused.
Our approach develops models for communication between devices and apps
based on information obtained at the network layer and above, and uses them
to verify that future communications are consistent with the previously-learned
models. A significant benefit of our approach is that it does not require invasive
changes to devices: it could be implemented tomorrow in a trusted OS, or next
week in an Intel controller, and most people would not even be aware that it is
happening.
All of the approaches discussed in this section have strengths and weaknesses.
In an ideal deployment, one or more of these approaches would be deployed
together to provide multi-layer protection.
4.6.3 Limitations
The central limitation of this work is that it would benefit from (1) further data
collection with the aim of capturing rare (but authentic) interactions, such as catas-
trophic events, (2) further evaluation with an adversarial presence in the WPAN,
and (3) further exploration of the limitations of VIA models.
Rare Interactions & Events
The new smart-device dataset we present in this work captures short (approximately
3-10 minutes), typical interactions in each network trace. Because our initial data
collection effort was concentrated on observing typical app-device interactions, it is
possible that our current dataset misses other types of interactions. For example,
network traffic that only occurs when a patient has a catastrophic health event, such
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as a heart attack. In the future, we will explore ways to introduce examples of rare
interactions and events into network traces.
Mimicry Attacks
One especially prevalent issue that must be addressed in intrusion detection sys-
tems is mimicry attacks. We chose to adopt models based on n-grams in our work to
aid in the characterization of network communications between apps and devices.
We made this choice largely because of past work that showed that n-grams effec-
tively model traffic patterns in a manner that is resilient to mimicry attacks [188].
Evaluating mimicry attacks requires more examples of Bluetooth-based attacks,
but identifying relevant examples is difficult. Recent, known vulnerabilities (e.g.,
BlueBorne [21]), do not try to mimic authentic behavior – they aim to exploit specific
vulnerabilities in implementation of Bluetooth software. For instance, the Android
information leak vulnerability (CVE-2017-0785) aims to exploit a buffer underflow
that leaks the internal memory of an Android device. The exploit is triggered by
repeatedly sending redundant requests, which ultimately results in sequential reads
of internal memory. In such an attack, the resulting n-grams should yield a high
frequency of a limited set of byte values for ingress traffic, and a large amount of
widely variable egress traffic. In theory, this sort of behavior would immediately
deviate from any authentic verification model we have seen in this work. Never-
theless, future work should explore opportunities to exercise known exploits and
evaluate how well our models can recognize these kinds of network interactions.
Intra-Class Similarity
In our evaluation we found evidence that our verification models are effective at
differentiating between devices within the same class (e.g., blood-pressure moni-
tors). This is not, however, true in all cases. For example, in our examination of
180
two environment sensors made by the same manufacturer our models were not as
successful. As we explain above, we suspect this outcome results from the similarity
of the hardware and software in these nearly identical devices. (To see just how
similar their profiles appear, see the n-grams in Appendix A.) This result points to
a potential limitation of VIA: highly similar devices (e.g., same make and model)
may not be distinguishable from one another. Although not a serious limitation, it
does warrant further investigation into more cases of similar devices to determine
the degree to which VIA can distinguish among makes and models.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter we describe an approach to verify interactions between apps and
devices over time. We apply techniques commonly used in anomaly-detection and
intrusion-detection systems to characterize normal, authentic interactions between
apps and devices within WPANs. We observed that authentic app-device interac-
tions in the form of Bluetooth communications are extremely consistent from one
interaction to the next. We exploit this observation to learn models early on (e.g.,
when two devices first connect and “pair”), that can be used to verify that future
communications remain consistent over time. If new interactions are found to be
inconsistent with previously-learned models, subsequent action can be taken to
preserve the integrity and trustworthiness of the WPAN. In summary, we make the
following contributions:
• We contribute a new data set that captures more than 300 Bluetooth HCI traces
for interactions between 13 different smartphone apps and 20 smart-health
and smart-home devices.
• We contribute extensions to open-source Bluetooth analysis software that
improve access to tools for practical exploration of the Bluetooth protocol and
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Bluetooth-based apps.
• We show how past work in anomaly-detection and intrusion-detection sys-
tems can be adapted to work in Bluetooth-based WPANs and learn models
that recognize authentic app-device interactions.
• We provide empirical results to show that our approach is successful in differ-




Summary and Future Directions
In this dissertation we explore issues associated with the trustworthiness of WPANs,
and develop solutions to address these issues.
In Chapter 2, we present our work on BASTION-SGX [156, 184]. We intro-
duce an architecture and methodology for achieving secure and trustworthy I/O
on platforms with SGX-enabled processors. In doing so, we identify and solve
several challenges in realizing Trusted I/O for Bluetooth on SGX-enabled platforms;
we define and present a new Trusted I/O architecture; we present an analytical
evaluation of the performance impact of Trusted I/O; and we present a prototype
and a case study that demonstrates how our solution effectively protects sensitive
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Bluetooth I/O data from privileged malware. This work demonstrates that it is
possible to establish more trustworthy channels for app-device communications
in WPANs.
In Chapter 3, we present our work on Amulet [91, 139]. We present a secure,
low-power platform and suite of tools for developing and deploying mobile-health
applications. My specific contributions to this project include substantial contribu-
tions to the design and implementation of Amulet’s software stack and runtime
system, the design and implementation of Amulet’s firmware-production toolchain
that guarantees application isolation, the design and implementation of resource
models that are deployed in graphical developer tools that aid developers in devel-
oping secure and efficient applications, and an experimental evaluation of Amulet.
This work demonstrates how to design more trustworthy peripheral devices for
WPANs. The entire Amulet platform has been publicly released and is freely
available.
In Chapter 4, we present our work on VIA. We introduce a novel approach for
ongoing verification of authentic interactions between apps and devices in WPANs.
We assembled a testbed made up of two distinct device categories (smart-health
and smart-home devices) consisting of 9 different device types, and 20 devices in
total. From this testbed, we produced a novel dataset of more than 300 Bluetooth
HCI network traces. We contribute extensions to open-source Bluetooth analysis
software for practical exploration of the Bluetooth protocol and Bluetooth-based
apps. We present a novel modeling technique (hierarchical segmentation), coupled
with n-gram models to reliably characterize and verify app-device interactions. We
present an experimental evaluation of our work using the 20 off-the-shelf devices
from our testbed. This work demonstrates that it is possible to verify trustworthy
behavior within WPANs.
The evaluation of our solutions shows promise for improving the trustworthi-
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ness of WPANs. There are, however, remaining questions and other areas of future
investigation. We discuss some of these areas next.
App-Device Binding
In future work I will explore a binding mechanism that binds applications (on a
mobile device) with devices (or, if relevant, applications on devices) in a mean-
ingful way. Pierson et al. show how devices in close proximity can easily share a
secret [158]. Often, this exchange is needed to share a secret, such as a cryptographic
key, that is used to encrypt information between devices (e.g., over a wireless radio
channel). Any entity with the key – in this case, each device – has the ability to
decrypt the information. Is this really what a user intends when two devices are
connected to share information? For example, suppose a user wishes to securely
connect a medical device with their smartphone or a smart display in a doctor’s
office to visualize their medical data. Should the phone or display as a whole have
access to any information from the medical device? The answer is surely “no.”
Generally, when a user connects two (or more) devices in this way, they (implicitly)
intend for a specific application or system service to have access to the data from the
device. The problem here is that there exists no mechanism for a user (or automated
system) to connect a specific application with a specific external device.
When devices “pair,” they form a “bond” at the device level (i.e., smartphone
to medical device). This problem has previously been studied within the context of
Android devices [144] and is referred to as the threat of external device mis-bonding. In
their work, the authors propose Dabinder: a solution to automatically generate se-
curity policies (“app-device relations”) that bind an external device to its authorized
app, and enforces the policies without otherwise impeding on the normal operation.
Their approach, however, automatically generates policies by monitoring which
application first tries to create a connection with a newly paired device; the applica-
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tion that first tries this connection becomes the “authorized app” (which they hope
is also the “official app”). While automatic policy generation in this way makes
sense on some level (i.e., no human input is needed), it is vulnerable to malware
that also looks for newly paired devices and attempts to create a connection with a
device first, enabling the malware to become the “official app” that is allowed to
communicate with the external device.
An appropriate app-device binding should extend the exchange of secret
information to be between the intended (“official”) application and external device,
while also enabling a human to confirm or “bless” a security policy. The models we
presented in Chapter 4 may be applicable here. For example, a binding between an
app and device could be allowed so long as the interactions are consistent with a
pre-defined VIA model.
Our recent work shows how binding/relationships between apps-devices
can be continuously (re-)verified, which presents an interesting alternative to the
DaBinder solution, which is static. If, however, an app or device is compromised at
a later time, it can abuse its access to the device/app to carry out nefarious activity.
Exploring Additional Anomaly Detection Techniques
In past work, many approaches to anomaly detection have been pursued, including
information theoretic approaches, neural networks, support vector machines, ge-
netic algorithms, and many more [178]. We plan to explore other algorithms and
features that may lead to improvements in our models.
Anomalies in WPANs
In the past there have been concerns around the effectiveness of machine learning
in network intrusion detection [178]. Much of this past work – which focuses on the
detection of intrusions in IP-based network traffic – faces extreme challenges due to
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characteristics of the networks in which they were deployed. For example, machine
learning models have to overcome enormous variability in benign network traffic.
Also, because of the size, scale, and nature of these networks, it is challenging
to know how a network operator should interpret something that is flagged as
anomalous; is an anomaly indicative of a cybersecurity threat? Or in the context of
smart-health devices and health monitoring, is an anomaly indicative of a critical health
event? Or is an anomaly an indication that the anomaly-detection model simply failed to
model this type of network activity? The criticisms thus far seem to ultimately be rooted
in the fact that anomaly detection is not coupled with tools to help with interpretation.
In other words, anomaly detection needs to be supported by a description of the
anomaly. While this is not an easy task, past work has proposed tools that can
help, such as the Multivariate Exploratory Data Analysis (MEDA) Toolbox [49];
these tools could, for example, be used to help network operators understand what
event(s) and what feature(s) led to their anomaly-detection system identifying
something as anomalous. In future work, we will explore the use of the MEDA
Toolbox and other related tools to better understand the anomalies that our work
detects, and to better understand the limitations of our approach.
Extending & Applying VIA
Our larger vision for VIA is that it would be deployed within WPANs to perform
active verification of network interactions over time. Our work thus far does not
make instantaneous decisions about the trustworthiness of a connection. Rather,
it assembles a sequence of interactions (packets) and measures the consistency of
those interactions with a previously-learned model. But how can this be further
quantified?
One idea is to determine the trustworthiness of active connections, based on
computed scores from observations in network traffic and compare this against pre-
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computed normative models. Different types of scores can be used to evaluate new
network traffic across different dimensions. For instance, for each observation one
could compute an instantaneous confidence score. Each instantaneous score can then
applied to a global and temporal confidence score that records changes in the system’s
overall confidence (global) over time (temporal). Ultimately, this confidence is
used to make decision about whether a previously established connection remains
trustworthy.
Coarse-grained Modeling & Analysis
One present limitation of VIA is that it primarily makes use of fine-grained features
obtained from network traffic. Past work (e.g., [112, 48]) has shown that anomaly-
detection models computed from normal network statistics based on network flows
can be quite effective in detecting anomalies (e.g., an abnormally high volume of
packets – volume anomalies – from a device observed in a short period of time),
which may indicate anomalous activity that warrants further investigation (e.g., a
network attack). The successes of past work lead us to believe that incorporating
more coarse-grained network features may improve our current approach.
To model normal network traffic based on network flows, many approaches
have been considered. Some are based on Principle Component Analysis (PCA),
including PCA-based Multivariate Statistical Process Control (PCA-MSPC) [112]
and, more recently, PCA-based Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring (PCA-
MSNM) [48]. One of the major benefits of PCA is its unsupervised nature (i.e., it
requires no a priori specification of potential anomalies).
At a high level, PCA-based anomaly detectors (specifically those based on
Multivariate Statistical Process Control Theory) work by dividing network data
(calibration data) into two sets (subspaces): a structured subspace (model) and
a noisy subspace (residual). Anomaly detection is performed in both subspaces
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using different statistical tests to detect anomalies.1 The statistics (Q-statistic and
D-statistic) are computed using the calibration data to set thresholds (control limits)
that can be used to detect anomalies in their respective subspaces. As incoming
data is processed by the detector, it is projected into one of the aforementioned
subspaces, and the control limits are used to identify anomalies, such as limits being
significantly or consistently exceeded [48].
Generally speaking, PCA is applied to a two-dimensional dataset consisting of
a number of observations (rows) of a number of features (columns). Like others [112,
47, 46], we can adopt the use of simple counters as quantitative features (“feature-
as-a-counter”). Basically, each observed feature value is defined as the number of
times a given event (e.g., the number of incoming/outgoing packets and bytes;
the number of requests to a port or group of ports) takes place during a time
window w. While this definition is rather general, it has been shown to be capable
of representing most of the types of information of interest in monitoring network
traffic for security [47]. See Figure 5.1 for an example of features used in recent
work demonstrating the effectiveness of a PCA-MSNM system [46].
Modeling and analyzing network traffic in a coarse-grained way stands to
provide additional, useful information to how our current models are learned.
Furthermore, we note that it is not possible to analyze the packet contents inside
individual datagrams when network traffic uses secure connections (e.g., HTTPS);
in these cases, fine-grained features extracted from deep packet inspection is im-
possible, but flow-level analysis can still provide meaningful insights into network
traffic.
We have already begun to investigate different types of features that can be
1A criticism of some past work is that they divide data into two subspaces: one representing
normal behavior and one representing anomalous behavior. Anomaly detection is performed only in
the latter. This is not consistent with Multivariate Statistical Process Control Theory – which recent
work [48] points out – and is the cause of some problems of past work.
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a given event–e.g. the apparition of a word in a log or of
a traffic flow involving a given port in a Netflow file–takes
place during a given time window. This general definition
makes it possible to handle, in a suitable way, most sources
of information in anomaly detection, like aggregated traffic
volume by location or ports, or logging information of spe-
cific events arranged according to severity levels. Moreover,
the feature-as-a-counter definition simplifies the fusion of
different data sources in a single set of features. See [7] for
more details.
4. Experimental Framework
The experimentation is carried out on a real network of
a Tier 3 ISP. The services provided by the ISP are mainly
virtualization and hosting. To a shorter extent, the ISP also
provides common Internet access services.
Netflow sensors were deployed in the border routers of
the network to collect legitimate background traffic cor-
responding to the normal operation of the network. In
addition, a total of 25 virtual machines were deployed in
order to perform controlled malicious activities. Some of
these virtual machines were used to launch a number of
specific attacks over time against the rest, which acted as
the victims of the attacks. The obvious ethical reason for
using virtual machines as victims of the controlled attacks
is to avoid negative effects on the normal operation of the
legitimate services. Both the attackers and the victims are
inside the ISP infrastructure to avoid the potential detection
and blocking of the attacks by other intermediate ISPs. The
ISP personnel was aware and collaborated in the experiment.
The following are the details of the legitimate traffic
data, referred as LD:
• Monitoring time: 3 months, from 10:50-03/18/2016
to 18:27-06/26/2016.
• Data volume: 13,615 nfcapd files of Netflow traffic
of 10 minutes each (730GB of bynary data).
• Statistics: more than 600M external IPs correspond-
ing to around 10M different (sub)networks and a
total of more than 5,000M differentiated flows.
We performed a second capture of traffic in which the
attacks were launched with real background traffic. The
resulting dataset is named CD, where letter C stands for
‘combined’. The complete attack experiment is carried out in
intervals of 2 hours that alternate with legitimate traffic dur-
ing 12 consecutive days. The total number of attack episodes
in the data set is 264. The types of attacks implemented are:
• Low-rate DoS: TCP SYN attack during 3 minutes
by using the tool hping3.
• Port scanning: Scanning to the victim’s IP during 3
minutes by using nmap.
• Botnet-related activity: We simulate botnet traffic
through data exfiltration from some infected ma-
chines to the attacker where the botmaster is as-
sumed to be located. Each of the bots performs these
exfiltrations variants: i) Exf1KB: 1KB length file is
TABLE 1. VARIABLE VALUES CONSIDERED AS FEATURES IN OUR
DETECTION SYSTEM.
Variable #features → values
Source IP 2 → public, private
Destination IP 2 → public, private
Source port 50 → specific services, Other
Destination port 50 → specific services, Other
Protocol 5 → TCP, UDP, ICMP, IGMP, Other
Flags 6 → A, S, F, R, P, U
ToS 3 → 0, 192, Other
# Packets in 5 → very low, low, medium, high, very high
# Packets out 5 → very low, low, medium, high, very high
# Bytes in 5 → very low, low, medium, high, very high
# Bytes out 5 → very low, low, medium, high, very high
sent to the botmaster. ii) Exf1MB: 1MB file is sent
to the botmaster. iii) Exf1MBp: 1MB of information
split in 1KB files is sent to the botmaster.
4.1. Anomaly Detection Techniques
We assessed the performance of the MSNM anomaly
detector and compared this performance with that of a one-
class support vector machine (OCSVM) [19], [20]. The
OCSVM is a classification-based network anomaly detec-
tion method [21] reported to provide excellent results [22].
Following [23], we used default values to set the metapa-
rameters, since other approaches like cross-validation are ill-
defined to set a one-class classifier. We considered both the
linear and non-linear versions of OCSVM, the latter based
on radial basis functions (RBF), the most extended kernel
choice. However, the non-linear version failed to converge,
reason why results are only presented for the linear variant.
4.2. Experiments configuration and selection of fea-
tures
Data from LD and CD datasets are parsed into M -
dimensional vectors (observations) representing time inter-
vals of 1 minute. In particular, we defined a set of M=138
network-related features, corresponding to 11 different Net-
flow variables as shown in Table 1. Traffic corresponding to
LD is used to train our detection system, that is, to estimate
the normality model. A test procedure is subsequently car-
ried out by using CD, so that false positive rate (FPR) and
true positive rate (TPR) can be estimated.
The anomaly detection methods are compared with the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, that show
the evolution of the TPR versus the FPR for different values
of the classifier threshold. A practical way to compare sev-
eral ROC curves is with the Area Under the Curve (AUC),
i.e. an scalar that quantifies the quality of the anomaly
detector. An anomaly detector should present an AUC as
close to 1 as possible, while an AUC around 0.5 corresponds
to a random classifier.
The ROC curves for MSNM were obtained by varying
a threshold in a specific combination of the Q-st and the
D-st:
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Figure 5.1: Variable values considered as features in a recent PCA-based anomaly detec-
tor [46].
used to detect anomalies in network traffic. Some of the previous features that we
thought would be useful were not as useful as we originally believed they would
be. For example, inquiry and connection establishm nt is considerably different for
Bluetooth classic devices when compared to BLE devices. It turns out that some
of the features (e.g., COD, PSM) are exchanged infrequently or not at all in BLE
network commun cations. In future work we will continue o explore opportunities
to include coarse-grained features into our current approach to model learning.
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A
N-Grams From Smart-Device Testbed
This appendix contains examples of n-grams (in our current work, 1-grams) that
are calculated from devices in our smart-device testbed. In each plot, we overlay
the n-grams computed from subsequent traces. Plotting n-grams in this way shows
how subsequent (authentic) interactions are very similar.
The n-grams shown below are computed over the payload portion of L2CAP
packets. We found that n-grams computed over L2CAP payloads provide a high-
quality source of information for learning our verification models and performing
subsequent verification. We also note that the L2CAP protocol is the layer at
which apps and devices exchange data in Bluetooth; because our work is interested
in modeling app-device interactions, this protocol layer is a logical choice for
modeling.
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Figure A.1: Choice Blood Pressure Monitor - Upper Arm
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Figure A.2: iHealth Blood Pressure Monitor - Upper Arm
Figure A.3: iHealth Blood Pressure Monitor - Wrist
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Figure A.4: Omron Blood Pressure Monitor - Upper Arm
Figure A.5: Omron Blood Pressure Monitor - Wrist
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Figure A.6: Inkbird Environment Sensor (1)
Figure A.7: Inkbird Environment Sensor (2)
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Figure A.8: Choice Glucose Monitor
Figure A.9: iHealth Glucose Monitor
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Figure A.10: Polar H7 Heart Rate Monitor (1)
Figure A.11: Polar H7 Heart Rate Monitor (2)
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Figure A.12: Zephyr Heart Rate Monitor
Figure A.13: iHealth Pulse Oximeter
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Figure A.14: Gurus Scale
Figure A.15: RENPHO Scale
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Figure A.16: August Smart Lock
Figure A.17: Schlage Smart Lock
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Figure A.18: Omron TENS Unit
Figure A.19: Kinsa Thermometer - Ear
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Figure A.20: Kinsa Thermometer - Oral
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When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean.
—Humpty Dumpty, in Alice in Wonderland’s Through the Looking Glass
Glossary
advertiser: A BLE device sending advertising packets.
ATT/GATT client: A Bluetooth device that sends requests to a server and receives
responses (and server-initiated updates) from it.
ATT/GATT server: A Bluetooth device that receives requests from a client and
sends responses back. It also sends server-initiated updates when configured
to do so, and it is the role responsible for storing and making the user data
available to the client, organized in attributes. Every BLE device sold must
include at least a basic GATT server that can respond to client requests, even
if only to return an error response.
authentic: “To be of undisputed origin; genuine; made or done in the original way,
or in a way that faithfully resembles an original; based on facts; accurate or
reliable” [118].
bandwidth: The amount of data that can be transferred from one point to another
per unit time; typically measured in bits per second.
BLE central: A BLE device that “repeatedly scans the preset frequencies for con-
nectable advertising packets and, when suitable, initiates a connection” [62].
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BLE peripheral: A BLE device that “sends connectable advertising packets period-
ically and accepts incoming connections” [62].
Bluetooth: Bluetooth (Classic) is a wireless technology for exchanging data be-
tween devices over short distances using short-wavelength UHF radio waves
in the ISM radio bands (2.400 to 2.485 GHz). Bluetooth Classic and BLE are
ideal technologies for building wireless personal area networks (WPANs).
Bluetooth controller: In Bluetooth, A logical entity made up of all of the layers
below the HCI.
Bluetooth Device Address: A unique 48-bit hardware device address used to iden-
tify a Bluetooth device, similar to an Ethernet MAC address for a computer.
Bluetooth host: “A logical entity made up of all the layers between Bluetooth’s
core profiles (i.e., Bluetooth applications and services) and the HCI” [35].
Bluetooth Low Energy: Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a wireless personal area
network (WPAN) technology intended to provide simpler Bluetooth connec-
tivity with considerably reduced power consumption and cost.
Bluetooth master: A Bluetooth device that initiates a connection and manages it
later.
broacaster: A BLE device that “sends nonconnectable advertising packets periodi-
cally to anyone willing to receive them” [62].
Class of Device: In Bluetooth, A 3-byte value that consists of major and minor
class numbers that are intended to define a general family of devices; the
Bluetooth specification [35] intends for this attribute to be used to indicate the
capabilities of a device.
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connection interval: In Bluetooth, the period in which each side communicates
with the other at least once.
egress: Refers to a packet that flows along the exit path from a hub to a connected
peripheral device; also referred to as h2d (host-to-device).
enclave: CPU-enforced containers that protect selected code and data from disclo-
sure or modification.
FRAM: Ferroelectric RAM (FRAM) is non-volatile memory technology that offers
persistent storage without power, and is 100 times faster than flash memory.
ingress: Refers to a packet that flows along the entry path into a hub from a
connected peripheral device; also referred to as d2h (device-to-host).
interaction: Any exchange of packets between a hub and peripheral device.
make: Refers to the manufacturer of the device.
Manufacturer Usage Description: An IETF specification and framework for for-
mally specifying the expected network behavior of an IoT device.
model: Refers to an identifier, such as a name or number, that is used to distinguish
between devices made by the same manufacturer.
network latency: The amount of time it takes for a packet to cross the network
from a device that created the packet to the destination device.
observer: A BLE device that “repeatedly scans preset frequencies to receive any
nonconnectable advertising packets currently being broadcasted” [62].
piconet: In Bluetooth, a collection of devices sharing a single radio channel (syn-
chronized to a master device).
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scanner: A BLE device scanning for advertising packets.
security policy: A specification of Bluetooth I/O metadata that is used to protect
I/O channels between a trusted app and the Bluetooth Controller.
slave: A Bluetooth device that accepts a connection request and follows the mas-
ter’s timing.
SRAM: Static RAM (SRAM) is volatile memory technology that offers storage
while powered.
trace: A packet capture consisting of all packets that are observed between the time
that a hub and peripheral device establish and terminate a connection.
trusted app: An app that protects select code and data using security features of
the platform.
trusted path: A secure path between a user app and a user I/O device, typically
realized by a combination of trusted components working together to protect
the I/O channel(s).
type: Refers to a device’s functionality and purpose.
verification: “The process of establishing the truth, accuracy, or validity of some-
thing; the act of making sure or demonstrating that (something) is true, accu-
rate, or justified” [173].
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Acronyms
AEAD: authenticated encryption with associated data.
AFT: Amulet Firmware Toolchain.
AOS: Amulet-OS.
ARP: Amulet Resource Profiler.
ARP-View: Amulet Resource Profiler View.
ATT: Attribute Protocol.
BASTION-SGX: Bluetooth and Architectural Support for Trusted I/O on SGX.
BDADDR: Bluetooth Device Address.
BER: Bit Error Rate.
BLE: Bluetooth Low Energy.
BT: Bluetooth.
CI: connection interval.
COD: Class of Device.
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CRC: Cyclic Redundancy Check.
DLE: Data Length Extension.
fn: False Negative.
fp: False Positive.
GATT: Generic Attribute Protocol.
HCI: Host Controller Interface.
IDS: Intrusion Detection System.
IFS: Inter Frame Space.
IoT: Internet of Things.
L2CAP: Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol.
LL: Link Layer.
MIC: Message Integrity Check.
MTU: Maximum Transmission Units.
MUD: Manufacturer Usage Description.
OS: Operating System.
OTA: Over-The-Air.
PAN: Personal Area Network.




SGX: Software Guard Extensions.
TCB: Trusted Computing Base.





VIA: Verification of Interaction Authenticity.
VSDC: Vendor Specific Debug Command.
WPAN: Wireless Personal Area Network.
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